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Abstract 
Theories of well-being give an account of what it is for persons to fare well 
or to live prudentially valuable lives. I divide the theoretical landscape based on 
the position that theories accord to schedules of concerns. A schedule of 
concerns is the loose program that specifies the objects that engage the 
subject’s active interest, attention, and care. Objective theories hold that the 
objects of one’s concerns alone determine one’s well-being. Subjective theories 
hold that one’s concerns alone determine one’s well-being. I assess each set of 
theories for descriptive adequacy and find that each runs into difficulty.  
Subjective theories confront the problem of worth. They imply that one can 
fare well despite the fact that the objects of one’s concerns are not objectively 
valuable. Critics object that the latter claim does not cohere well with some pre-
analytic beliefs about well-being. Not all the objects in one’s schedule of 
concerns are on equal axiological footing. Meanwhile, objective theories confront 
the problem of authority. They imply that, provided the objects to which one 
relates are independently valuable, one can fare well despite the fact that one 
does not endorse the conditions of one’s life. This alienates welfare subjects from 
their well-being. Finally, each set of theories imply that objective goods and 
schedules of concerns on their own do not contribute to well-being. I argue that 
this claim is counter-intuitive. I call this the double bind problem. 
My research shows that we can address the problem of authority, the 
problem of worth, and the double bind problem by defending an accommodating 
view of well-being as endorsing worthy goods. This is a hybrid account of well-
iii 
 
being that tries to take seriously the intuition that well-being has both a subjective 
and an objective part. The endorsement condition captures the subjective part of 
well-being; the worth condition captures the objective part of well-being. My 
considered view is that, in central cases, one fares well at a time when one 
endorses worthy goods. 
Keywords 
Ethics, Well-Being, Authority, Worth, Subjectivism, Objectivism, Sumner, Parfit, 
Darwall, Dworkin. 
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Executive Summary 
The Standard View 
 
Theories of well-being give an account of what it is for persons to fare well 
or to live prudentially valuable lives. I divide the theoretical landscape based on 
the position that theories accord to schedules of concerns. A schedule of 
concerns is the loose program that specifies the objects that engage the 
subject’s active interest, attention, and care. Objective theories hold that the 
objects of one’s concerns alone determine one’s well-being. Subjective theories 
hold that one’s concerns alone determine one’s well-being. Several theories 
mean to tell us what it is for a person to fare well and we must decide which is 
best. 
 
Analytic Criteria  
 The best theories of well-being should meet four tests. They should meet 
the criteria for descriptive adequacy; they should address the problem of 
authority; they should address the problem of worth; and they should escape the 
double bind problem. 
 
Descriptive adequacy 
In chapter one, I argue with Sumner that theories of well-being should be 
descriptively adequate. Descriptive adequacy can be understood in terms of four 
criteria: fidelity, generality, formality, and neutrality. I explain the four criteria and 
argue that we should temper our acceptance of them. The extent to which a 
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theory of well-being brings together disparate subjects and judgments typically 
counts toward its acceptance. However, placing too much emphasis on some of 
the criteria leaves us prone to three mistakes. First, it inclines us to ignore 
relevant differences amongst core welfare subjects; second, it conceals the role 
that communities play in their development and their welfare judgments; and, 
third, it rules out weakly partial but otherwise intuitive accounts of well-being. 
Sumner is not committed to these mistakes. Still, we can avoid this outcome by 
ensuring that the character, decisions, and behavior that theories of well-being 
describe are possible for the kind of welfare subject under consideration. 
 
Authority and Worth 
In chapter two, I argue that two theses about the structure of theories of 
well-being are particularly important: the agent sovereignty thesis and the 
endorsement thesis. The agent sovereignty thesis holds that one's schedule of 
concerns alone determines one’s well-being. The endorsement thesis holds that 
the possession of some good contributes to one’s well-being only if one endorses 
it under suitable conditions. What a theory entails about the truth of these two 
claims generates two problems: the problem of authority and the problem of 
worth.  
In section 2.2, I argue that objective theories hold that the objects of one’s 
concerns alone determine one’s well-being. Objective theories reject both the 
agent sovereignty thesis and the endorsement thesis. On this view, endorsing 
the goods in one’s life is at best an additional good alongside other goods. Such 
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theories confront the problem of authority. They imply that, provided the objects 
to which one relates are independently valuable, one can fare well despite the 
fact that one does not endorse the conditions of one’s life. This alienates welfare 
subjects from their well-being. 
In section 2.3, I argue that subjective theories hold that one’s concerns 
alone determine one’s well-being. Subjective theories accept both the agent 
sovereignty thesis and the endorsement thesis. Such theories confront the 
problem of worth. They imply that one can fare well despite the fact that the 
objects of one’s concerns are not independently valuable. Critics object that the 
latter claim does not cohere well with some pre-analytic beliefs about well-being. 
Not all the objects in one’s schedule of concerns are on equal axiological footing.  
 
The Double Bind Problem 
In sections 2.2 and 2.3, I argue that existing solutions to the problem of 
authority and the problem of worth each imply that a part of well-being does not 
contribute to well-being on its own, and that this inference is counter-intuitive. 
Call this the double bind problem. I appeal to two imaginary cases to illustrate the 
problem: John the grass counter, and Richard the artist. I argue that we should 
formulate an account of well-being that recognizes that each part of well-being on 
its own contributes to well-being at least to some extent. 
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An Alternate Account 
In chapters three and four, I construct a hybrid account of well-being that 
meets the analytic criteria I outline in chapters one and two. We can address the 
problem of authority, the problem of worth, and the double bind problem by 
defending an accommodating view of well-being as endorsing worthy goods. The 
solution requires that we accept the endorsement thesis but reject the agent 
sovereignty thesis. This is a hybrid account of well-being that tries to take 
seriously the intuition that well-being has both a subjective and an objective part. 
The endorsement condition captures the subjective part of well-being; the worth 
condition captures the objective part of well-being. My considered view is that, in 
central cases, one fares well at a time when one endorses worthy goods. 
 
Endorsement 
In chapter three, I argue that addressing the problem of authority requires 
that we accept the endorsement thesis. In central cases, endorsement is 
necessary for well-being. This principle says that, in most cases, the possession 
of some good contributes to one’s well-being only if one endorses it under 
suitable conditions. I then argue that we should reject the agent sovereignty 
thesis. One’s schedule of concerns alone does not always determine one’s well-
being. The modal qualifier is necessary to escape the double bind problem. In 
some cases, endorsement alone contributes to one’s welfare, though that 
contribution is small. Call the welfare contribution that endorsement makes in the 
absence of worthy goods “low fare.” My considered view is that there are 
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discontinuities between low fare and the welfare contribution one gets from 
endorsing worthy goods. Call the latter “full fare.”  
In section 3.2, I formulate a pluralistic model of endorsement that captures 
the diversity of subjective evaluative states that welfare subjects experience. Call 
this view endorsement as favouring. I argue that our practices surrounding 
endorsement and the negative implications of denying its importance lend 
credibility to the claim that endorsement matters to well-being, and that such 
endorsement meets an experience requirement for theories of well-being.  
In section 3.3, I argue that subjective theories seem intuitive largely 
because of a more general agreement concerning the intrinsic importance of 
such endorsement. What best explains this agreement is that endorsement is 
constituted in part by a distinctive evaluative attitude that captures the intrinsic 
importance of endorsement experiences to one’s well-being. This is consistent 
with the agent-relativity of welfare claims. 
In section 3.4, I then consider three objections to my view. The first two 
objections are related. First, one might object to making value conditional on 
endorsement. On this view, the value of a state of affairs does not depend on the 
subject’s endorsement. Second, one might object that subjects sometimes fail to 
endorse a state of affairs for superficial reasons. On this view, a state of affairs 
may be valuable even if the subject fails to endorse it. I argue that we can 
address either by restricting the scope of the endorsement thesis to welfare 
value, or by insisting that the endorsement in question occur under suitable 
conditions. The third objection targets the stipulation that endorsement is only 
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necessary for well-being in central cases. I argue that the qualification is 
necessary to escape the double bind problem, and that we can address this 
concern of subjectivists by recognizing a discontinuity in welfare value. A 
discontinuity in value is a sharp break between the welfare contributions of 
different kinds of welfare goods such that no amount of one good can ever be 
more valuable than some finite amount of another good. In the central case, 
faring well involves both endorsement and goods. Call the great contribution that 
endorsement and worth make together “full fare.” It is also true that endorsement 
on its own counts toward well-being, though it counts for less than the unity. Call 
the small contribution that endorsement makes on its own “low fare.” The 
discontinuity in welfare value between low fare and full fare is necessary to deal 
with the double bind problem without abandoning the endorsement thesis. 
 
Worth  
In chapter four, I argue that we can explain the sense in which objects are 
independently valuable without rejecting the endorsement thesis, but it requires 
that we abandon the agent sovereignty thesis. I then argue that this result is 
consistent with the previous chapter’s conclusions.  
In section 4.2, I analyse the welfare judgments that we make from the first-
person and the third-person standpoint. I argue that some welfare judgments 
presuppose that some objects are more worthy of concern than other objects, 
and that we have good reason to accept this characterisation of welfare 
judgments. Endorsement figures prominently in welfare judgments, but so do 
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questions concerning the worth of the objects one endorses. We should reject 
the agent sovereignty thesis. 
In section 4.3, I argue that we can explain the sense in which certain 
objects are more worthy of concern than other objects without denying the 
endorsement thesis. The skillful pursuit of welfare is an expertise that one 
acquires and develops over time. The endorsements that subjects make under 
suitable conditions situate them as epistemic authorities in a community of 
knowers who share an interest in faring well. On this view, judgments of worth 
are intersubjective ideals that play a crucial role in developing expertise in the 
pursuit of welfare and enabling the practice of welfare value. Specifically, 
judgments of worth guide welfare subjects toward authentic standards of self-
assessment and reliable sources of well-being. Faring well over time consists in 
endorsing objects worthy in this sense. 
In section 4.4, I consider objections to this characterization of worth. First, 
I suggest that judgments of worth do not figure to the same extent in all welfare 
judgments. I then argue that judgments concerning the worth of an object are 
defeasible. I grant that the resulting account of worth is not the kind of 
independent value requirement that an objectivist about well-being would 
endorse. Worth remains tied to schedules of concerns in an intersubjective 
sense. However, I suggest that this feature is an asset rather than a liability. 
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Endorsing Worthy Goods 
In chapter five, I survey three of the most important extant hybrid theories 
of well-being. I argue that these are important accounts in their own right, but that 
they do not meet the formality criterion and only weakly satisfy the generality 
criterion. I then summarize my own view and assess how well it meets the criteria 
for descriptive adequacy I describe in the first two chapters. Well-being as 
endorsing worthy goods is not a view of the highest well-being, or an account of 
what counts as a successful life. It is a hybrid account of what faring well-consists 
in at a time and over a period. On my view, one fares well at a time if one 
endorses worthy goods. I conclude by considering puzzles and problems that I 
leave unresolved.  
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Chapter 1: Well-Being and Descriptive Adequacy 
 
1.1 Breaking Ground 
Despite a surge of interdisciplinary research, there is a regrettable lack of 
consensus concerning what well-being consists in.1 Theories of well-being give 
an account of what it is for persons to fare well or to live prudentially valuable 
lives. A prudentially valuable life is one that is good for the person who lives it. 
Theories of well-being serve three functions in practical reasoning: they are the 
foundation for rational decisions in which only the interests of the individual are 
concerned; they capture what we have reason to promote for others; and they 
are the basis for the consideration of a person’s interests in moral argument.2 A 
common view is that the first function has pride of place: well-being matters to 
benefactors and disputants because of its importance to welfare subjects.3 A 
successful account of well-being does not necessarily add to the protean list of 
what human beings find prudentially valuable or worthwhile. Rather, it clarifies 
the intension of the concept, and grants a clearer basis for the measurement and 
interpersonal comparisons of well-being. 
                                            
1 I use the terms “well-being,” “welfare,” and “prudential value” synonymously. Though some write 
as if “the good life” also denoted a life that is good for the person who lives that life, the phrase 
sometimes denotes a morally good life. To avoid ambiguity, I limit my usage to the first two terms. 
2 The term “person” denotes the welfare subject, but the set of persons in this context is not 
limited to humans or even to individuals. For instance, some accounts of well-being might entail 
that ecosystems are welfare subjects – that is, that some things are good and bad in themselves 
for ecosystems – but we need an additional premise to establish the moral standing of 
ecosystems. 
3 See Thomas Scanlon. “The Status of Well-Being.” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 
1996: 93-143. 
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Several theories mean to tell us what it is for a person to fare well and we 
must decide which is best. We do not have an entirely free hand in choosing 
among alternative theories, however. In this chapter, I describe the broadly 
coherentist approach to normative questions that characterises the rest of the 
work. I then situate L.W. Sumner’s test for descriptive adequacy for the selection 
of theories of well-being, and assess the criteria that compose it. I argue that we 
have reason to accept the fidelity criterion for descriptive adequacy, which 
ensures that theories of well-being cohere reasonably well with our beliefs of 
well-being. A well-defined test for descriptive adequacy acts as a kind of creative 
constraint on our deliberations. However, we should temper our acceptance of 
the other criteria. Placing too much emphasis on generality, formality, and 
neutrality leaves us prone to three mistakes. It inclines us to ignore relevant 
differences amongst core welfare subjects; it conceals the role that communities 
play in the development of welfare subjects and the practice of welfare 
judgments; and it rules out weakly partial but otherwise intuitive accounts of well-
being. I propose revisions to the test for descriptive adequacy to avoid these 
mistakes. 
 
1.2 Reflective Equilibrium 
The broadly coherentist approach I propose to follow is consistent with the 
method of reflective equilibrium, a theory of justification first formulated by Nelson 
Goodman and given prominence in ethics by John Rawls.4 According to this 
                                            
4 See Nelson Goodman. Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1955; John Rawls. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971. For a 
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account, a belief’s justification cannot hinge on its relation to more foundational 
beliefs. Instead, a belief is justified if it coheres well with other considered 
judgments. As Rawls puts it, a belief is justified if it would survive a process that 
brought it into “reflective equilibrium” with all of one’s normative and descriptive 
beliefs.5 Bringing a belief into reflective equilibrium involves resolving conflicts 
between considered moral judgments and considered moral principles, though 
Rawls says little about how to resolve conflicts between them. A considered 
moral judgment is one made with confidence in light of the relevant non-moral 
facts, when one is calm and even-tempered, and when one does not stand to 
gain or lose based on the answer given. Thus, there is a sense in which 
considered moral judgments are self-evident. Although they remain open to 
revision, they are likely to be more stable over time than their less considered 
cousins. 
The outcome of reflective equilibrium involves more than simple 
consistency. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls writes, “moral philosophy is Socratic: 
we may want to change our present considered judgments once their regulative 
principles are brought to light. And we may want to do this even though these 
principles are a perfect fit.”6 For instance, we might require that moral principles 
possess explanatory virtues that reach beyond their mere consistency with 
considered moral judgments, virtues such as simplicity or explanatory power. 
                                            
useful survey of reflective equilibrium in ethics, see Jeff McMahan, “Moral Intuition.” Blackwell 
Guide to Ethical Theory. Edited by H. LaFollette. Oxford: Blackwell, 92-110. 
5 See John Rawls, “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics,” Philosophical Review 60 (1951), 
177-97 and “The Independence of Moral Theory,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 47 (1974-5): 5-22. 
6 Rawls (1971): 49. 
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Since Norman Daniels’ accepted reformulation of reflective equilibrium, Rawls’s 
model has evolved from a theory of justification to a full-blown method for 
conducting inquiries in normative ethics. On Daniels’ view, the function of 
reflective equilibrium is to produce coherence in an ordered triple of a set of 
beliefs held by a particular person, namely, a set of considered moral judgments, 
a set of moral principles, and a set of relevant background theories.7 As far as we 
focus on particular cases and the principles that relate to them, we are seeking 
only narrow reflective equilibrium. Conversely, wide reflective equilibrium tests 
our beliefs against developed moral and non-moral theories of various kinds, 
some of which contain moral beliefs of their own. These might include theories 
about the nature of persons, the interface between self-interest and morality, and 
the social function of morality. 
The present investigation seeks to produce a narrow reflective equilibrium 
between a set of considered welfare judgments, and a set of relevant 
background theories about the nature of well-being. The equilibrium sought is 
narrow rather than wide because it does not consider how well the view coheres 
with various moral principles. It is typical for investigations into the nature of well-
being to hold matters concerning the right in abeyance until matters concerning 
the good are nearly settled. In his seminal work on the nature of well-being, 
Sumner draws a helpful distinction between the normative and descriptive 
adequacy of a theory. A theory is normatively adequate if it plays its designated 
                                            
7 The exact scope of the relevant background theories is a matter of debate. See Norman 
Daniels. “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics.” Journal of Philosophy 76 
(1979): 256–82; reprinted in Daniels, N., 1996, Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in 
Theory and Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 21–46. 
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role within a given framework; it is descriptively adequate if it fits with our 
ordinary beliefs and judgments about well-being.8 For Sumner, descriptive 
adequacy precedes normative adequacy. We cannot simply find an account that 
best serves our favorite theory of distributive justice, for instance, and assert that 
it best defines what well-being consists in. Our deliberations must first take into 
account our pre-analytic beliefs about well-being, and the coarse understanding 
of the concept and its cognates we presuppose in practical reasoning and 
common sense psychological explanations. We must then formulate a model that 
fits best with these convictions. Definitions of well-being that fail to prioritize 
descriptive adequacy risk failing as descriptions of what faring well consists in, 
however well they cohere with other theoretical commitments. 
The idea, then, is to suspend judgment on the question of how well an 
account of well-being fits within a favoured normative framework until we get a 
sense of how well it coheres with our pre-analytic beliefs about well-being. There 
is no guarantee that we can assess theories for descriptive adequacy while 
holding open questions about their normative adequacy, but we cannot answer 
this question in advance of our inquiry. A well-defined test for the descriptive 
adequacy of a theory of well-being should act as a kind of creative constraint on 
our deliberations. It should help us recognize and ground relevant considerations 
without situating the analysis in favour of a given account. As we assess an 
account’s degree of fit with our considered welfare judgments, the decision to 
                                            
8 Sumner (1996): 9. 
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favour one account of well-being over another should be the outcome of an 
impartial test. 
A particular test for descriptive adequacy may prove too restrictive, 
however. If a test precludes relevant information, or if it excludes intuitive 
accounts of well-being from consideration, then we have good reason to revise it. 
In the next section, I argue that we have good reason to revise Sumner’s test for 
descriptive adequacy. Specifically, we have reason to accept the fidelity criterion 
for descriptive adequacy, but we should temper our acceptance of its other 
criteria. 
 
1.3 Descriptive Adequacy 
Sumner parses descriptive adequacy in terms of fidelity, generality, 
formality, and neutrality.9 Fidelity is perhaps the most important criterion. It 
requires that a theory of well-being cohere with our pre-analytic beliefs about 
well-being, and that it explain why beliefs are unreliable in cases in which it does 
not. The relevant beliefs consist in the intuitive assessments we make about our 
own well-being and the well-being of others in light of our pre-reflective beliefs 
about well-being. We make plain the data candidate theories must fit when we 
judge, for instance, that a life is going well or poorly, that someone has benefitted 
from good fortune, that a policy is in the best interest of a community, or that one 
group is enjoying a higher quality of life than another group. Fidelity needs only 
two assumptions. First, it assumes that there exists a network of pre-analytic 
concepts and welfare judgments stable enough to support a high degree of 
                                            
9 Sumner (1996): 8-10. 
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agreement concerning when an object is good for a person and when it is not. 
Sumner explains this assumption by analogy: just as answers to the question 
‘what is it for one event to cause another?’ presuppose a shared network of 
causal concepts and judgments, so do answers to the question ‘what is it to fare 
well?’ Second, it assumes that we use the concept of well-being either implicitly 
or explicitly in common-sense psychological explanations, and in judgments 
concerning a person’s well-being.10 Importantly, claims concerning the fidelity of 
a given concept of well-being assume nothing about the moral implications of 
that concept. The notion of well-being may have moral implications, but well-
being is not a moral notion.  
Generality, the next criterion, has two parts. The first part requires that a 
theory of well-being capture the range of welfare judgments we make. For 
instance, it requires that a theory tell us what it is for a person to fare well or 
poorly at a time and over a period, and for a person to gain or lose well-being 
over time. The second part requires that a theory of well-being fit all core 
subjects of welfare assessments. This requirement is more challenging than it 
may seem at first glance, for the term “well-being” and its cognates apply to a 
wide-variety of subjects. We speak of the well-being of children and adults, plants 
and animals, communities and nations, and even species and ecosystems. A 
perfectly general theory of well-being will not only explain the various welfare 
judgments we make, but also capture what faring well consists in for the variety 
of subjects we deem capable of faring well.  
                                            
10 For a dissenting view, see Thomas Scanlon. “The Status of Well-Being.” The Tanner Lectures 
on Human Values (1996): 93-143.  
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Next, formality requires that theories explain the nature of well-being 
rather than describe its typical sources. Specifically, theories should name the 
properties that make something good for a subject, that is, the features of a state 
of affairs that make an object good or bad for the entity it harms or benefits. 
Moreover, they should explain how these combine to inform judgments of how 
well a subject fares at a given moment and over time. Together, generality and 
formality require that an account of well-being explain at least two things. Where 
S is the welfare subject and x is the object affording the harm or benefit, an 
account of well-being W must explain the property that makes x good or bad for 
S at a time or interval t, and how the particular contributions of a given object 
determines the overall level of well-being of S over time. Thus, a credible 
explanation of well-being should complete the formula “x benefits S at t iff x 
stands in relation W to S at t.” The idea is that, while subjects may require 
satisfying vastly different conditions in order to fare well, a theory of well-being 
must abstract from the accidental features of subjects and their context to answer 
questions such as ‘what is it for an entity to fare well?’ and ‘what is for an object 
to benefit an entity?’ Unless we have reasons to believe otherwise, we should 
guide our inquiry with the assumption that the nature of well-being is separate 
from its sources. 
Neutrality is the fourth and final criterion of descriptive adequacy. Sumner 
suggests that prior concerns for generality and formality should move us to 
accept the neutrality criterion, which calls for us to avoid bias toward a preferred 
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form of life.11 If a theory is to apply to a wide range of cases involving creatures 
of diverse natures and tastes, if a theory is to consist of more than a list one’s 
favorite sources of well-being, then it must not have built into it a bias toward 
concrete forms of life. Indeed, concerns over neutrality seem to arise naturally 
from previous commitments to generality and formality. We may deem that 
certain natures flourish better under some conditions than others, but as Sumner 
suggests, the judgment “must fall out as a confirming implication of a formally 
neutral theory.”12 Where fidelity ensures a given account of well-being coheres 
with our pre-analytic beliefs about well-being, generality, formality, and neutrality 
combine to exclude narrow, biased or otherwise confused accounts of well-being 
from consideration. 
We have good reason to accept the fidelity criterion since it ensures that 
theories of well-being cohere reasonably well with our pre-reflective beliefs about 
well-being. Consider the two assumptions that underwrite it. Common welfare 
judgments evince our shared grasp of the concept of well-being, as well as the 
role these beliefs play in practical reasoning and in common sense psychological 
explanations. When we muse on the kind of life we want for ourselves and 
others, when we consider whether we would gain from taking up a project, when 
we reflect on whether a procedure is in the best interest of a patient, we reveal a 
rough grasp of what faring well consists in, how to measure it, and how to weigh 
the gain of one against the loss of another. Granted, the nature of well-being is 
contested, yet such disagreement is possible only in light of a broad, more basic 
                                            
11 Sumner (1996): 18. 
12 Ibid.  
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agreement about what counts as a sensible description of well-being and its 
cognate concepts. This basic agreement need not be deeply philosophical to be 
useful. For instance, discussions of well-being tend to converge on a plausible 
list of goods that contribute to well-being, though accounts of why these goods 
deserve to be on the list diverge widely.13 Most would likely grant that wealth is 
merely a means to an end, that meaningful work and healthy relationships are 
important sources of well-being, and that poor physical and mental health tend to 
compromise one’s well-being. These judgments about typical sources of well-
being are much too coarse and provisional to constitute a suitable account of 
well-being on their own. However, they are typically stable and reliable enough to 
provide us with grist for the mill. We should be prepared to specify these 
judgments as we go, especially where they conflict with theoretical 
considerations that bear on their acceptance. Thus, the fidelity criterion fixes 
coherence as a creative constraint on our deliberations about well-being. We 
must choose among theories by seeing which one coheres better with our 
considered welfare judgments. If a theory has counterintuitive implications, then 
this evidence counts against it. In such cases, we must be willing to make a 
diagnosis and decide whether to reject our considered judgments or revise the 
theory of well-being under consideration. 
Moreover, we have good reason to mind the aspects of the formality that 
prevent us from confusing the nature of well-being with an enumeration of 
                                            
13 On convergence in theories of well-being, see Fred Feldman. Pleasure and the Good Life. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 160. 
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common sources of well-being.14 Most theorists concede that a wide variety of 
objects confer harms and benefits, and will index the list of welfare goods in 
some way to the welfare subject. On most accounts, the nature of well-being will 
not reduce to a list of welfare goods. The formality requirement ferrets out 
confusion by insisting that we separate the nature of well-being from the objects 
from which we derive welfare value. For instance, my son Jarrod might be 
tempted to define well-being as playing computer games on a cold autumn 
morning. However, the activity is a source of well-being rather than an account of 
its nature. Playing computer games on a cold autumn morning benefits Jarrod if 
and only if the activity figures in an account that captures what it is for Jarrod to 
fare well. 
However, we should temper our acceptance of the generality, formality, 
and neutrality criteria for descriptive adequacy. Placing too great an emphasis on 
these three criteria leaves us prone to three mistakes. It inclines us to ignore 
relevant differences amongst core welfare subjects; it conceals the role that 
communities play in the development of welfare subjects and the practice of 
welfare judgments; and it rules out weakly partial but otherwise intuitive accounts 
of well-being. 
Consider how insisting on generality inclines us to ignore relevant 
differences amongst core welfare subjects. Sensory hedonists offer perhaps the 
most general theory of well-being, suggesting that faring well consists in 
                                            
14 Sumner warns against this confusion. See Sumner, “Two Conceptions of the Good.” In The 
Good Life and the Human Good. Ellen Frankel Paul, et. al, eds. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992, pp. 1-15; Sumner (1996): 16-17. 
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experiencing surplus sensory pleasure.15 Their account situates all the different 
welfare judgments we make along a single scale, and defines the set of core 
welfare subjects clearly as the set of entities capable of sensory pain and 
pleasure. Unfortunately, the claim that well-being consists only in experiencing 
surplus sensory pleasure is not faithful to our pre-analytic beliefs about well-
being. The problem is that it seems incredible to suggest that faring well consists 
merely in securing surplus sensory pleasure. A life spent hooked up to an 
experience machine that ensures a surplus of sensory pleasure is not one in 
which welfare subjects fare well.16 Where does the account go wrong?  
One way to diagnose the mistake is to notice that sensory hedonists 
achieve generality at the cost of what we know empirically about human beings. 
They capture all core subjects of welfare assessments, from the fetus to the 
senior, only by prescribing a program that reduces the practice of welfare 
judgments to simple hedonistic terms. On this view, the only relevant features of 
welfare subjects are their capacity to feel sensory pleasure and to reason how to 
secure pleasure over time. The formality criterion does nothing to prevent the 
exclusion. The upshot is the imposition of an informational constraint on accounts 
of well-being, one that excludes much of what we know about the development 
and behavior of creatures like us, and precludes otherwise relevant information 
from consideration. Specifically, sensory hedonism focuses on the type of 
welfare judgments that are attainable in solitude, privileging first-person reports 
                                            
15 I complete a detailed survey of competing accounts of well-being in the next chapter. 
16 Robert Nozick. State, Anarchy, and Utopia. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974, 
pp. 42-45. 
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of sensory pain and pleasure. On this view, what matters is determining the 
property that makes a state of affairs good for a subject, the conditions under 
which the subject correctly perceives those properties, and how best to relate to 
the property over time. No other feature of the welfare subject is directly relevant 
to the nature of well-being or the practice of welfare judgments. We might think 
that sensory hedonism errs in excluding too much information from its account of 
what faring well consists in, particularly in its account of the welfare subject. 
We should inform our account of the welfare subject with the sum of what 
we know empirically about human psychology and the communities in which they 
grow and live. Conversely, we should reconsider or reject theories that clash with 
such knowledge. This suggests that theories of well-being should meet a minimal 
sort of psychological realism. When constructing a theory of well-being, we 
should ensure that the character, decisions, and behavior described are possible 
for the kind of welfare subject under consideration. The condition seems to be an 
implication of the fidelity criterion, an insistence that theories of well-being be 
faithful to our considered judgments of what we know about human beings and 
the communities in which they live.  
We have good reason to accept this new constraint. First, placing too 
much emphasis on generality inclines us to ignore relevant differences amongst 
core welfare subjects. If we tailor the nature of well-being to the exercise of 
rational and perceptual capacities for the sake of generality, much will escape 
our notice. For instance, we will fail to notice that human faculties develop and 
deteriorate gradually through one’s childhood, adulthood, and senescence, and 
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that reason and perception mature and decline at different rates. Next, it inclines 
us to construct welfare subjects in a way that conceals the role that communities 
play in their development and their practice of welfare judgments. Welfare 
subjects are not atomistic valuers who perceive, judge, and value in solitude. 
They are individuals who are born and grow in communities that influence and 
inform their considered judgments about what faring well consists in and which 
goods are worthy of pursuit. Consider children as welfare subjects. Unlike adults, 
children have few settled dispositions, and the choices of caregivers, whether 
implicit or explicit, have a large part to play in settling their future character. This 
process of education is necessary and appropriate, for the dispositions they 
would have in the absence of such influence would satisfy only the most basic 
theories of well-being. In fact, few theorists would take the dispositions human 
beings are born with as necessary and sufficient for well-being. Even sensory 
hedonists will want to shape the dispositions of the children in their care to impart 
them with the capacity to defer gratification, and desires theorists, the capacity to 
correct mistaken desires.  
An account that modeled welfare subjects exclusively in terms of 
perceptual and rational capacities might downplay the role communities play in 
the development of those faculties, and describe the well-being of children 
entirely in terms of future goods. In the Nicomachean Ethics, for instance, 
Aristotle argues that human well-being consists in the exercise of one’s rational 
faculties in accordance with excellence. Since they are unable to share in 
excellent activity owing to the immaturity of their rational faculties, Aristotle 
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estimates that children cannot fare well, and those “who are called happy are 
being congratulated by reason of the hopes we have for them.”17 Yet children are 
not merely virtuous-agents-in-waiting; they are welfare subjects in their own right, 
with the capacity to enjoy present as well as future goods. All things being equal, 
a child who is enjoying a day at the beach on warm summer day is faring well at 
a time, whatever future goods may be just over the horizon. Hence, a 
descriptively adequate account of well-being must construct subjects in terms 
that capture their growth from dependence to relative self-sufficiency without 
compromising the ability to assess their well-being at different stages of life. 
Imposing an informational constraint on welfare judgments for the sake of 
generality runs the risk of excluding contextually relevant features of states of 
affairs, including the role of communities in enabling and informing welfare 
judgments, and of barring legitimate welfare subjects from full consideration. We 
should insist, then, that adequate theories of well-being commit to a minimal sort 
of psychological realism, which includes what we know about the social setting of 
welfare subjects. In effect, we might insist that fidelity take precedence not only in 
the construction of theories of well-being but also in the construction of welfare 
subjects. 
It is important to note that contemporary accounts of well-being need not 
commit to an atomistic construction of the welfare subject or the exclusion of 
communal influences on moral development. Sumner’s criteria for descriptive 
                                            
17 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics (1098a10-15; 1100a1-5). To be fair, Aristotle does recognize 
the important contribution of political communities to moral education. See Politics (1252a-
1253b). 
 16 
 
adequacy are not wedded to either of these assumptions. For instance, he 
recommends that a reasonably general theory of well-being can be attentive to 
the variety of subjects for whom we make welfare judgments, though our account 
is bound to exclude some things from the set of welfare subjects. “A theory of 
well-being would clearly be incomplete were it to exclude children or cats,” he 
writes, “but it would not clearly be incomplete were it to exclude paramecia or 
plants.”18 This complicates the task of finding a general account of well-being. 
One challenge is that different welfare subjects have very different capacities and 
characteristics: some manifest a form of mental life, others are insensate; some 
are individuals, still others, collectivities. Sumner proposes that we distinguish 
between our core beliefs about well-being, those we hold with the highest degree 
of confidence, and peripheral beliefs less likely to survive critical reflection. 
“Whereas a theory must fit the core of our concept, it cannot avoid some degree 
of stipulation in its periphery,” he writes, “yielding determinate results where the 
application of that concept is vague and taking sides where it is in dispute.”19 We 
may legitimately strive to preserve the considered intuitions, beliefs, and 
practices surrounding our concept of well-being, even if we do so at the expense 
of a more general account. Hence, there is no reason to believe that Sumner is 
committed to either rigid atomism or individualism. In this sense, the discussion 
highlights elements of descriptive adequacy that bear consideration rather than a 
censure of Sumner’s position. 
                                            
18 Sumner (1996):15. 
19 Ibid. 
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We should be attentive to the possibility of extending the core-periphery 
distinction to beliefs about the welfare subject. Just as we can distinguish 
between core and peripheral beliefs about well-being, so too can we distinguish 
between core and peripheral beliefs about the welfare subject. Applying 
Sumner’s distinction in this direction creates a logical space for a more subtle 
construction that recognizes relational aspects of the subject that might otherwise 
escape our notice. To borrow Sumner’s turn of phrase, our account of the welfare 
subjects would be incomplete if it excluded the relevant characteristics of welfare 
subjects at different stages of life, or the role that communities play in developing 
the capacities of welfare subjects, a claim I defend in the fourth chapter. 
However, our account would not be clearly incomplete were it to exclude more 
idiosyncratic characteristics, such as height, weight or eye color. 
This suggests a refinement to an earlier claim concerning the generality of 
accounts of well-being: we should expect accounts of well-being not only to 
exhibit a degree of unity, but also to accommodate relevant distinctions between 
welfare subjects. While generalisations in our construction of the welfare subject 
are inevitable, we should be prepared to justify the theoretical choices we make, 
appreciate the distortions they impose on accounts of well-being, and realize 
when generality comes at too great a cost. It is possible that conflicts between 
generality and fidelity are irrevocable, in which case we might abandon attempts 
to produce a unified theory of well-being, and accept that a theory may be narrow 
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but true for the beings to which it applies.20 As always, the burden of proof rests 
with those who would advance a more complex account of well-being. 
Julia Annas constructs an account of well-being that exhibits this kind of 
refinement. Annas suggests that questions about the quality of life should be 
attentive to the complication that individuals come already grouped in families 
and communities, and that gender influences the details of one’s life at least to 
some extent. In most societies, the fact of being a man or a woman determines 
both one’s life choices and how one perceives them. She suggests that societal 
norms governing the gendered division of labor are bad for women, and she 
wonders whether we can best explain the injustice through an appeal to human 
nature. “There are everywhere two actual norms for human life,” she writes, “in 
no society is it indifferent to the shape of your life and what you can make of it, 
whether you are a man or a woman.”21 However, she is unsure whether the two 
norms are parts of a single account of human florishing, or whether each belongs 
to a distinct account. Her point seems to be that there might be two different 
accounts of flourishing, one for women and one for men, based on the 
assumption that men and women have distinct natures. She contents herself with 
pointing out the harms that gender and social location can impose on welfare 
subjects. For instance, women who live in traditional societies in which gender 
strongly determines suitable ways of life will have difficulty conceiving of 
                                            
20 Anthony Skelton explores this possibility in his own work on well-being. See "Utilitarianism, 
Welfare, Children," in Alexander Bagattini and Colin Macleod (eds.) The Well-Being of Children in 
Theory and Practice (Springer, forthcoming) and "What Makes a Child's Life Go Well?" 
(unpublished). 
21 Annas "Women and the Quality of Life: Two Norms or One." In The Quality of Life, edited by 
Amartya Sen and Matha Nussbaum. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, 279. 
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alternatives that violate these conservative social norms. As a result, they may 
adjust their desires to their circumstances as an adaptive strategy to achieve a 
measure of contentment.22 
Just as we should temper our acceptance of the generality and formality 
criteria for descriptive adequacy, so too should we temper our acceptance of 
neutrality. Neutrality requires that our theories of well-being be impartial toward 
rival forms of life. The claim is open to interpretation, however, and some 
readings rule out weakly partial but otherwise intuitive accounts of well-being that 
deserve consideration.  
Strong neutrality disqualifies accounts of well-being that violate the welfare 
subject’s evaluative perspective. On this view, descriptively adequate theories of 
well-being should be indifferent to the choices of welfare subjects, since the 
evaluation of welfare goods squarely rests on a welfare subject’s concerns. For 
better or worse, well-being is a function of choice. Conversely, weak neutrality 
disqualifies accounts of well-being that advance unfounded substantive critiques 
of a welfare subject’s concerns. On this view, accounts that advance more than a 
procedural critique require justification, though we need not disqualify them on 
principle. Well-being is still a function of choice, but not every choice counts 
toward one’s well-being. 
Some theories of well-being satisfy strong neutrality. Unrestricted desire 
theories satisfy strong neutrality since they identify faring well with the 
satisfaction of the welfare subject’s actual desires. The evaluation of a good rests 
                                            
22 On adaptive preferences, see J. Elster, “Sour Grapes,” in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds.), 
Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 219-238. 
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squarely with the welfare subject’s concerns. It is worth noting that abbreviating 
the set of desires to those formed under suitable conditions, as informed desire 
theories do, need not violate strong neutrality. The recommendations of informed 
desire theories do conflict, at times, with the agent’s present concerns. However, 
informed desire theories accept the subject’s concerns as normative for their 
well-being, and only impose procedural conditions to deal with problems with its 
implementation. Like simpler unrestricted account, informed desire theories rest 
the evaluation of a good squarely on the welfare subject’s concerns, though they 
insist that the set manifest a rational structure. Therefore, both unrestricted and 
informed desire accounts satisfy the strong neutrality criterion for descriptive 
adequacy. Likewise, hedonistic theories satisfy strong neutrality, but only if 
psychological hedonism is true. The latter is the view that welfare subjects in fact 
desire only pleasure.23 If psychological hedonism were true, the 
recommendations of hedonistic theories would always align with one’s concerns, 
since experiencing pleasure would be one’s only concern. Psychological 
hedonism is false however: most welfare subjects desire things other than 
pleasure. Thus, the recommendations of hedonistic theories do at times conflict 
with the concerns of welfare subjects. For the hedonist, faring well consists in 
experiencing surplus pleasure whatever the subject’s concerns. As such, 
hedonists run afoul the strong neutrality criterion for descriptive adequacy. 
Nonetheless, strong neutrality is an overly demanding criterion for 
descriptive adequacy. An account satisfies strong neutrality only if the evaluative 
                                            
23 On psychological hedonism, R.B. Brandt, “Happiness,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Edited by Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan, 1967. 
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perspective of the welfare subject alone determines the nature of well-being. This 
condition limits the set of plausible accounts of well-being to only a few theories. 
Suppose a theory of well-being defines faring well in terms of a list of 
independently valuable goods whose status as welfare goods does not depend 
on the concerns of welfare subjects. The best such a theory can do to account 
for one’s concerns is to allow one to decide the manner and the extent to which 
one instantiates specific goods in one’s life. Since the evaluative perspective of 
welfare subjects does not determine which goods deserve the status of welfare 
goods, these theories run afoul strong neutrality. Surely, this condition is too 
strong. The Euthyphro dilemma is compelling because each of its horns makes 
sense of different welfare judgments.24 Some welfare judgments seem consistent 
with the claim that the nature of well-being is not entirely up to the welfare 
subject; others, with the claim that the evaluative perspective of welfare subjects 
determines the nature of well-being.25 We cannot rule against accounts of well-
being that make a place for independently valuable goods before we set out on 
our inquiry, especially since we do not yet have reason to believe that the 
concerns of welfare subjects alone determine the nature of well-being. We 
should reject strong neutrality as a criterion for descriptive adequacy. 
Still, it is worth noticing that both horns of the Euthyphro dilemma are 
consistent with the claim that one can be mistaken about what well-being 
                                            
24  "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the 
gods?" Plato. Euthyphro. In Complete Works. Hackett Publishing Company: Cambridge, 1997, 
(10a). 
25 For a relevant  discussion, see Richard Kraut, “Two Conceptions of Happiness,” The 
Philosophical Review, vol. 88 (1979).  
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consists in. On both accounts, we believe that some states of affairs have 
welfare value, and we disagree about the nature of well-being. We seek evidence 
for our opinions and act as if there is something to discover. We act as if there is 
a fact of the matter, and talk about welfare value claims as being true or false, 
and of people knowing the better even while doing the worse. What is at stake in 
this debate is not the realism of welfare value but the nature of well-being itself. 
Weak neutrality is a more promising criterion for descriptive adequacy. It 
holds that accounts of well-being advancing substantive critiques of schedules of 
concerns should justify their violation of the evaluative perspective of the welfare 
subject. The intent of weak neutrality is to avoid partial, idiosyncratic accounts of 
well-being that reveal more about the biases of welfare theorists than the nature 
of well-being itself. Concerns over neutrality about the good arise most often in 
political philosophy, where anxieties over the unjustified encroachment of the 
state on individual conceptions of the good loom large. For instance, Rawls 
suggests that his conception of justice does not “try to evaluate the relative 
merits of different conceptions of the good.” Rather, it assures the individual 
access to primary goods, those necessary for any rational plan of life, and 
guarantees “an equal liberty to pursue whatever plan of life [one] pleases as long 
as it does not violate what justice demands.”26 We may have practical reasons to 
endorse neutrality in the design of our institutions. Perhaps principles of justice 
that do not themselves presuppose a particular conception of the good do a 
better job of governing social and political institutions in pluralistic societies. 
                                            
26 Rawls (1971): 91. 
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Perhaps we have reason to believe that individuals know best which states of 
affairs are the most promising sources of well-being, or that individuals derive 
greater welfare value from states of affairs if they choose freely among a variety 
of forms of life, so that interfering with their evaluative perspective is self-
defeating.27 
These concerns justify following a policy of respect for the evaluative 
perspective of welfare subjects; however, they imply very little about the nature of 
well-being itself, or the underlying agreement concerning what counts as a 
sensible description of well-being. Its role in political philosophy notwithstanding, 
weak neutrality might seem out of place in discussions concerning the nature of 
well-being. What reason do we have to believe that the most descriptively 
adequate concept of well-being is one that satisfies the weak neutrality criterion 
for descriptive adequacy?  
Neutralism arises from a healthy skepticism concerning substantive 
accounts of well-being. Note that such doubt cannot extend to all welfare claims. 
Radical skepticism would undermine both objective and subjective accounts of 
well-being. It would undermine not only the substantive claim that some ends 
have greater intrinsic welfare value than others; it would also undermine the 
formal claim that the normative evaluation of choices rest on the subject’s 
concerns. Few theorists, regardless of creed, can afford to endorse such radical 
doubt. However, selective skepticism about our ability to know the good seems to 
                                            
27 See J.S. Mill. On Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2008 [1859]), especially chapter 4. 
For a contemporary defense of this view, see R. Goodin. “Liberalism and the Best-Judge 
Principle,” Political Studies 38: 181-5. 
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motivate at least some claims surrounding weak neutrality. For instance, an 
important proponent of liberal neutrality, D.A. Lloyd-Thomas grants that while 
“some of our beliefs about what is of intrinsic value are very probably true… it is 
not the case that we already know (everything) that is of intrinsic value” or that 
we are certain beyond reasonable doubt which things have intrinsic value.28 
Similar doubts underscore Sumner’s own concern for neutrality. “A [substantive] 
value requirement… presupposes that there is an evaluative analogue to 
empirical truth or reality: a right answer to every question about value.”29 Whether 
substantive accounts of well-being must demonstrate such completeness is an 
open question. The point here is only that the claim that substantive accounts 
can propose even a modest analogue to the evaluative standpoint from which 
welfare subjects are to make welfare judgments is open to reasonable doubt. If 
proponents of substantive accounts are unable to allay these concerns, then we 
have good reason to reject their account. 
Typically, this selective skepticism targets claims about a value 
requirement beyond the responses of the subject. In fairness, accounts that 
respect the evaluative standpoint of the welfare subject seem less susceptible to 
the skeptic’s complaint. Such accounts rely on the presumption of truth we grant 
to a person’s self-reports for their appeal. Since Descartes, most philosophers 
have thought either that self-knowledge is epistemically distinctive or that 
pronouncements about one’s mental states bear a special presumption of truth.30 
                                            
28 D.A. Lloyd-Thomas, In Defence of Liberalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 120. 
29 Sumner (1996): 164. 
30 See Anthony Hatzimoysis. Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
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When I report on my propositional attitudes, I am not tracking the facts at issue 
so much as I am establishing them, and others tend to construe the report as 
authoritative unless they have good reason to be skeptical about it. Hence, the 
conclusion that well-being must depend on the evaluative perspective of the 
welfare subject. If welfare judgments are reports of inner perceptual states, then I 
am the final authority on whether my life is going well for me. The initial 
plausibility of such subjective accounts does not imply that we should equate 
welfare value with all but the most direct description of a welfare subject’s 
concerns. Most accounts of well-being do not. Instead, such subjective accounts 
strive to reveal procedural flaws that undercut the rationality of welfare subjects, 
or that point to social and cultural factors that constrain their autonomy.  
Whether theories of well-being provide a procedural or a substantive 
critique of a subject’s concerns, it is fair to insist that theories that stray from a 
straightforward ratification of subjectivity provide an account of exactly how far 
they stray from the subjective measure and why. Unlike strong neutrality, 
however, weak neutrality does not dismiss substantive theories without due 
consideration, but only insists that they justify critiques of the welfare subject’s 
evaluative perspective. 
 
1.4 Conclusion  
Several theories mean to tell us what it is for a person to fare well and we 
must decide which is best. I argued that the best theories of well-being should 
pass a test for descriptive adequacy. Sumner parses his own test in terms of 
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fidelity, generality, formality, and neutrality. On his view, the best theories of well-
being should be faithful to our pre-analytic beliefs about well-being, and their use 
in practical reasoning and common-sense psychological explanations. Next, they 
should capture the range of welfare judgements we make, and apply to all core 
subjects to whom these judgements apply. Finally, they should explain the nature 
of well-being rather than list common sources of well-being, and they should 
strive to remain neutral between different concrete forms of life. I argued that we 
should accept the fidelity criterion for descriptive adequacy. 
However, we should temper our acceptance of the other criteria. The 
extent to which a theory of well-being brings together disparate subjects and 
judgments typically counts toward its acceptance. Yet, placing too much 
emphasis on generality, formality, and neutrality leaves us prone to three 
mistakes. First, it inclines us to ignore relevant differences amongst core welfare 
subjects; second, it conceals the role that communities play in their development 
and their welfare judgments; and, third, it rules out weakly partial but otherwise 
intuitive accounts of well-being. We can avoid this outcome by ensuring that the 
character, decisions, and behavior that theories of well-being describe are 
possible for the kind of welfare subject under consideration. In effect, the 
principle reminds us that the fidelity criterion applies to both well-being and the 
welfare subject. Both should be faithful to our considered judgments of what we 
know about well-being, welfare subjects, and the communities in which they live.  
Over the course of the next four chapters, I argue that rival accounts of 
well-being confront problems that should encourage us to investigate 
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alternatives, namely, the problem of authority, the problem of worth, and the 
double bind problem. In the second chapter, I situate the problems in the context 
of the story of well-being, and I investigate strategies to address them in the third 
and fourth chapters. In the fifth chapter, I bring together the lessons of my 
investigation into my considered view. I argue that we can address the problems 
of authority and the problem of worth by defending an accommodating view of 
well-being according to which one fares well at a time when one endorses goods 
worthy of concern. This is a hybrid account of well-being that tries to take 
seriously the intuition that well-being has both a subjective and an objective 
component.
 28 
 
Chapter 2: Authority, Worth, and the Double Bind 
 
2.1 The Story of Well-Being 
The story of well-being groups theories of well-being into three sets. 
Hedonistic theories claim that well-being consists in experiencing surplus 
pleasure. Desire theories claim that well-being consists in getting a subset of 
what one wants, or in having more of one’s (ideal) desires satisfied than 
frustrated. Finally, objective list theories claim that well-being consists in the 
possession of a greater number of independently valuable objects than worthless 
ones. 
We can divide the theoretical landscape into subjective and objective 
accounts of well-being. It is worth borrowing from L.W. Sumner’s seminal work 
on the subjectivity of well-being to get the conflict between subjective and 
objective accounts right. “The defining feature of all subjective theories,” he 
writes, “is that they make your well-being depend on your own concerns,” 
whereas objective theories “exclude all reference to attitudes or concerns.”31 
Given their exclusion of subjectivity, objective accounts must find another 
approach to capture the intuition that a person’s life is prudentially valuable only if 
it is going well for them. Hence, the key difference between subjective and 
objective accounts is the necessity of the reference to one’s schedule of 
concerns, the loose program that specifies the objects that engage one’s active 
interest, attention, and care. Such a program need not be particularly organized 
                                            
31 L.W. Sumner. Welfare, Happiness and Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996: 43.  
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or forward-looking to constitute a schedule of concerns, though some programs 
certainly can be. 
In this chapter, I examine the structure of different theories of well-being. 
Specifically, I examine the place of the concerns of welfare subjects in this 
structure and the value of the objects of their concerns. I argue that two theses 
about the structure of theories of well-being are particularly important: the agent 
sovereignty thesis and the endorsement thesis. The agent sovereignty thesis 
holds that one's schedule of concerns alone determines one’s well-being. The 
endorsement thesis holds that the possession of some good contributes to one’s 
well-being only if one endorses it under suitable conditions. What a theory entails 
about the truth of these two claims generates two problems.  
First, objective theories hold that the objects of one’s concerns alone 
determine one’s well-being. Objective theories reject both the agent sovereignty 
thesis and the endorsement thesis. Such theories confront the problem of 
authority. They imply that, provided the objects to which one relates are 
independently valuable, one can fare well despite the fact that one does not 
endorse the conditions of one’s life. This alienates welfare subjects from their 
well-being. Second, subjective theories hold that one’s concerns alone determine 
one’s well-being. Subjective theories accept both the agent sovereignty thesis 
and the endorsement thesis. Such theories confront the problem of worth. They 
imply that one can fare well despite the fact that the objects of one’s concerns do 
not have independent value. Critics object that this claim does not cohere well 
with some pre-analytic beliefs about well-being. Not all the objects in one’s 
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schedule of concerns are on equal axiological footing. The longevity of the 
Euthyphro dilemma and the ease with which each side constructs a general case 
against the other speaks to the salience of the subjective-objective distinction in 
value theory. 
 
2.2 Authority 
Not long ago, subjectivists could omit objective theories from their 
discussions of well-being. In arguing for a happiness theory of well-being, for 
example, R.B. Brandt dismisses objective theories as obsolescent and proposes 
to ignore them.32 Even so, objective theories have undergone a revival in recent 
decades, and they provide a legitimate counterpoint to subjective theories. 
Generally, objectivists believe that faring well consists in suitably relating 
to independently valuable objects. Characteristically, they strive to provide a 
complete list of the goods that constitute a life that is good for the person who 
lives it. In most cases, the list includes more than experiencing surplus pleasure 
or getting what one wants. The items on the list are intrinsically good rather than 
good as a means to some further end, and what is good for a person is to relate 
suitably to the items on a correct and complete list of goods. Accordingly, the 
properties that make a given object intrinsically good for a person at a time are 
having independent value. Likewise, the properties that make a given object 
intrinsically bad for a person at a time are lacking independent value. How one 
relates to independently valuable objects also has an impact on one’s well-being. 
                                            
32 Richard Brandt. A Theory of the Good and the Right. Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1979, 246. 
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For instance, insofar as knowledge has independent value, one benefits at a time 
not only when one instantiates it in one’s life, but also when one pursues it in a 
suitable way and directs it toward suitable objects.33 Conversely, one suffers at a 
time not only when one remains ignorant, but also when one pursues knowledge 
in an unsuitable way, pursues knowledge of unsuitable objects, or applies 
knowledge to unsuitable ends. 
Beyond this rudimentary description, objective theories are structurally 
complex. Some proposals specify one list for all welfare subjects, or a distinct list 
for relevant subsets of subjects. For instance, the proposal to index the nature of 
well-being to gender is consistent with an approach that sports two distinct lists of 
objective goods.34 Other proposals specify that some objects produce a greater 
amount of well-being than other objects. One might hold, for instance, that 
pleasure contributes to one’s well-being but that goods that engage one’s rational 
faculties make greater contributions to one’s well-being. Others specify that the 
welfare contributions of some objects plateaus or even decreases after they 
reach a certain magnitude.35 For instance, it is commonplace that successive 
episodes of pleasure provide a diminishing marginal return such that 
contributions become negligible beyond a given magnitude. Still others stipulate 
that some goods are necessary to a person’s well-being while others merely 
                                            
33 For a proponent of this view, see John Finnis. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1980: 72. 
34 See section 1.3. Annas is agnostic about whether there truly are two accounts of well-being at 
work, or whether the gendered norms represent different facets of a single account. See "Women 
and the Quality of Life: Two Norms or One." In The Quality of Life, edited by Amartya Sen and 
Matha Nussbaum. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
35 For instance, see Kagan, “Well-Being as Enjoying the Good,” Philosophical Perspectives 
(2009): 253-272. Kagan is defending a hybrid view of well-being. 
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enhance it, or that some goods are such that welfare subjects must appreciate 
the properties that make them good in order to benefit from them. 
Despite this diversity, all objective theories are committed to renouncing 
the agent sovereignty thesis. The agent sovereignty thesis holds that one's 
schedule of concerns alone determines one’s well-being. Subjectivity is both 
necessary and sufficient for well-being. Since objectivists believe the axiological 
status of the objects of one’s concerns does not depend on their inclusion in 
one’s schedule of concerns, they must reject the claim that one’s schedule of 
concerns alone determines one’s well-being. Subjectivity is not sufficient for well-
being: an object can have welfare value even if it does not figure on one’s 
schedule of concerns. As Finnis puts it, “a [person] who is well-informed…simply 
is better off…than a [person] who is…ignorant, that the state of the one is better 
than the state of the other, not just in this particular case or that, but in all cases, 
as such, universally, and whether I like it or not.”36  
Objectivists may accept that one’s schedule of concerns is an important 
source of objective goods. This is consistent with the additive thesis, the claim 
that the pursuit of the loose program that specifies the objects that engage one’s 
active interest, attention, and care contributes to one’s well-being along with 
other welfare goods. However, the axiological status of the objective goods in 
one’s life does not depend on whether they figure on one’s schedules of 
                                            
36 John Finnis. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980: 72. 
Objectivists can combine this account of faring well at a time with any view of aggregation they 
like, which will produce an account of faring well over time. Importantly, objectivists need not be 
totalists, however; they can select lives instead of moments as an evaluative focal point and 
appeal to organic unities in assessing well-being. 
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concerns. In section 1.3, we saw how to construe hedonism as an objective 
theory of well-being that lists only a single welfare good. If psychological 
hedonism were true, the recommendations of hedonistic theories would always 
align with the welfare subject’s concerns, but psychological hedonism is false. 
Therefore, the recommendations of hedonistic theories do at times conflict with 
the concerns of welfare subjects. Experiencing surplus pleasure contributes to 
one’s well-being whatever one’s concerns. Such a view implies that pleasure by 
itself is good for the welfare subject, but it conflicts with the strong neutrality 
criterion for descriptive adequacy. Pleasure and pain affect one’s well-being 
whatever one’s schedule of concerns. 
Griffin’s ideal desire account of well-being strives to strike a similar 
balance between subjectivity and objectivity. On his view, ideal desires include 
desires for objects that tend to figure on schedules of concerns. For instance, 
one might claim that enjoyment and suffering are objects that one would desire if 
one appreciated their nature. Suppose that, fully informed and thinking clearly, all 
welfare subjects would desire both enjoyment and autonomy. It follows that all 
welfare subjects would benefit from instantiating these two goods in their life. 
However, it is possible that, in some cases, autonomous pursuits would produce 
such anxieties for a particular welfare subject that instantiating it would not to be 
worth the trouble.37 “That is not to deny autonomy its objectivity,” writes Griffin, 
“[or] that it is a universal value. It still allows that autonomy would, other things 
being equal, make his life better.”38 The enjoyment and suffering of this particular 
                                            
37 James Griffin. Well-Being. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 32-33. 
38 Griffin (1986): 54. 
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welfare subject do not change the welfare value of autonomy itself, but they 
figure with it on a list of objective goods. We must consider them along with the 
others. Provided they allow for such cases, objectivists can construct accounts of 
well-being that incorporate objects normally found on schedules of concerns as a 
reliable source of well-being without compromising the objectivity of well-being 
itself. 
One might doubt whether objectivists provide a legitimate alternative to 
subjective theories of well-being. In constructing their accounts, objectivists 
cannot avoid making normative judgments about what is valuable, suitable, or 
appropriate because formal, descriptive claims about the concerns of welfare 
subjects do not settle matters. As such, their prescriptions run the risk of 
conflicting with the neutrality criterion for descriptive adequacy. The conflict will 
be a matter of degree. We need not dismiss as hopelessly biased accounts of 
well-being that are only weakly partial to a given form of life, but considerations of 
neutrality will disqualify more obviously biased accounts of well-being from 
consideration. Moreover, objectivists seem prone to confusing the nature of well-
being with its typical sources, which violates the formality criterion for descriptive 
adequacy. Providing a list of objective goods is not yet to provide an account of 
the nature of well-being. These worries are premature, however. If objectivists 
can justify the limited place they accord to schedules of concerns, and if they can 
provide an account of what unifies the objects on their list, then we may yet have 
good reason to give them serious consideration.  
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Accounts born from a re-examination of the natural law tradition strive to 
do just that. Over the course of several works, Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis develop 
a teleological account of well-being according to which faring well consists in 
relating suitably to basic human goods.39 The concept of a basic good is broadly 
consistent with the concept of intrinsic value, according to which an object has 
value “as such,” “in itself,” or “for its own sake.” Like intrinsic goods, the basic 
goods we pursue for their own sake differ from instrumental goods, which we 
pursue for the sake of something else. One or more of these basic goods 
underlie any purpose for acting, at least when our goals are “specifically 
human.”40 On this view, a person fares well if they instantiate basic goods in their 
lives, though the particular goods instantiated will depend on the particular life. 
The most direct way to uncover basic goods is by reflecting on the purpose of a 
given action until one reaches reasons for acting which need no further reason, 
objects one pursues for their own sake. Grisez et al provide different lists of basic 
goods in various works, but settle as a rule on life, health, safety, knowledge and 
aesthetic experience, excellence in work and play, as well as personal and 
communal harmony.41  
This reconsideration of the natural law tradition rejects agent sovereignty. 
The welfare value of the basic goods that characterise distinctively human lives is 
a function of object-given properties. For Grisez et al, a distinctly human life is a 
                                            
39 For recent work in the tradition, see John Finnis. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1980; T.D.J. Chappell. Understanding Human Goods. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1995; David Oderberg and Timothy Chappell. Human Values: New 
Essays on Ethics and Natural Law. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 
40 Grisez, et al. “Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends.” American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 32 (1987): 103. 
41 Idem, 99-152. 
 36 
 
rational life, and a life is rational only when intentionally grounded in a set of 
basic goods that humans discover through observation and reflection. While 
schedules of concerns alone do not determine one’s well-being, they still figure 
prominently in the account. 
Schedules of concerns play an important part in the discovery of welfare 
value but not in its justification. The welfare value of basic goods is self-evident; 
we know the propositions stating their contributions to a distinctly human life just 
by grasping the meaning of their terms. Our knowledge of welfare value is not 
intuitive but direct and empirical, at least when we are fully informed and thinking 
clearly. We can deepen our insight into their welfare contributions by studying the 
natural inclinations of human beings and noticing that humans tend to recognize 
certain objects as basic reasons for action in distinctively human lives. Grisez et 
al are eager to address concerns that their view conflicts with the naturalistic 
fallacy. Crucially, they insist, we do not infer the value of these objects from the 
observation that we tend to pursue them. Instead, we weigh our tendency to 
pursue a given object as evidence for the claim that it is in fact good as such, an 
insight we then deepen through study, reflection, and further observation. For 
instance, we notice our own tendency to question, analyze, classify; we see 
curiosity bloom in others; we consider Aristotle’s claim that “all men by nature 
desire to know”; finally, we appreciate the basic value of knowledge.42 This 
process of intuitive induction implies that the basic goods tend to figure among 
the objects that engage one’s active interest, attention, and care.  
                                            
42 Aristotle, Metaphysics (980a25). 
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In passing, it is noteworthy that the view is consistent with the additive 
thesis, though Finnis et al. do not defend the latter view. The additive thesis 
captures the welfare contributions of suitable concerns by counting them along 
with other objective goods. The pursuit of the loose program that specifies the 
objects that engage our active interest, attention, and care contributes to our 
well-being, at least when those objects are suitable for creatures like us. 
The features of this reconsideration of the natural law tradition provide an 
initial response to worries concerning the formality and neutrality of the account. 
The judgment that certain objects are more suitable than others does not rest on 
mere bias. Nor does it confuse common sources of well-being with the nature of 
well-being. Rather, it rests on a robust, teleological conception of human beings 
as subjects whose fulfillment hinges on the exercise of their rational faculties. 
“Any creature which acts is one whose reality is not fully given at the outset,” they 
write. “It has possibilities which can be realized only through its acting.”43 Human 
beings fulfill their nature when basic goods motivate their actions. Such goods 
are not merely a source of well-being but “aspects of the fulfillment of persons” 
and parts of well-being itself.44 Of course, we may fail to act in accordance with 
basic goods. Perhaps we fail to reflect sufficiently on our choices, so that we do 
not yet see how to instantiate basic goods in our lives. Perhaps we see how to 
instantiate basic goods, but we fail to follow through or succeed only in acting 
against our better judgment. In such cases, our lives will suffer from a dearth of 
goods. When we choose rationally, our actions instantiate basic goods, we fulfill 
                                            
43 Grisez, et al (1987): 114. 
44 Ibid. 
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our nature, and we benefit. When we choose irrationally, we fail to instantiate 
basic goods, we fall short of the ideal, and we suffer harm. The resulting account 
is weakly partial to the rational life, perhaps, but its justification rests on a 
metaphysically complex account of human nature rather than on mere bias. 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the most pointed objections to the natural law 
account target this metaphysical apparatus. Even if we grant natural law theorists 
the explanation of how we come to know basic goods, the claim that some goods 
correlate with a normative account of human nature that uniquely determines 
what is good for a person is difficult to accept. Grisez et al postulate that the 
capacity to act in accordance with reason is what makes human lives distinctly 
human, a time-honoured view rooted in the Aristotelian corpus.45 Still, it is 
unclear why we should accept the claim that humans have a single function, or 
that the exercise of reason is more distinctly human than, say, the qualified 
pursuit of pleasure or desire satisfaction. Crucially, the authors explicitly discount 
pleasure as an intelligible good, one that we can think of as providing a reason 
for acting, because its pursuit does not lead to the fulfillment of the person as a 
whole.46 However, this consideration is unlikely to sway a committed subjectivist 
since the notion of fulfillment at play presupposes an answer to the very question 
at issue, namely, whether it is best to conceive of well-being independently of 
schedules of concerns. It is not clear why it would be illegitimate for skeptics to 
weigh the human tendency to pursue pleasure or satisfy desires as evidence for 
                                            
45 See, for instance, Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics (1098a5-10): “…the human function is the 
soul’s activity that expresses reason [as itself having reason] or requires reason [as obeying 
reason]”. 
46 Grisez et al (1987): 105. 
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the claim that well-being consists in subjective rather than objective 
considerations. Without a further argument to privilege one form of life over the 
other as distinctly human, the natural law account runs the risk of begging the 
question against others who would instead ground well-being directly in 
schedules of concerns. Moreover, without the account’s rational constraint on 
human nature, it is not clear that simply choosing the objects we tend to pursue 
by nature contributes to our well-being. 
Doubts concerning the metaphysical apparatus of the natural law account 
make it vulnerable to objections from formality and neutrality. Although there is 
some evidence for the claim that human beings tend to pursue certain goods, the 
lacuna opens the account to charges that it is confusing the sources of well-being 
with its nature, and flirting with elitism and paternalism. For their part, 
subjectivists can grant that the goods that Grisez et al identify as independently 
valuable are reliable sources of well-being. As a rule, for instance, human beings 
desire to know and enjoy satisfying their curiosity. Where the natural law account 
falters, however, subjectivists can give an account of the properties that make 
knowledge valuable in terms of well-being – namely, its presence on the 
schedule of concerns of most welfare subjects. 
A second, related objection is that the natural law account seems too 
narrow. The importance the account accords to the intentional willing of a 
coherent program of action weakens its generality, that is, its capacity to unify the 
different welfare judgments we make and the welfare subjects about whom we 
make them. Surely, some goods contribute to one’s well-being despite the fact 
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that they do not figure on a detailed program of action. This objection holds even 
if we limit, unrealistically, the set of welfare subjects to human beings. As it 
stands, the account that Grisez et al construct seems most relevant to welfare 
assessments involving complete human lives or the lives of human adults at the 
height of their faculties. This is consistent with their Aristotelian inclinations. 
Famously, Aristotle ties well-being to the exercise of one’s rational capacities, 
and suggests that well-being assessments are most reliable when considering 
complete lives. “For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day,” he 
writes, “nor, similarly, does one day or a short time make us blessed and 
happy.”47  
However, not all welfare subjects who lack this kind of rationality and 
coherence are obviously faring poorly, nor is it realistic to insist that we restrict 
well-being judgments to complete lives.48 It is revealing that Aristotle denies that 
children can fare well at all. Since they cannot share in rational activity, “boys 
who are called happy are being congratulated by reason of the hopes we have 
for them.”49 Surely, we sometimes want to claim that healthy toddlers with a 
sunny disposition are faring well at a time. This is true despite their inability to 
plan and pursue a complex axiological program, and our ignorance of the future 
goods fate has in store for them. Likewise, we sometimes want to claim that 
satisfied seniors whose retirement involves nothing more elaborate than enjoying 
                                            
47 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (1098a20).  
48 On the risks of conceiving of life as a career, with its emphasis on narrative unity and planning, 
see Margaret Urban Walker. “Getting Out of Line: Alternatives to Life as a Career.” In Mother 
Time: Women, Aging and Ethics. Edited by Margaret Urban Walker. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1999. 
49 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (1100a1-5). 
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good company and playing an occasional game of shuffleboard are faring well at 
a time. This is true despite the fact that they might be unwilling or unable to 
reflect on their lives or make plans for the future. Granted, in both cases, shifting 
our evaluative focal point from moments to periods or lives may inform the 
welfare judgments that we make when we deny that the welfare subjects in these 
cases fare well. We might bemoan the fate of healthy toddlers who live in 
contexts that are likely to limit their access to future goods. Likewise, we might 
bemoan the fate of satisfied seniors who are content to play shuffleboard 
because they have reluctantly lost a battle with a debilitating mental illness. Still, 
we cannot neglect to provide an account of how well they fare at a time, however 
well we believe they fare over time. 
These judgments are hardly peripheral cases that a coherent account of 
well-being can afford to discount unless we are willing to accept that an account 
that fully applies to only a handful of core human cases is the best we can do. 
One of the strengths of competing subjective accounts is the resources they can 
marshal in the service of a balanced account of faring well at a time, over a 
period, or over a life. For instance, subjectivists can claim that human beings 
tend to fare well if they manage a program of pleasure maximization or desire 
satisfaction over a life, but can deny that such a program is necessary for happy 
toddlers or satisfied seniors to fare well at a time. All that assessments of well-
being at a time require are loose schedules of concerns of the kind captured by 
the formula, “Jarrod enjoys, desires, or has a pro-attitude to strawberry ice cream 
at time t.” Subjectivists can also bemoan the future fate of underprivileged 
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toddlers, who are likely to find it difficult to pursue successfully even modest 
schedules of concern in the future, or the fate of satisfied seniors, who have lost 
the capacity to regret their cognitive decline and would have wanted their lives to 
turn out differently.  
A descriptively adequate account of well-being cannot focus exclusively 
on adult capacities or concerns. It should be attentive to the variety of both 
welfare subjects and welfare judgments. It should capture what faring well 
consists in at different stages of a human life, be it childhood, adulthood, or 
senescence, and describe welfare judgments at a time, over a period, and over a 
life. Natural Law theorists might suggest that their account is perhaps narrower 
than they thought, but that this does not make it false for the entities to which it 
applies. However, this reply is available only if they are willing to limit the 
generality of their account, and apply it only to adult human beings at the height 
of their rational faculties. The move to weaken the importance of generality may 
be difficult in light of the normative account of human nature they rely on. 
Objectivists might reply by weakening the requirement to express well-
being in terms of a distinctive human function. For instance, Martha Nussbaum 
argues with Amartya Sen that faring well is a matter of capabilities and 
functionings. 50 Functionings are various states of human beings and activities 
that a person can undertake. Examples of states of beings are being well-
                                            
50 Martha Nussbaum holds the broadly Aristotelian view that we can root a distinctive human 
function in the exercise of our rational faculties. See “Nature, functioning and capability: Aristotle 
on political distribution.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, 1988: 
145-184. For a summary statement of Sen’s more subjective view, see “Capability and Well-
Being” in The Quality of Life. Edited by M. Nussbaum and A. Sen. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993: 30-53. 
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nourished, being housed, being educated, being part of a supportive social 
network, and being happy. Examples of activities are travelling, caring for 
children, voting in an election, taking part in a debate, and donating money to 
charity. At a glance, the examples I cite are positive, but it is important to note 
that the notion of functionings is neutral in itself. In a sense, the goodness or 
badness of various functionings depend on the context which one endorses. For 
instance, a conservative, communitarian normative theory would likely identify 
the work of a mother who is caring for children and elderly parents as a valuable 
functioning, while a feminist theory might do so only if the functioning is the result 
of an autonomous choice made under suitable conditions. Conversely, 
capabilities are a person’s real freedoms or opportunities to achieve functionings. 
For instance, travelling is a functioning, and the real opportunity to travel is the 
capability. Functionings are to capabilities what the realized is to the possible. 
That is, the distinction is between achievements on one hand and opportunities 
on the other. 
On this view, a person or group fares well when they are effectively able to 
perform valuable actions and achieve valuable states of being. The focus of the 
capabilities approach is on removing obstacles so that they have more freedom 
to live the kind of life which, upon consideration, they find valuable. The 
persuasiveness of this collaborative program hinges in part on identifying 
valuable actions and states of affairs that constitute human well-being, a step 
that is a matter of some controversy. Whether the capabilities approach counts 
as an objective or a subjective theory depends on how one identifies the valuable 
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functionings that constitute the basics of the theory. In some moods, Sen is 
willing to let schedules of concerns determine the decisive ranking of valuable 
functionings, which would make the capabilities approach a subjective theory.51 
Nussbaum consistently prefers a more objective reading of functions, and tends 
to ground them in a normative account of human nature. When pressed, 
however, even Nussbaum allows that settling on a single, distinctively human 
function is not essential to the program of finding a coherent account of human 
well-being.52 While we may be unable or unwilling to describe a characteristic 
human function, we have little trouble gauging when humans are functioning well 
by standards appropriate to their kind.  
Others writers go as far as to abandon appeals to normative accounts of 
human functioning altogether. They insist on the independent value of the goods 
on their favored list, but deny that an account of the property that unifies them is 
necessary or even possible. In his substantive good theory of well-being, for 
instance, Thomas Scanlon admits that certain goods make a life better, and that 
we are sometimes prepared to defend this claim with reasons. Yet Scanlon 
muses that a unified account of what makes things good for welfare subjects may 
be impossible. “It seems unlikely that there are any good-making properties 
which are common to all good things,” he writes, “If this is correct, there will be 
no general theory of goodness… [beyond] diverse arguments about why various 
                                            
51 For Sen’s ambivalence, see his “Capability and Well-Being,” in The Quality of Life. Edited by 
Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, 31-33. 
52 See her “Non-relative virtues.” In Quality of Life. Edited by M. Nussbaum and A. Sen. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993. 
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properties of particular objects make those objects good.”53 However, 
abandoning the project of providing an account that unifies welfare goods 
threatens the very detachment from subjectivity objectivists are trying to achieve. 
To be fair, objective theories can take some comfort in the fact that list theories 
tend to converge on a classic triad of objects, namely, truth, virtue, and beauty. 
We might hope that this convergence is evidence of truth, but it is difficult to 
imagine what might count as support for this claim. One possible strategy is to 
attempt to bring the arguments about various good-making properties into wide 
reflective equilibrium with the relevant moral and non-moral theories. If this is 
correct, then projects like the one undertaken here are a step in the right 
direction.54 
Objectivists might reply by substituting a normative account of human 
function with a descriptive account of the basic needs essential to living a normal 
life. On this view, faring well consists in having basic needs like nourishment, 
exercise, rest, companionship, and personal security satisfied. This account is 
objective since the status of the needs in question is not conditional on the 
welfare subject’s schedule of concerns.55 However, the proposal violates the 
formality criterion. Identifying as objectively good the elements needed to live 
normal human lives runs the risk of confusing intrinsic welfare goods with the 
                                            
53 See his “Values, Desire and Quality of Life” in The Quality of Life. Edited by Martha C. 
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, 190-1. See also 
"Contractualism and Utilitarianism." In Utilitarianism and Beyond, edited by Amartya Sen and 
Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.  
54 The triad is mentioned in William Frankena, Ethics. Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973, 
88. Fred Feldman discusses convergence in theories of well-being in Feldman (2004). 
55 The list is David Baybrooke’s. See his Meeting Needs. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988, 31. For a more recent discussion, see Lawrence Hamilton. The Political Philosophy of 
Needs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
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merely instrumental, and the nature of well-being with its likely sources. What 
nourishment, exercise, and rest have in common is not that we value them as 
constitutive parts of human well-being but that they enable its pursuit and are, at 
times, important sources of well-being. To see this, we need only consider the 
value of each element independently of its causes or consequences. When I 
consider nourishment on its own, I find that I value it instrumentally rather than 
intrinsically. It matters only because it allows me to pursue other things that 
matter intrinsically, be it pleasure, desire satisfaction, knowledge, achievement 
and so on. I eat because I enjoy a good meal, because it sates my appetite, 
because I need energy to live, work and play, but I do not eat merely for the sake 
of eating. We can make a similar case against accounts that equate faring well in 
part with securing items on a list of primary goods or with having others respect 
one’s human rights.56 As Aristotle recognized, some measure of external goods 
is naturally useful in pursuing well-being “since we cannot or cannot easily, do 
fine actions if we lack the resources.”57 However, we value these external goods 
as the means to pursue what really matters. A person’s access to external goods 
can provide a proxy measurement of well-being, but it does not provide an 
account of its nature. 
These thoughts on the general structure of objective theories do not 
comprise a decisive argument against the latter. Objectivists can reply to the 
                                            
56 Rawls famously identifies a set of primary goods, which constitute the basics required for the 
formation and pursuit of any rational plan of life. Note that Rawls proposes a rational desire 
theory of well-being, which counts as a subjective rather than an objective account. John Rawls. 
A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971, 92-3. For an argument 
that human rights should figure on a list of constitutive welfare goods, see Partha Dasgupta. An 
Enquiry into Well-Being and Destitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, chapter 1.  
57 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1099b. 
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narrowness of their account by limiting its generality, applying the account only to 
entities whose well-being it captures fairly well. Likewise, they can reply to the 
lack of a justification of the goods that belong on a correct and complete list by 
assigning list membership tentatively and revising it when they have reason to do 
so. However, the most serious indictment of objective theories is not the claims 
they advance but those they deny. Suppose objective theories can produce a 
suitable metaphysical apparatus to justify the normative judgments they make. 
The mark of such theories remains the denial of agent sovereignty, which 
commits them to the denial that one’s schedule of concerns alone determines 
one’s well-being. To some extent, it also commits them to the substitution of that 
schedule of concerns with an independent standard of value. Goods have 
welfare value, not because subjects value them, but because they are 
independently good for subjects. In trying to place well-being assessments on 
secure footing, objectivists break the connection between its nature and the 
person whose well-being is in question. It is no longer strictly necessary for the 
objects in one’s life to engage one’s active interest, attention, and care in order 
for one to fare well. If this is right, then a person can fare well despite the fact that 
he does not endorse the conditions of his life provided they relate suitably to 
independently valuable objects. The implication is controversial enough to 
challenge the acceptance of objective accounts. Call this the problem of 
authority. 
Objectivists may respond by seeking common ground. They might grant 
that schedules of concern are often a reliable source of well-being, and that one’s 
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experience and desires matter, even if they are not the only things that matter. 
Thus, they might concede that the subjective elements of rival theories are also 
objectively valuable, and argue for their inclusion on their list of favoured goods. 
On this view, subjective theories identify one important respect in which we can 
fare well: hedonists single out pleasant experiences; and desire theorists, getting 
what you (rationally) want. The mistake subjectivists make is building an account 
of well-being around a single basic good. Enjoyable experiences and desire 
satisfaction have welfare value, but they are only a few among many goods that 
share this status. For instance, Richard Arneson adds enjoyment and desire 
satisfaction to an objective list account in order to give them at least some role to 
play in well-being. However, he denies that one must either enjoy or desire the 
objects in one’s life in order to fare well.58 Thus, one fares well if one’s life 
contains objectively valuable objects, including, among others, knowledge, 
achievement, desire satisfaction, and experiences of pleasure. This strategy can 
accommodate a diversity of good lives since what matters is not which basic 
good one chooses to instantiate but that one responds fully to those one does 
instantiate. 
The reply fails to address the problem of authority, however. On the 
revised account, schedules of concerns do not yet restrict the sort of lives that 
count as good for the person who lives that life. Since there is no constraint on 
the goods one’s life instantiates, it is still possible to assess that one fares well 
though one remains subjectively alienated from the goods in one’s life. What 
                                            
58 “Human Florishing versus Desire Satisfaction,” Social Philosophy and Policy. 16 (1999): 42-43.  
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matters is only that one’s life relate to valuable objects. One need not like, want, 
or respond positively to the goods one relates to in order to benefit from them. 
Moreover, one can fare well even if one’s life is devoid of pleasure or desire 
satisfaction provided one relate suitably to other basic goods. Simply insisting 
that one’s life contain at least some pleasure or desire satisfaction does not go 
far enough.  
This response to objective theories is not bad as far as it goes. However, it 
implies that objective goods by themselves do not count towards well-being. This 
is difficult to accept. In effect, the problem of authority puts us in a double bind: if 
we accept the agent sovereignty thesis and the endorsement thesis, we seem 
committed to the claim that unendorsed objective goods are worthless in welfare 
terms. They might not count for much, but why not think objective goods count 
for a bit? Suppose Richard’s life relates suitably to independently valuable 
objects but is otherwise devoid of pleasure or desire satisfaction. A depressed 
artist, he spends his days working at the Smithsonian cleaning and stabilizing 
works of art, a calling arguably of great value but one that he no longer enjoys or 
desires. The problem of authority implies that we do not suddenly rescue him 
from desolation by plugging him into a pleasure machine for an hour at the end of 
each day. Richard’s case is tragic precisely because he is not faring well despite 
the fact that his life contains much in it that is independently valuable, a judgment 
that objective theories do not capture. However, it seems unreasonable to claim 
that objective goods by themselves fail to count towards well-being. Given the 
choice of two lives, each of which Richard equally fails to endorse, it must be the 
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case that Richard fares better in the life that contains objective goods than in the 
one that does not. 
The problem of authority challenges us to move beyond the additive 
thesis. It arises when theories deny the structural role that one’s concerns play in 
defining what faring well consists in. Given that schedules of concerns can be 
more or less structured, the problem is especially important in cases where one 
has a firm and steady schedule of concerns. If this is correct, then the problem of 
authority will have a scalar dimension, making trouble for some cases more than 
for others. However, even cases involving relatively loose and variable schedules 
will confront the problem to some extent. Objective theories fail to recognize that 
the engagement of one’s active interest, attention, and care has a role to play in 
delineating one’s well-being. What is needed is an account in which schedules of 
concerns restrict what counts as good for a person, one that assesses that 
Richard fares well only if he enjoys or desires the very goods that he is fortunate 
enough to have in his life. At the same time, it is difficult to accept that one part of 
well-being has no welfare value in the absence of the other. In the case of the 
depressed artist, for instance, it seems unreasonable that objective goods by 
themselves fail to count towards Richard’s well-being. Plausible solutions to the 
problem of authority must take into consideration both concerns. 
 
2.3 Worth 
Subjective theories are perhaps the most venerable accounts of well-
being. Subjectivists claim that a person’s well-being depends only on his 
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concerns, and deny that the objects of these concerns have further value that 
bears on well-being. Where objectivists deny the agent sovereignty thesis, 
subjectivists affirm it: one’s schedule of concerns alone determines one’s well-
being. As Sumner puts it, over his well-being, the adult subject is sovereign, at 
least under suitable conditions.59  
Traditional taxonomies divide the general class of subjective theories into 
two kinds: hedonistic and desire theories. Hedonists claim that well-being 
consists in experiencing surplus pleasure. On this first view, the property that 
makes a state of affairs intrinsically good for a person at a time is being an 
episode of pleasure. The property that makes a state of affairs intrinsically bad 
for a person at a time is being an episode of pain. Internalists about pleasure 
define faring well in terms of a distinctive feeling that all pleasant experiences 
share. Unfortunately, describing the exact nature of this feeling is difficult.60 
Externalists about pleasure define faring well in terms of a feeling that is wanted 
or desired by the individual who experiences it.61 Conversely, desire theorists 
claim that well-being consists in getting what we want. On this second view, the 
properties that make a state of affairs intrinsically good for a person at a time are 
being a satisfied object of desire. The only properties that make a state of affairs 
intrinsically bad for a person at a time are being a frustrated object of desire. 
                                            
59 “When [an affirmation of the conditions of her life] is based on a clear view of those conditions, 
we have no grounds for questioning or challenging its authority: in this respect, the individual is 
sovereign over her well-being.” Sumner (1996): 160. 
60 Griffin (1986): 8; Sumner (1996): 92-3; Thomas Carson. Value and the Good Life (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 2000), 13-4; Justin Gosling. Pleasure and Desire (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1969), 37-40.  
61 For instance, see Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life, 85, 119; Sumner, “Feldman’s 
Hedonism,” The Good, the Right, Life and Death. Oxford University Press, 2006. 
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Hedonists and desire theorists can combine their account of faring well at a time 
with any view of aggregation they like, which will produce an account of faring 
well over a period or on the whole. Typically, hedonists sum episodes of pleasure 
over time, with more intense episodes of greater duration counting for more than 
shorter, less intense ones. Likewise, desire theorists sum the satisfaction of 
discrete desires, with more intense desires counting for more than less intense 
ones. 
To situate the problem of worth, it might be helpful to rehearse some 
alternative accounts of each kind of subjective theory, along with some familiar 
claims about their shortcomings. Suppose we start with hedonism. As I 
mentioned, hedonists satisfy both the generality and the strong neutrality criteria 
for descriptive adequacy.62 Since the capacity to feel pleasure and pain is 
ubiquitous, hedonists capture all core subjects of welfare assessments, from the 
animal to the human, the fetus to the senior. Moreover, their recommendations 
always align with the welfare subject’s concerns, but only if psychological 
hedonism is true. 
I argued that hedonists achieve these results only by violating the fidelity 
criterion for descriptive adequacy. It seems incredible to suppose that, for any 
welfare subject, the capacity to feel and forecast pain and pleasure are the only 
features relevant to one’s well-being, or to suppose that one can always reduce 
one’s various concerns to the pursuit of pleasure. The hedonist’s claim may be 
true of foetuses or the family dog, but it is less clearly true of high-functioning 
                                            
62 See sections 1.3 and 2.2. 
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adult humans. Likewise, insisting that experiencing surplus pleasure contributes 
to one’s well-being whatever one’s concerns violates strong neutrality and the 
agent sovereignty thesis. It is no longer the case that one’s schedule of concerns 
alone determines one’s well-being. This objection effectively marks hedonism as 
an objective-list theory of well-being with a single good on its list. Hedonists can 
respond to these objections by limiting the generality of their account, applying it 
only to entities whose well-being it captures fairly well. For instance, the claim 
that well-being consists in surplus pleasure is most plausible in the case of the 
happy toddler or the satisfied senior, where the objects of one’s pleasure matters 
less to how well one fares at a time. However, hedonists can reach for this 
response only by yielding tacitly to rival theories of well-being in cases where 
their own approach violates fidelity. 
Now, the claim that well-being consists in experiencing surplus pleasure 
raises at least two questions: What is pleasure? Does well-being consist uniquely 
in experiencing surplus pleasure? An adequate account of the nature of pleasure 
is essential since pleasure is likely to play at least some role in our conception of 
well-being, whatever view we defend. However, the anti-hedonist arguments 
hinge chiefly on the second question. Suppose hedonists can specify a 
descriptively adequate account of pleasure, one that coheres well with our 
various pre-analytic beliefs about pleasure. Can hedonists make good on the 
central claim that well-being consists uniquely in experiencing pleasure? A 
powerful objection to hedonism is the claim that they cannot.  
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We can reach this conclusion by noticing first that all hedonistic theories 
essentially place an experience requirement on well-being. If hedonism is true, 
then welfare subjects must experience pleasure in some sense in order to 
benefit. Now, imagine Tom, an executive who dies content, thinking that his 
family loves him, and that his colleagues respect him; in fact, his family secretly 
despised him, and his colleagues only pretended to like him for their benefit, 
though he never knew the truth of it.63 In thinking about his life, it is difficult to 
escape the conclusion that mental states are not all that matter to our well-being. 
If mental states are all that matter, then what we do not know cannot harm or 
benefit us. However, it seems that what we do not know can harm or benefit us. 
Therefore, mental states are not all that matter. Since hedonistic theories impose 
an experience requirement on well-being, they fail to recognize that things other 
than our experiences matter to our well-being.  
Hedonists might reply that the assessment that Tom is not faring well rests 
in part on the suspicion that he will likely find out the truth and be devastated, or 
that the deception would otherwise color the relationships that are important to 
him. On this view, we are letting the allegedly poor quality of his personal 
relationships, or the pain we imagine he will experience when he finds out, 
undermine our judgment of how well he is faring now. This reply will not assuage 
critics, however. They insist that we can imagine a case where Tom does not find 
out about the deception and, we are assuming, the deception does not color his 
experience. He thought his partner was faithful, but she was not. Even if he never 
                                            
63 Thomas Nagel. Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 1 – 10. 
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learns the truth, the deception diminishes his well-being because a facet of his 
life about which he cared deeply failed to work out the way he wanted. For 
hedonists, the external state of affairs cannot make Tom’s experience less 
valuable because it does not affect his mental states, but mental states are not 
all that matter. The best explanation of this is that hedonism cannot be the whole 
story. 
The case of Tom might move us to accept a desire theory of well-being. 
The reason poor Tom is not faring well is that he is not getting what he really 
wants. What Tom wanted was the love of his family and the respect of his 
colleagues, and while it seemed that he had their esteem, he was mistaken. 
Desire theories differ from their hedonistic counterparts in two important 
respects. First, they are concerned not only with mental states but also with the 
obtaining of external states of affairs beyond the mind. Desire theorists assert 
that faring well consists in getting what we want, and what we want is not limited 
to experiencing pleasure and avoiding pain. On this account, a life spent hooked 
up to an experience machine that replicated the mental states associated with 
enjoying what we most desired would be a life low in well-being.64 Whether we 
want to meet interesting people, have intimate relationships, or attain complex 
goals, we want more than the pleasant mental states that come with the belief 
that these states of affairs obtain. We actually want them to obtain. Second, 
desire theorists break the connection between experience and well-being. A 
desire is satisfied much like the clause in a contract is satisfied. In both cases, 
                                            
64 See Robert Nozick, State, Anarchy, and Utopia. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1974, 42-45. 
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satisfaction occurs if the relevant state of affairs obtains.65 This implies that a 
person can benefit from a state of affairs even if he does not experience 
gratification or know it obtains. In some cases, we may prefer that states of 
affairs obtain even if we never know they do or we never experience the mental 
states associated with their obtaining. Given the choice, for instance, parents 
may prefer that their child have a successful life even if, for some reason, they 
never learn of their child’s success.66 
The simplest desire theories are unrestricted accounts, which claim that 
getting what one wants always makes an intrinsic contribution to one’s well-
being. As we have seen, unrestricted desire theories satisfy the generality 
criterion and the strong neutrality criterion for descriptive adequacy.67 In the case 
of generality, the argument is similar in structure to the argument for the 
generality of hedonism. Since appetition is ubiquitous, unrestricted desire 
theories capture all core subjects of welfare assessments, from the animal to the 
human, the fetus to the senior. Likewise, since they identify faring well with the 
satisfaction of the welfare subject’s desires, the evaluation of a good rests 
squarely with the welfare subject’s concerns, which implies the truth of the agent 
sovereignty thesis: one’s schedule of concerns alone determines one’s well-
being.68 However, unrestricted accounts must contend with two problems of their 
own: the problem of scope and the problem of mistaken desires. 
                                            
65 See Griffin (1986): chapter 1. 
66 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, 495-6. 
67 Note that this is true only on the view that what is good for you is the satisfaction of actual 
desires. 
68 See section 1.3. 
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Consider the problem of scope. Suppose that Derek desires that a 
stranger he met briefly fare well.69 Though the stranger fares well, Derek never 
thinks of him again and never knows his fate. It seems incredible that the 
unwitting satisfaction of this desire should benefit Derek, but if we accept the 
unrestricted account, we are committed to the view that the satisfaction of even 
this desire contributes to his well-being. The problem of scope arises because of 
the intentionality of desires and the notion of satisfaction at work.70 Desires are 
directed at contingent states of affairs, which may not be contiguous to the 
subject in time and space, and some states of affairs obtain without a noticeable 
effect on the subject. These two features of desire theories explain what goes 
wrong in the case of Tom: in so far as he was deceived, the object of his desire 
failed to obtain and he did not fare as well as he thought, even if he never 
learned of the deception or experienced the truth of it. As the case of Derek 
illustrates, however, many other states of affairs obtain without a noticeable 
effect on subjects, and at least some of them seem immaterial to their well-being. 
The problem of scope implies a violation of the fidelity criterion of descriptive 
adequacy. The deliverances of unrestricted desire theories do not cohere well 
with our pre-analytic beliefs about well-being. 
Desire theorists might reply by admitting that the set of desires whose 
satisfaction is relevant to well-being on the unrestricted account is too broad. On 
this view, desire theorists need a principled way to identify the set of desires 
whose satisfaction bears on a person’s well-being. In effect, this response 
                                            
69 Derek Parfit. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, 494. 
70 On the intentionality of desires, Sumner (1996): 124-5. 
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narrows desire accounts to a set of cases in which subjects satisfy a subset of 
desires that ostensibly bear on well-being. One strategy involves giving 
prominence to desires that have a more central place in a person’s life. For 
instance, we can stress the importance of long-standing, identity-conferring 
desires, desires that unify a greater number of minor desires, or desires that are 
explicitly about one’s own life. A full discussion of the implications of the scope 
problem would take us far afield, but note that proposals point to the role the 
structural features of a state of affairs play in determining its bearing on a 
person’s well-being. Identifying the set of relevant desires is a matter of 
determining not only whether a desired outcome obtains but also whether it 
relates suitably to other aspects of a person’s life.  
Next, consider the problem of mistaken desires. Even when their content 
is “about us” in some sense, our actual desires can themselves be impulsive or 
misinformed. Simply put, what one actually wants does not reliably track one’s 
well-being. The literature is replete with grisly cases: I want to drink a glass of 
poison mistakenly thinking it is orange juice; I want to drive home drunk; I want to 
end my life during a depressive spell; I want a treatment I falsely believe will cure 
my illness; I want to smoke cigarettes though I know they are addictive and 
cause cancer. In these cases, merely getting what I want does not make my life 
intrinsically better. Desire theorists might reply that the satisfaction of each desire 
is good in itself but not overall. Each desire frustrates other desires, perhaps, like 
the desire not to be addicted to smoking. However, it simply seems incredible to 
claim that the satisfaction of these desires contributes to a person’s well-being at 
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all. Once again, desire theories seem to breach the fidelity criterion of descriptive 
adequacy: their deliverances simply do not cohere well with our pre-analytic 
beliefs about well-being. 
Instead of counting the satisfaction of our actual desires – which might be 
wrong-headed – desire theorists suggest that perhaps we should pursue the 
satisfaction of the subset of desires we would have if we were fully informed and 
thinking clearly. The idea is to analyze actual desires from a counterfactual 
standpoint that uniquely captures in formal terms what is good for a person. 
Peter Railton suggests that 
an individual’s good consists in what he would want himself to want, or to 
pursue were he to contemplate his present situation from a standpoint fully 
and vividly informed about himself and his circumstances, and entirely free 
of cognitive error or lapses of instrumental rationality.71  
The desires of these ideal advisors, our cognitively ideal counterparts, fix the set 
of desires the satisfaction of which constitutes our well-being. Well-being might 
then consist in the satisfaction of what we might call “ideal desires.”  
At a glance, we can make two initial observations on ideal desire theories. 
First, abbreviating the set of desires to those formed under suitable conditions 
need not violate strong neutrality.72 The recommendations of informed desire 
theories do conflict, at times, with the agent’s present concerns. However, 
informed desire theories accept the subject’s concerns as normative for their 
                                            
71 Peter Railton, “Facts and Values.” In Facts, Values and Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, 54. 
72 See section 1.3. 
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well-being, and only impose procedural conditions to deal with problems with its 
implementation. Although they insist that a subject’s concerns manifest a rational 
structure, the evaluation of a good rests on those concerns alone. Second, 
insisting on reducing well-being to the satisfaction of ideal desires seems to 
violate generality. Not all welfare subjects are able to form or approximate ideal 
desires. It makes little sense to speak of my border collie’s well-being in terms of 
the satisfaction of the set of desires he would form under suitable conditions 
since there is no possible world in which he is able to perform this complex 
cognitive feat. Again, ideal desire theorists might grant the narrowness of their 
account by limiting its generality, applying the account only to entities whose 
well-being it captures fairly well.  
The times have not been kind to ideal desire theories. A first set of worries 
question whether the outcome of the idealization process is predictable enough 
to yield reliable advice.73 Perhaps running the gauntlet would sow in my ideal 
advisor a deep aversion to my personality type so that his advice would be 
hostile. Perhaps it would alter his personality so deeply that I would no longer 
hold the desires of this very different person as normatively relevant to my own 
well-being. A second set of worries questions the coherence of the process. It 
seems unlikely that one could even become as fully informed as the ideal advisor 
account requires.74 Ideal desire theorists generally reply to these worries by 
striving to find a principled way to specify the idealization process. Griffin’s own 
contextual account stipulates that a desire “be formed by appreciation of the 
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74 David Sobel, “Full-information Accounts of Well-Being.” Ethics 104 (1994): 784-810. 
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nature of its object, and it includes anything necessary to achieve it.” 75 Griffin 
admits that the proposal is at once less determinate and less ambitious than 
Railton’s seminal account. Achieving an appreciation of the object may require 
much less than full information and perfect rationality, a feature of his view that 
Griffin deems advantageous.76 
Once we move to an ideal desire theory, however, the appeal to desires 
seems either insufficient for well-being or redundant. First, there is no guarantee 
that even ideal desires would track well-being, since it might simply be a 
psychological fact about a given subject that their ideal desires fail to track 
objective goodness.77 Consider John, a brilliant mathematician who is as rational 
and informed as ideal desire theorists would like. He could contribute to 
important problems in his field but instead develops a strong desire to count 
blades of grass on the lawns of his local university, and devotes his life to the 
enterprise, from which he derives great pleasure.78 Ideal desire theorists are 
committed to the view that John is faring well provided he formed his desire 
under suitable conditions. This is difficult to accept. They might reply that the 
idealization process would rule out grass counting as a defective desire, but it is 
not clear what procedural mistake John is making. In such cases, the appeal to 
ideal desires seems insufficient. Even ideal desire theories, it seems, violate the 
fidelity criterion for descriptive adequacy. 
                                            
75 Griffin (1986): 14. 
76 James Griffin. Value Judgments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 26. 
77 For an instance of this objection, see Richard Arneson, “Human Florishing v. Desire 
Satisfaction,” Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (1999). 
78 John Rawls. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971, 432. 
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Second, even if we grant that ideal desires track well-being, what matters 
now is not that a given object is wanted but that it is worth wanting. In such 
cases, the appeal to desires seems redundant. Since ideal desires track 
independent value, it is trivially true to say something is good for us only if we 
would prefer it under ideal circumstances. Where ideal desire theories go wrong 
is in assuming that it is the fact that we want those things under ideal 
circumstances that makes them good for us to have. What matters is not the fact 
that John desires the object but that his desire reflects an appreciation of the 
nature of its object, that is, recognition of its good qualities, value, or significance. 
In effect, ideal desire theorists violate the formality criterion, confusing the nature 
of well-being with the objects that reliably produce it. We may benefit from having 
objects we would want under suitable conditions, yet wanting itself has no part in 
the nature of well-being.  
For some, this is enough to tip the scales toward objective theories. 
However, instead of returning to theories that explain well-being uniquely in 
terms of the value of objects, we might opt to construct a subjective account from 
the salvage of hedonistic and desire theories. Theories that pursue this middle 
way are committed to addressing the difficult cases that subjective theories face 
without moving to an objective view that would appeal to the value of objects. 
Like their subjective counterparts, theories in this set affirm the agent sovereignty 
thesis, the claim that a person’s schedule of concerns alone determines one’s 
well-being, and they reject the claim that the objects of those concerns have 
further value that bears on well-being.  
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The chief weakness of subjective theories is that they violate the formality 
criterion of descriptive adequacy. Each picks out an important source of well-
being, and gives a lucid account of the sector of our lives in which it best applies. 
I have tried to show that this weakness is the same in each case: each account 
violates the fidelity criterion in the sector of our lives covered by its rivals, and 
salvages its credibility only by limiting the generality of the account. Sumner’s 
theory of authentic happiness is a good example of theories of well-being that 
pursue a conciliatory argumentative strategy. He proposes a hybrid approach 
that explains the property that these goods have in common that makes them 
reliable sources of well-being. 
Authentic happiness draws on different parts of competing subjective 
theories to formulate something in between hedonism and desire theories. Like 
hedonism, authentic happiness ties the nature of well-being to psychological 
responses; like desire theories, it imposes procedural constraints to eliminate 
those responses that do not track well-being. Happiness has an affective and a 
cognitive component. “The cognitive aspect of happiness,” writes Sumner, “is a 
positive evaluation of the conditions of your life, a judgment that, at least on 
balance, it measures up favourably against your standards or expectations.”79 
This evaluation constitutes an affirmation of the conditions of one’s life according 
to criteria of one’s own devising, a judgment that, on the whole and taking 
everything in consideration, life is going well. Meanwhile, “the affective side of 
happiness,” he writes, “consists in what we commonly call a sense of well-being: 
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finding your life enriching or rewarding, or feeling satisfied or fulfilled by it.”80 The 
affective side of Sumner’s account of happiness incorporates an experience 
requirement, which he recommends as “the important insight in classical 
hedonism.”81 One benefits from a state of affairs only if it positively affects the 
quality of one’s experience.  
The cognitive and affective components of happiness together constitute 
endorsement, which is only part of the story of what faring well consists in. 
Whatever else is true, one fares well only if one’s endorsement is authentic; that 
is, only if one’s endorsement accurately reflects one’s point of view. If welfare 
subjects are poorly informed about their circumstances, or if their standards are a 
function of external manipulation, then they are not faring well even if they 
endorse the conditions of their life.82 Endorsements are sufficiently informed 
when more information would not make a difference to the welfare subjects’ 
response to their life given their ideals and concerns.83 Endorsements are 
autonomous when there is no reason to believe that they have been influenced 
by mechanisms that erode the welfare subjects’ capacity to reflect critically on 
their values, standards, and expectations.84 Only when endorsements are 
authentic – when they are informed and autonomous – do they count towards 
well-being. 
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84 Sumner (1996): 171. 
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Sumner’s middle way, then, meets the two conditions that a theory must 
satisfy to count as a subjective theory. First, it affirms the agent sovereignty 
thesis. One’s schedule of concerns alone determines one’s well-being provided 
one’s endorsements are authentic. Second, it denies that the object of these 
concerns have further value. The constraints he proposes for authentic 
happiness offer no substantive critique of the endorsements in play, nor do they 
suggest that one’s ends have independent value that bears on one’s well-being. 
In fact, the procedural constraints empower rather than impede agent 
sovereignty, allowing third-party judgments to override one’s endorsements only 
when there is reason to believe that they do not truly represent one’s point of 
view.  
The resulting account has plausible implications for tests cases. First, 
authentic happiness entails that mental states are not the only thing that matters. 
Schedules of concerns range over both states of the mind and state of the world. 
If knowing that his worldly successes are beholden to an experience machine 
would change Robert’s endorsement of the conditions of his life, then Robert is 
not faring well after all. He does not benefit from his endorsement of the 
experiences the machine constructs because his endorsement does not 
accurately reflect his concern that his experiences connect with reality in the right 
way. With the necessary changes, the same goes for the case of Tom. If learning 
that his partner and colleagues are insincere would change his endorsement of 
the conditions of his life, then he is not faring well however pleasant his mental 
states. Then again, if knowing the relevant information would not change the 
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relevant endorsements in these two cases, then the two men fare well, whatever 
else critics of subjective theories might claim. Hence, authentic happiness 
complies fairly well with the fidelity criterion for descriptive adequacy.   
However, even this most plausible subjective view is susceptible to the 
problem of worth. Whatever subjective theory we choose to pursue will affirm the 
agent sovereignty thesis and deny the independent value of one’s concerns. 
Persons do not value welfare goods because they are good for them; welfare 
goods are good for persons because they value them. In describing welfare 
value exclusively in terms of psychological facts, subjectivists are committed to 
the view that all objects of concerns are on equal axiological footing. All 
pleasures are equally valuable as such, no desire is better in itself than another 
is; no standard is more worthy of concern than another is. If this is right, then one 
can fare well despite the fact that one takes pleasure in worthless pleasures and 
desires, and one’s standards miss the mark. The implication is controversial 
enough to challenge the acceptance of subjective accounts of well-being.  
The problem arises in part because it is difficult to shake the intuition that 
there is more to well-being than bare psychological facts. The worth of the 
objects of one’s concerns also matter. Yet procedural constraints alone do not 
ensure that a person’s pleasures, desires, or standards track the worth of the 
objects of one’s concerns. What is missing from the subjectivist’s assessment of 
John’s rational desire to count blades of grass is an appraisal of the object of his 
desire. The trouble is not that his response is poorly informed, unreasonable, or 
unduly quirky, but that it fails to take into account the assessment that blade 
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counting is nearly worthless. In raising the problem of worth, it is important to 
hold in abeyance judgments concerning the normative adequacy of subjective 
theories. The trouble is not that subjective theories of well-being conflict with a 
favored account of the right. Rather, they fail to provide a descriptively adequate 
account of the nature of well-being. Simply put, there is more to well-being than 
is captured in schedules of concerns. Still, it is possible to overstate the case for 
worth. Like the problem of authority, the problem of worth will have a scalar 
dimension, making more trouble for cases in which the worth of the objects of 
one’s concerns is salient. We might assess, for instance, that worth has little 
bearing on how well the happy toddler or the contented senior fares at a time, yet 
insist that the grass counter does not fare well given the worth of the objects of 
their concerns. 
Subjectivists might reply that we are letting our concerns about John’s 
sanity cloud our assessment of the welfare value of his activities. When we place 
these concerns aside, we can see that such activities are not intrinsically harmful 
for the people who choose to engage in them. In fact, to the extent that subjects 
liked or want them, they are beneficial. We may have justified moral qualms 
about leading these lives. We may think that those who live them could do 
something more useful for others, but these reasons do not impugn their welfare 
value for those who live them. There is room for reasonable doubt, however. 
Recall that well-being is not only the foundation for rational decisions in which 
only personal interests are concerned; it also captures what we have reason to 
promote for the sake of others. Even if we grant that the subjectivists’ replies 
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address the kinds of welfare judgments we make in the first instance, it is not 
obvious that they address those we make in the second. It is difficult to imagine 
recommending the life of the grass-counter to others because of a nagging sense 
that the grass-counter does not fare as well as he could fare. Our concerns are 
not all that matters to our well-being. In some cases, the worth of the object of 
those concerns also matters. 
Elements of this problem are almost as old as subjective theories 
themselves, and motivate, among others views, John Stuart Mill’s distinction 
between higher and lower pleasures. “It is quite compatible with the principle of 
utility,” Mill famously writes, “that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and 
more valuable than others.” If all or almost all of those who are competently 
acquainted with two pleasures agree in preferring one to another, then “we are 
justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment superiority in quality, so far 
outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.”85 Mill’s 
distinction is replete with conceptual problems, not the least of which involves 
trying to formulate a concept of pleasure that makes sense of the claim that 
higher pleasures are more valuable to those who experience them. Nothing in 
the problem of worth itself commits us to Mill’s account of qualitative pleasures, 
however. All that is wanted is the recognition that, in some cases, a descriptively 
adequate conception of well-being must account for the intuition that the worth of 
the objects that subjects pursue matters.  
                                            
85 John Stuart Mill, Collected Works, Vol. X. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969, 211.  
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Ironically, where subjective theories of well-being err is in a well-meaning 
but diffident respect for the autonomy of persons. As we have seen, the 
subjectivity of well-being can seem to be a matter of self-ownership: over himself, 
over his well-being, the individual is sovereign. In this sense, self-interested 
choices and the normative assessment of outcomes rest squarely on the 
person’s schedule of concerns. No other reference group is more relevant, no 
other norm more authoritative, provided the schedule of concerns is formed 
under suitable conditions. In effect, the subjectivist imposes an information 
constraint on welfare judgments: information about the axiological status of the 
object of a person’s concerns is (directly) irrelevant to whether he is faring well. 
To brook an independent value requirement is to impose alien values on 
individuals, and to compromise the main strength of subjective theories, namely, 
that they treat individuals as the final authorities on their well-being under 
suitable conditions.86 
Certainly, addressing the problem of worth involves formulating an 
independent value requirement that makes sense of the notion that some objects 
are more worthy of concern than other objects without succumbing to the 
problem of authority. A successful response should not collapse into an objective 
account; that is, it should not alienate the welfare subject from his own well-being 
or reduce welfare value to a rival dimension of value. Moreover, it should address 
concerns over perceived violations of weak neutrality. As daunting as formulating 
such an account may seem, it is worth remembering that subjectivity alone is, in 
                                            
86 For similar objections, see Sumner (1992), Sumner (1996), and Sumner (2006). 
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some cases, an insufficient metric for well-being. Specifically, it cannot 
adequately deal with cases in which subjects seem not to fare as well as they 
could despite the fact that their responses are formed under suitable conditions. 
In trying to respect unusual but worthy forms of life, subjectivists seem to capture 
common but worthless ones. 
However, the problem of worth puts us in a double bind of its own: if we 
reject the agent sovereignty thesis and the endorsement thesis, we seem 
committed to the claim that concerns alone do not count towards well-being. This 
too is difficult to accept. Subjects may fare best when worthy goods figure on 
their schedule of concerns, but why not think their concerns alone counts at least 
to some extent? The problem of worth implies that John does not fare as well as 
he might if he concerned himself with a more worthy object. However, it seems 
unreasonable to claim that his concerns by themselves fail to count towards well-
being at all. Given the choice of two lives in which John fails to concern himself 
with worthy objects, it must be the case that John fares better in the life in which 
he endorses the conditions of his life than the one in which he does not. 
The problem of worth arises when subjective theories deny the role that 
the worth of a person’s concerns plays in defining what faring well consists in. 
Any account that discounts information concerning whether the ends a person 
pursues are worthwhile fails to capture an important dimension of the welfare 
judgments we actually make. At the same time, it is difficult to accept that one 
part of well-being has no welfare value in the absence of the other. In the case of 
the grass-counter, for instance, it seems unreasonable that endorsement by itself 
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fails to count towards John’s well-being. Plausible solutions to the problem of 
worth must take into consideration both concerns. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
One might worry that the problem of authority and the problem of worth 
are no more than products of our description of the central conflict between 
subjective and objective theories of well-being. Surely, everyone appreciates that 
schedules of concerns have an important place in well-being, and that we tend to 
want and enjoy the objects on typical lists of independently valuable goods. This 
worry misconstrues the issue. The longevity of the Euthyphro dilemma and the 
ease with which each side constructs a general case against the other speaks to 
the salience of the subjective-objective distinction. What matters to disputants on 
each side of the divide is not that the best account of well-being finds some role 
for these elements but that these elements play a central role in well-being. 
One recurring theme in the story of well-being is that we are often tempted 
to sacrifice fidelity to generality. As objections persuade theorists to refine and 
clarify their view, each can reply that their favored theory of well-being gives a 
lucid account of what faring well consists in for the entities whose well-being it 
best captures, even if it fails to capture what faring well consists in for all core 
subjects. Generality gives way to fidelity. We must take care lest the solution we 
propose sacrifice fidelity for generality in the same way. We should strive to 
formulate a formal theory flexible enough to satisfy both criteria.  
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Another recurring theme is that it is difficult to accept that the subjective 
and objective parts of well-being have no welfare value. In the case of the 
depressed artist, it seems unreasonable that objective goods by themselves fail 
to count towards Richard’s well-being at least to some extent. They might not 
count for much in the absence of Richard’s endorsement, but why not think 
objective goods count for something? Similarly, in the case of the grass-counter, 
it seems unreasonable that desire satisfaction by itself fails to count towards 
John’s well-being. He might fare better if he desired a more worthy object, but 
why not think his desire satisfaction counts for something? In suggesting 
solutions to the problem of authority and the problem of worth, we must bear 
these themes in mind.
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Chapter 3: Well-Being and Endorsement 
 
3.1 Introduction 
We now turn to the problem of authority. The greatest obstacle for 
objectivists is their reluctance to grant that endorsing an object is necessary for 
that object to confer a benefit on the subject. This reluctance alienates subjects 
from their own well-being. The case of Richard is tragic precisely because he is 
not faring very well despite the fact that his life contains much that is 
independently valuable. We must take the risk of alienation seriously. To deal 
with the problem of authority, we need an account that affirms the importance of 
relating to objects that engage one’s active interest, attention, and care without 
denying the possible bearing of the worth of those objects on one’s well-being. 
The account must address the problem of authority without sacrificing fidelity to 
generality, and it must accommodate the intuition that objective goods count 
toward well-being to some extent even in the absence of endorsement.87  
In this chapter, I argue that addressing the problem of authority requires 
that we recognize that, in central cases, endorsement is necessary for well-
being. A descriptively adequate theory of well-being should incorporate the 
endorsement thesis: that is, it should grant that, in the central case, the 
possession of some good contributes to one’s well-being only if one endorses it 
under suitable conditions. As we shall see at the end of the chapter, the caveat is 
necessary to deal with the double bind problem. Specifically, it is necessary to 
                                            
87 I specify the aspects of generality with which I am concerned in the conclusion of the preceding 
chapter. 
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build a theory of well-being in a way that escapes the conclusion that either the 
subjective or the objective parts of well-being do not contribute to well-being on 
their own. 
In section 3.2, I formulate a pluralistic model of endorsement. I argue that 
subjective theories seem intuitive largely because of a more general agreement 
concerning the intrinsic importance of such endorsement.  
In section 3.3, I discuss what best explains this agreement. An experience 
of endorsement is constituted in part by a distinctive evaluative attitude that 
captures the intrinsic importance of such experiences to one’s well-being. This 
evaluative attitude is consistent with the agent-relativity of welfare claims.  
In section 3.4, I consider objections to making welfare value depend on 
the subject’s endorsement. I argue that, in central cases, endorsement is 
necessary for welfare, and that objectively good states of affairs one does not 
endorse contribute at least to some extent to one’s welfare. I suggest that the two 
claims together commit us to a discontinuity in welfare value between what I call 
“full fare” and “low fare.” A discontinuity in value is a sharp break between the 
welfare contributions of different kinds of welfare goods such that no amount of 
one good can ever be more valuable than some finite amount of another good. In 
the central case, faring well involves both endorsement and goods. Call the great 
contribution that endorsement and worth make together “full fare.” It is also true 
that endorsement on its own counts toward well-being, though it counts for less 
than the unity. Call the small contribution that endorsement makes on its own 
“low fare.” The discontinuity in welfare value between low fare and full fare is 
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necessary to deal with the double bind problem without abandoning the 
endorsement thesis. 
3.2 Endorsement  
The problem of authority arises from the denial of the agent sovereignty 
thesis. The agent sovereignty thesis holds that one's schedule of concerns alone 
determines one’s well-being. Since objectivists believe that the axiological status 
of the objects of one’s concerns does not depend on their inclusion in one’s 
schedule of concerns, they must reject the claim that one’s schedule of concerns 
alone determines one’s well-being. The rejection of the agent sovereignty thesis 
in turn suggests the denial of the endorsement thesis. The endorsement thesis 
holds that, in central cases, one must endorse a good in order for that good to 
contribute to one’s well-being. If one’s schedule of concerns alone does not 
determine one’s well-being, then perhaps one need not endorse a good in order 
for that good to contribute to one’s well-being. Once one rejects the endorsement 
thesis, the spectre of alienation is not far behind. 
One possible response to the problem of authority is to hold the agent 
sovereignty thesis in abeyance and mount a defence of the endorsement thesis. 
One can hold that endorsement is necessary for well-being in central cases 
without conceding that schedules of concerns alone determine one’s well-being. 
One might insist that the concerns of welfare subjects are not merely additional 
welfare goods that contribute to how well one fares overall, but also a condition 
for objects to contribute to one’s well-being, at least in most cases. The first 
move in this argumentative strategy is to describe the nature of endorsement. 
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Unfortunately, the precise nature of endorsement is contentious. Most welfare 
theorists agree that endorsement matters, but they disagree on what it consists 
in, whether it is a necessary condition for well-being, or whether it is merely a 
reliable source of well-being.  
Endorsement captures the subjective part of well-being. It is tempting to 
define endorsement in terms of a single dimension, and argue for the most fitting 
description of this dimension.88 This approach has not produced a conclusive 
account of endorsement. The literature contains three broad characterisations of 
the subjective dimension of well-being. The first two are hedonistic accounts of 
well-being; the third is an informed desire account. Internalists about pleasure 
define faring well in terms of a distinctive feeling that all pleasant experiences 
share. Unfortunately, describing the exact nature of this feeling is difficult.89 
Externalists about pleasure define faring well in terms of a feeling that is wanted 
or desired by the individual who experiences it.90 Finally, desire theorists define 
faring well as a function of satisfied desire only to falter on the description of the 
set of desires whose satisfaction matters to one’s well-being. None of the 
descriptions of the subjective dimension of well-being captures what faring well 
consists in for all core subjects, though each gives a lucid account of what faring 
well consists in for the entities whose well-being it best captures.91 
                                            
88 For a survey of subjective accounts of well-being, see section 2.3. 
89 Griffin (1986): 8; Sumner (1996): 92-3; Thomas Carson. Value and the Good Life (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 2000), 13-4; Justin Gosling. Pleasure and Desire (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1969), 37-40.  
90 For instance, see Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life, 85, 119; Sumner, “Feldman’s 
Hedonism,” The Good, the Right, Life and Death. Oxford University Press, 2006. 
91 Section 2.4, page 68. I am indebted to Anthony Skelton for pressing the importance of this 
conciliatory claim. 
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Perhaps we should resist this reductive impulse. There is no reason to 
take as fact the claim that the many evaluative states that subjects experience 
necessarily reduce to a single shared property. Suppose we set out to construct 
an account of endorsement at a time that acknowledges the diversity of 
subjective evaluative states. One might say that one endorses an object when 
one favours it, a term chosen deliberately to capture the wide range of possible 
evaluative states that subjects experience. The favouring relation situates the 
subject’s orientation toward a state of affairs along an evaluative dimension. If 
the subject favours a state of affairs, then he or she is positively oriented towards 
that states of affairs. If the subject holds a state of affairs in disfavour, then he or 
she is negatively oriented towards that state of affairs. Finally, if the subject 
neither favours a state of affairs nor holds it in disfavour, then he or she is 
neutrally oriented toward that state of affairs. What might the favouring relation 
include? 
The hedonic quality of experience at a time is a natural first candidate. 
The great lesson of classical hedonism is that sensory pains and pleasures 
matter to one’s well-being. Sensory pains and pleasures capture one’s 
orientation toward eating strawberry ice cream or stepping barefoot on a child’s 
toy. One fares well at a time to the extent that one experiences surplus sensory 
pleasure. However, the hedonic quality of experience at a time on its own is not 
an adequate account of favouring in all cases. There is more to favoring than 
experiencing sensory pleasure and avoiding sensory pain.  
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In some cases, one’s orientation toward states of affairs that do not affect 
one’s immediate sensory experience also matters. For instance, attitudinal 
pleasures differ in quality from sensory ones, yet their physiological and 
behavioral manifestations are no less important to well-being.92 One can 
experience attitudinal pain and pleasure in anticipating or remembering a holiday, 
satisfying one’s curiosity, performing a skilled task with virtuosity, or believing 
that a friend in a distant city is faring reasonably well. What these experiences 
share is not a common sensory quality but an attitudinal response on the part of 
the subject to a state of affairs that does not necessarily affect his or her sensory 
experience. One believes a state of affairs has occurred, is occurring, or will 
occur, and one is pleased or displeased that this is the case.93 One fares well at 
a time to the extent that one is pleased with a given state of affairs. Just as the 
sensory quality of experience must figure in an adequate account of favouring, so 
too must the attitudinal responses to states of affairs that go beyond one’s 
immediate experience. 
Again, one’s attitudinal responses at a time are not an adequate account 
of favouring on their own. This is the case for two reasons. First, the concept of 
attitudinal pleasures fails to explain simpler cases in which one’s orientation 
toward an immediate state of affairs has a merely sensory quality. We might 
follow Feldman in claiming that all cases of sensory pleasure are also cases of 
                                            
92 Michael Kubovy, “On the pleasures of the mind,” Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic 
Psychology. D. Kahneman et al. (eds). New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1999, chapter 7; 
J. Elster and G. Lowenstein, “Utility from memory and anticipation,” in J. Elster and G. Lowenstein 
(eds.), Choice over time. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993, 213-24.  
93 Fred Feldman defines these experiences as attitudinal pleasures. “Two questions about 
pleasure,” Philosophical Analysis (1988): 59-81. See also Pleasure and the Good Life. London: 
Oxford University Press, 2004. 
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attitudinal pleasure.94 However, the move does not seem to do justice to our 
experience of sensory pleasures. My orientation toward eating strawberry ice 
cream or stepping barefoot on a child’s toy has a subjective feel that goes 
beyond an attitudinal response. Second, the concept of attitudinal pleasures fails 
to capture cases in which one favours a state of affairs toward which one is not 
consciously oriented. For instance, subjects report being positively oriented (in 
hindsight) toward states of “flow,” experiences in which both the sensory quality 
of experience and one’s sense of self fade as one becomes engrossed in an 
activity.95 The states of mind one experiences when engaged in engrossing 
athletic or creative activities, like long distance running or playing a musical 
instrument, are paradigmatic flow states. Such experiences involve an 
effacement of the self and a suspension of conscious experience. Unlike mere 
states of intense enjoyment, flow states tend to be enjoyed consciously only in 
hindsight. In the moment, flow states obtain without the sensory qualities of 
sensory pleasures or the complex evaluative and epistemic states typical of 
attitudinal pleasures. In order to favour a state of affairs in the latter sense, one 
must believe that the state of affairs obtains and assess it (at least tacitly) against 
criteria of one’s own devising. Flow states are evidence that the evaluation of 
some stimuli can occur outside awareness, only to become accessible once the 
stimulus ends. An adequate account of favouring must capture these states as 
well. 
                                            
94 See, for instance, his Pleasure and the Good Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 79-
81. 
95 M. Csikszentmihalyi. Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience. New York: Harper and 
Row, 1990. 
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Dispositional accounts of pleasure can inform the sense in which subjects 
endorse states of affairs that occur outside of one’s awareness.96 In such cases, 
we can characterise one’s positive orientation toward a state of affairs at a time 
not as a mental state or as a property of mental states, but as an observable 
disposition to continue or maintain a state of affairs. For instance, we can say 
that marathoners straining to the finish line favour the experience if they 
persevere despite the presence of distressing physical pain, if they become 
frustrated with race interruptions, and if they resist attempts to impede their 
progress. This dispositional account of favouring is not adequate in every case. 
For instance, one might favour the subtle trace of a fragrance but find its 
persistence cloying. In such cases, it seems more fitting to describe favouring in 
terms of sensory pleasure.97 In other cases, it seems more fitting to describe 
favouring in terms of an attitudinal response to a state of affairs. My partner and I 
favoured her giving birth, but it would be odd to describe the favouring in sensory 
or dispositional terms. Neither of us favored the experience for its sensory 
qualities, nor were we disposed for her labor to continue longer than necessary. 
We set out to explore the subjective evaluative states that a pluralistic 
account of endorsement might include. The diversity is intimidating. We can 
characterise a subject’s orientation toward a state of affairs at different times as a 
quality of his or her sensory experience, an attitudinal response to a state of 
affairs, and a disposition to continue or maintain a state of affairs. We must 
suppress the reductionist impulse and accept the complexity of subjective 
                                            
96 Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right. Oxford, Clarendon Press 1979, 40 – 41. 
97 Justin Gosling, Pleasure and Desire. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969, 65. 
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evaluative states that subjects experience. The dimension one emphasizes in a 
given case will depend on the state of affairs under consideration, and the 
purpose for which one is conducting the analysis. In some cases, endorsement 
will involve the sensory quality of an experience; in others, an attitudinal 
response; in still others, a disposition to continue or maintain a state of affairs.98 
In complex cases, two or more subjective evaluative states may come to bear in 
a single analysis of endorsement. 
A natural way to describe endorsement at a time is to reach for a 
pluralistic account that can accommodate this diversity. Call this view 
endorsement as favouring. We can say that one endorses an object when one 
favours it under suitable conditions; that is, when one is positively oriented 
towards it in feeling, thought, and action; or when one anticipates it 
enthusiastically and is disposed to pursue it; or when one is pleased when it 
obtains and one is disposed to continue the experience or maintain the state of 
affairs; or when one has pleasant thoughts about it after it obtains.99 This implies 
that the favouring need not take place at the same time as you experience a 
good, which is necessary to deal with cases such as flow states, where the 
endorsement occurs only in hindsight. This account of endorsement at a time 
identifies two significant evaluative dimensions: an attribute of subjective 
                                            
98 It is debatable whether the dispositional account of endorsement is distinct from a desire 
account of well-being. Brandt (1979) seems to imply that the dispositional account of happiness 
that inspires my own account of endorsement is distinct from desire accounts of well-being. 
Bykvist (2010) questions whether the distinction between the desire account and the dispositional 
is a real distinction but does not pursue the issue. I will continue to treat them as distinct. 
99 My formulation of endorsement relies on Donald Davidson’s account of pro-attitudes. See 
“Actions, reasons and causes.” In Essays on Actions and Events. London: Clarendon Press, 
1980, 4. 
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experience, and an observable tendency to continue an experience or maintain a 
state of affairs. The first dimension captures endorsements that involve a sensory 
or attitudinal orientation to a state of affairs; the second dimension captures 
endorsements that involve a disposition to continue an experience or maintain a 
state of affairs.100  
The considered view I defend in the fifth chapter is that we can address 
the problem of authority, the problem of worth, and the double bind problem by 
defending an accommodating view of well-being according to which one fares 
well at a time when one endorses worthy goods. This is a hybrid theory of well-
being that joins endorsement as favouring with an account of worth. On my 
considered view, endorsement is necessary for well-being at a time, and welfare 
subjects fare better over time when they endorse worthy objects. As we shall see 
at the end of this chapter, the caveat that endorsement is only necessary for well-
being in central cases is necessary to deal the double bind problem. While a full 
assessment of the descriptive adequacy of my considered view must wait for the 
fifth chapter, we can appreciate the impact of endorsement as favouring on the 
generality of the subjective part of the account. 
Endorsement as favouring is not a conjunctive account of the subjective 
part of well-being, though its elements can interact in various ways. Insisting on 
                                            
100 One might wonder whether there is room for desire in a pluralistic account of endorsement. 
Depending on how broadly one characterises the attitudinal and dispositional dimensions of 
endorsement, it can be difficult to distinguish between a state of affairs one is pleased obtains, a 
state of affairs one is disposed to continue, and a state of affairs that one is satisfied obtains. 
Moreover, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the dispositional view of pleasure and 
the attitudinal view. Fred Feldman treats them as separate. See “On the intrinsic value of 
pleasure.” Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 
125-150. 
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describing favouring as a single distinctive evaluative state or a necessary 
conjunction of such states would be misleading. In some cases, the obtaining of 
a single dimension will be sufficient to warrant the claim that a subject favours a 
state of affairs; in most cases, several conditions will be jointly sufficient. The 
upshot is a descriptively adequate account of endorsement that can capture the 
wide range of evaluative states characteristic of different welfare subjects from 
the animal to the human, the fetus to the senior.  
For instance, human adults who endorse eating strawberry ice cream are 
likely to be positively oriented toward the activity along a number of dimensions. 
They will be positively oriented toward eating strawberry ice cream in feeling, 
thought, and action, they will be disposed to pursue it for a time, and they will 
have pleasant thoughts about it after the state of affairs obtains. Experiences 
such as those of straining marathoners may also call for a multi-faceted 
description, one that includes not only their disposition to continue the race, but 
also the hedonic quality of their experience, their attitudes about the race, and 
their expectations about their performance. In other cases, endorsement will 
consist of a more modest combination of evaluative states, or involve only 
unconscious evaluative states. The endorsement of a toddler nestled in a warm 
blanket is no less significant for lacking the sophistication of adults, who are more 
likely to anticipate, savor, and remember the states of affairs they endorse. 
Likewise, the endorsement of autotelic agents immersed in flow states is no less 
significant for its unconscious character.101 Flow states make important 
                                            
101 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi describes autotelic agents as people who are internally driven and 
more likely to experience flow states. Csikszentmihalyi (1997): 117.  
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contributions to well-being despite the fact that we cannot characterise subjects 
at the time as positively oriented towards them in feeling and thought. Still, they 
may well anticipate them, be disposed to continue them, and have pleasant 
thoughts about them after they obtain. 
The requirement that favouring occur under suitable conditions concedes 
that some favourings are susceptible to procedural mistakes. On this account, 
some kinds of favourings involve a perception of a qualitative feature of a state of 
affairs, such as its sensory profile. Others involve a judgment assessing some 
feature of a state of affairs against criteria of one’s devising, such as its attitudinal 
profile. Following Sumner, we might insist that one’s attitudinal responses be 
informed and autonomous. If more information would change one’s grasp of a 
state of affairs or change one’s evaluative criteria, or if there is reason to believe 
that mechanisms have eroded one’s capacity to reflect critically on one’s values, 
standards, and expectations, then one’s favouring is suspect. Hence, Tom, the 
deceived executive who falsely believes his life a success, may not fare well 
despite the fact that he is positively oriented toward his experiences. The 
deception may not affect his experience ex hypothesi, but it is reasonable to 
suspect that more information would change his attitudinal response to the 
conditions of his life.102 In the possible world where more information would not 
affect his judgment, then Tom fares well despite the deception.  
Notice that perceptions and judgments are not equally susceptible to 
procedural mistakes. Suppose a toddler favours resting under a warm blanket in 
                                            
102 See section 2.3. 
 85 
 
the sense that he or she experiences surplus sensory pleasure when the state of 
affairs obtains. It is difficult to imagine how such favouring could be mistaken. 
This is an important epistemic difference between the sensory and attitudinal 
components of endorsement as favouring. Note that the different dimensions of 
well-being may conflict as well. I may take sensory pleasure in something that 
later displeases me in an attitudinal sense. In such cases, we must weigh the 
intensity of one kind of endorsement against the other and determine the 
intensity of the endorsement overall. It would certainly be simpler to abandon the 
pluralistic account in favor of another that reduces endorsement to a single 
dimension. However, the pluralistic account is consistent with how we make 
welfare judgments in practice. The subjective part of well-being does not reduce 
to a single dimension. Rather, we reach for the kind of endorsement that is most 
compelling in a given case. In some cases, as when I am considering the impact 
of eating strawberry ice cream on my well-being, it will make most sense to draw 
on the sensory part of endorsement. In other cases, as when I am considering 
the impact of anticipating a vacation on my well-being, it will make most sense to 
draw on the attitudinal part of endorsement. In central cases, one kind of 
endorsement will likely be dominant. 
Is endorsement in this sense necessary for well-being under suitable 
conditions? Perhaps the weaker claim that such endorsement matters is not a 
bad place to start searching for an answer. What reasons do we have to believe 
that this less controversial claim is true? Our practices surrounding endorsement 
provide at least some initial reasons for believing that it matters to our well-being. 
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We capture endorsements in schedules of concerns; we act as if they matter; we 
believe that they give direction to our actions; and we believe that they constrain 
the actions of others. In cases where morality requires that we modify our 
schedules of concerns for the sake of others, we experience the change as a 
loss, though we may adopt it willingly and we may ultimately benefit from it later. 
Conversely, the claim that endorsement as such and on its own has no value, 
that what one cares about lacks intrinsic importance, has unattractive 
consequences. It implies that projects and relationships for which we care deeply 
do not matter as such, and that involuntary pleasures, like the comfort we take in 
a warm blanket, make no intrinsic contributions to our well-being. We may insist 
with Sumner that endorsement be authentic, i.e. informed, and autonomous, but 
once we do so, it is difficult to deny its intrinsic importance. 
The consequences of denying the intrinsic importance of endorsement are 
even more unattractive in cases involving negative endorsements. This is the 
case particularly if one maintains a symmetrical view of the importance of welfare 
and illfare, that is, if one assumes that faring well and faring poorly are equally 
important.103 We can say that one rejects an object when one holds it in disfavour 
under suitable conditions: that is, when one is negatively oriented towards it in 
feeling, thought, and action; one anticipates it unenthusiastically and is disposed 
to avoid bringing it into being; one is displeased when it obtains, and one is 
disposed to discontinue the experience or bring the state of affairs to an end; and 
                                            
103 The term “welfare” has no obvious opposite in English, which makes it difficult to express the 
idea of the importance of states of affairs in which one fares well and others in which one fares 
poorly. For my purposes, the term “illfare” refers to the latter. 
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one has unpleasant thoughts about it after it obtains. Denying the intrinsic 
importance of negative endorsements implies that rejecting a state of affairs also 
lacks intrinsic importance; that physical injuries, headaches, and mental anguish 
have no disvalue as such and on their own; and that poor Richard’s depression 
in itself does not bear on his well-being. These claims will strike all but the most 
ascetic observer as seriously implausible. 
Still, the endorsement thesis, the claim that endorsement is necessary for 
well-being, must turn on something more than broad agreement with the weaker 
claim that endorsement matters, if only to address suspicions that the judgment 
is premature, and the endorsement thesis, too ambitious. Even if endorsement 
matters, it may not matter in every case; that is, it may not be necessary for well-
being. 
Recognizing the intrinsic importance of endorsement requires that we 
grasp the relation between well-being and experience. We must preserve what 
Griffin calls the experience requirement.104 Placing an experience requirement on 
well-being commits us to the view that the explanation or justification of the 
welfare value of a state of affairs derives in part from its effect, actual or possible, 
on human experience and its quality. The modal conditions embedded in this 
description of experience requirement are necessary to account for cases in 
which the welfare subject’s endorsement is inauthentic. If more information about 
one’s circumstances would make a difference to one’s judgment about how well 
one is faring, or if one’s standards are a function of external manipulation, then 
                                            
104 Griffin (1986): 13-19. 
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one does not fare well despite the state of affairs’ actual effect on one’s 
experience and its quality. More simply, in most cases, welfare subjects benefit 
from a given state of affairs only if that state of affairs has an effect on them. 
Endorsement as favouring meets the experience requirement in its most 
general sense. On this view, one cannot be positively oriented towards a state of 
affairs that does not have an effect on one’s mind or experience. The 
phenomenology of well-being that emerges from endorsement as favouring is 
familiar. The environment affects welfare subjects; their brain evaluates the 
relevant states of affairs and generates an orientation to them; those orientations 
are fairly stable and reliable under suitable conditions; and welfare subjects have 
access to some orientations and can communicate them to others. In some 
cases, such as flow states, the evaluation of a state of affairs will be below the 
threshold of awareness. In others, it will have a merely sensory quality, and lack 
the complex beliefs and attitudes about its occurrence or its welfare value that 
attitudinal orientations have. However, in all cases, endorsement as favouring 
implies that states of affairs that confer harm or benefit on a welfare subject must 
affect the experience of subjects. This claim seems to have controversial 
implications. For instance, it seemingly implies that the deceived executive who 
falsely believes his life a success fares well despite the deception. This 
conclusion is less controversial than it may seem at first glance. 
As we have seen, desire theorists argue that preserving the connection 
between experience and well-being entails that mental states are all that 
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matter.105 This commits us to the view that Tom, the deceived executive who 
falsely believes his life a success, fares well to the extent that he endorses the 
conditions of his life, since the deception does not affect his experience ex 
hypothesi. As Griffin describes it, “if the delusion is complete, one believes that 
one has the truth; the mental states involved in believing something that really is 
true and believing a successful deception are the same.”106 The intimate relation 
between well-being and experience implies that Tom fares well ‘on the inside’ 
despite what his life may seem like to observers ‘from the outside.’ Desire 
theorists insist that what we do not know can harm or benefit us. If Tom wants his 
children to fare well and unbeknownst to him they do not, Tom does not fare well 
despite the fact that his mental states are indistinguishable from someone whose 
children do fare well. Therefore, the experience requirement is false: mental 
states are not all that matters.  
Other writers have suggested ways to lessen the sting of the experience 
requirement. We can do so in two ways. First, we can insist with Sumner that 
Tom endorse the state of affairs under suitable conditions. This seems right. If 
Tom is poorly informed or if his standards are a function of external manipulation, 
that is, if they are not authentic, then he is not faring well at a time despite his 
endorsement.107 The concession does not threaten the intrinsic importance of 
endorsement to well-being since it merely imposes procedural constraints on 
welfare value, a constraint that sustains rather that impedes agent sovereignty. 
                                            
105 See section 2.3., page 51. For a discussion of this position, see Parfit (1984), Griffin (1986), 
Kagan (1992) and Kagan (1994). 
106 Griffin (1986): 13. 
107 Sumner (1996): 172. 
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Second, we can explain our reluctance to grant that Tom fares well 
despite the deception. As Feldman points out, when considering Tom’s case, it is 
tempting to project ourselves into the thought-experiment.108 This too seems 
right. Perhaps knowing what we know of Tom’s life, we would not want to be in 
his shoes. Of course, the projection violates the conditions of the thought-
experiment: we are assuming that the deception will never affect Tom’s 
experience. If we hold the conditions of the thought-experiment constant, the 
claim that Tom fares well despite the deception is more plausible. 
It is unfortunate that the case of Tom anchors discussions of the 
soundness of the experience requirement. Certainly, we can explain the harm in 
Tom’s case by appealing to the claim that things other than mental states matter 
to well-being. However, the experience requirement is not a claim about the 
kinds of objects that have welfare value, but a claim about the kind of relation 
that must hold between the subject and a state of affairs for that state of affairs to 
have welfare value. Specifically, the experience requirement establishes that a 
state of affairs must affect a subject in order to confer a harm or benefit. It is 
perhaps no surprise that the insistence of desire theorists to abandon the 
experience requirement generates the scope problem.109 On one view, the 
reason that I do not benefit from the satisfaction of my desire that a stranger met 
briefly fare well is that it does not affect my experience. In a limited sense, 
experience delineates the boundaries of well-being.110  
                                            
108 Feldman (2004): 110. 
109 Section 2.3, page 55. 
110 This is discussed in Parfit (1984): 494. 
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This claim is far less controversial than the claim that only mental states 
matter, since it is consistent with the claim that things other than mental states 
matter to one’s well-being. We have good reason to believe that experience is 
necessary for well-being at a time. Following Kagan, we can observe that, since 
Tom’s well-being is a state of his person, changes in his well-being must involve 
changes in his mind or his body. Since the deception does not involve changes in 
Tom’s mind or body, it does not have an impact on his well-being.111 Kagan 
thinks that this entails that our experiences alone ground our well-being, but we 
need not accept this stronger claim, nor do we need to conclude that only actual 
and occurrent mental states matter to one’s well-being.112 For instance, 
unconscious mental states (such as flow states) and the very specific 
counterfactual mental states implied by Sumner’s authenticity conditions also 
matter. 
We may be tempted to judge that Tom fares well, but that in light of the 
deception, he does not fare as well as he might otherwise fare. The temptation to 
account for the deception does not suggest that Tom’s life is bereft of welfare 
value, or that his endorsement is not necessary for well-being. Rather, it may 
suggest that we recognize the deception as an important axiological factor in the 
assessment of his well-being. Experience may delineate the boundaries of Tom’s 
well-being, but the quality of Tom’s experience may not be the only factor 
relevant to his well-being. 
                                            
111 Kagan (1994): 317-9. 
112 Kagan rejects this view in a later piece. See “Well-being as enjoy the good.” Philosophical 
Perspectives 23 (2009): 253-272. 
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In effect, it is possible to defend the endorsement thesis without asserting 
the agent sovereignty thesis. That is, we can hold that endorsement is necessary 
for well-being without committing to the view that schedules of concern alone 
determine one’s well-being. Other axiological factors matter too. We can capture 
this judgment in two ways. 
In the first, one’s endorsement counts toward one’s well-being, but the 
state of affairs that comprises one’s endorsement alone constitutes a whole of 
less welfare value than another possible state of affairs that contains one’s 
endorsement and an independently valuable object. In Tom’s case, his 
endorsement counts toward his well-being, but the state of affairs that comprises 
his endorsement and the deception constitutes a whole of less welfare value than 
another possible state of affairs in which Tom endorses the conditions of his life 
and he is not deceived. The first explanation attaches welfare value to the state 
of affairs as a whole, and adjusts the value to accommodate all the relevant 
axiological factors.  
In the second, one’s endorsement counts towards one’s well-being, but an 
independently valuable object increases the welfare value of the endorsement 
itself. In Tom’s case, his endorsement counts towards his well-being, but the 
deception diminishes the welfare value of the endorsement itself. The second 
explanation attaches welfare value to one’s endorsement, and applies a discount 
rate to the value of the endorsement to account for other axiological factors.  
In either case, endorsement is necessary to one’s well-being, but 
properties of the state of affairs one endorses affect how well one fares as 
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well.113 That is, in either case, endorsement is necessary to Tom’s well-being, but 
properties of the state of affairs he endorses affect how well he fares overall. 
Whichever explanation we choose to capture the judgment, Tom fares well, but 
not as well as he would fare were he not deceived. Hence, it is possible to 
defend the endorsement thesis without asserting the agent sovereignty thesis. 
That is, it is possible to hold that endorsement is necessary for well-being in 
central cases without holding that one’s schedule of concern alone determines 
one’s well-being. We can have endorsement without sovereignty.  
Accepting endorsement as favouring does not commit us to the view that 
schedules of concern alone always determine one’s well-being. Other properties 
of states of affairs may matter to one’s well-being. This limitation is necessary to 
deal with the double bind problem. Subjects may fare well in states of affairs they 
endorse, but unless the independent value of goods alone counts at least to 
some extent, it will be impossible to account for some difficult cases. Given the 
choice of two states of affairs, both of which one fails to endorse, it must be the 
case that one fares better in the state of affairs in which one relates to 
independently valuable objects than in the one in which one does not. 
We have not yet shown that the endorsement thesis is true; that is, we 
have not yet shown that endorsement is necessary for well-being in central 
cases, a claim on which a solution to the problem of authority hinges. What we 
need to capture the latter is an argument that establishes that, in central cases, 
endorsed experience is necessary for well-being. 
                                            
113 For a discussion of the two readings of organic unities, see Tom Hurka, “Two Kinds of Organic 
Unities,” The Journal of Ethics 2 (1998): 299-320. 
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3.3 Agent-Relativity 
In this section, I argue that endorsed experience is a constitutive part of 
well-being. Endorsement as favouring is a collection of sensory, attitudinal, and 
dispositional orientations to states of affairs that affect the welfare subject. We 
can say that one endorses an object when one favours it under suitable 
conditions; that is, when one is positively oriented towards it in feeling, thought, 
and action; or when one anticipates it enthusiastically and is disposed to pursue 
it; or when one is pleased when it obtains and one is disposed to continue the 
experience or maintain the state of affairs; or when one has pleasant thoughts 
about it after it obtains. When subjects experience endorsement, they recognize 
that it is constitutive of states of affairs that contribute to well-being. That is, one 
cannot knowingly favour an object without recognizing that such experiences in 
part constitute what it is to fare well.  
Endorsement as favouring is an epistemic and not a metaphysical claim. 
Puppies and toddlers are positively oriented toward a great many states of 
affairs, though they are unable to reflect philosophically on the welfare value of 
that orientation. For reflective human adults, however, the evaluation is an 
integral part of the experience. This is not simply the claim that welfare subjects 
value well-being because part of what constitutes welfare states is that they 
endorse them. The latter can only establish that welfare subjects value states of 
affairs that they endorse; it does not yet establish that these states of affairs are 
good for them. The necessary connection between endorsement and well-being 
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derives from the agent-relativity of well-being, the intuitive claim that one’s well-
being generates reasons for acting. Subjective theories of well-being seem 
intuitive largely because the endorsement thesis makes clear the relation 
between one’s well-being and the agent-relativity of well-being. 
Consider how Parfit deploys the agent-relativity of well-being against the 
moral sceptic. Parfit asks whether we have good reason to believe that the 
question of the objectivity of ethics remains open, and notices that most moral 
sceptics are not sceptics about rationality. If we accept that there are reasons for 
acting, then it is an open question whether some reasons for acting are moral 
reasons. Parfit suggests that we already accept that one has an agent-relative 
reason to promote one’s own well-being. “Suppose that, unless I move, I shall be 
killed by a falling rock, and that what I now most want is to survive. Do I have a 
reason to move? It is undeniable that I do.” The claim that one has such a 
reason, he asserts, “would have been accepted in all civilizations, at all times. 
This claim is true.” 114 Well-being has agent-relative normativity in the sense that 
the claim that a state of affairs is good for someone generates a reason for that 
person to bring it into being. In a word, our personal well-being should matter to 
us. It is no accident that we often focus on the role that well-being plays in self-
interested decisions. The agent-relativity of well-being explains the place we give 
to well-being in decision-making that involves only our personal interests. It also 
explains why we take the well-being of others into consideration. The agent-
relative normativity of well-being justifies our concern for the well-being of our 
                                            
114 Parfit (1984): 452. 
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intimates, and the moral consideration we give to the well-being of strangers. A 
person’s well-being should matter to us because it should matter to them (and it 
usually does). 
Recognizing that endorsement is necessary for well-being spells out the 
agent-relativity of well-being: if S endorses x, then S is good for x and S has a 
reason to bring x into being. Objective theories that include endorsement as one 
good among others fail to capture this relation. We can see the truth of this claim 
if we return to the case of Richard.  
Richard experiences many goods, but tragically, he fails to endorse them. 
His work with the Smithsonian is drudgery, an activity in which he takes no 
enjoyment and from which he takes no satisfaction.115 What matters to Richard’s 
well-being is not only that he experience the goods in his life but also that he be 
positively oriented towards them. The constitutive part that endorsement plays in 
Richard’s well-being makes a stronger claim than merely that suffering and regret 
mar his life, that these features make his life worse for him on the face of it. If 
Richard’s well-being were merely an objective matter, then the positive 
contributions that other goods make to his life could outweigh these negative 
consequences. However, the presence of other goods does not outweigh the fact 
that he does not endorse the conditions of his life, or that his schedule of 
concerns is frustrated. 
If they fail to affirm the endorsement thesis, the best that theories of well-
being can do is provide an agent-neutral account of the normativity of well-being. 
                                            
115 Section 2.3, page 47. 
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Since objective accounts do not tie benefits to a particular perspective, the claim 
that a person would relate to objects of value in a given state of affairs generates 
a reason for anyone to bring it into being. This misrepresents the nature of well-
being and its role in practical reasoning. A formal example should help illustrate 
this idea. 
First, assume that the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral 
reasons follows Nagel’s distinction between subjective and objective reasons.116 
According to Nagel, reasons are universal; that is, for every token reason, there 
is a predicate R, which figures in the following universally quantified proposition:  
Every reason is a predicate R such that for all persons p and events A, if 
R is true of A, then p has prima facie reason to promote A.117 
Nagel defines a subjective reason as one “whose defining predicate R contains a 
free occurrence of the variable p,” where p is a member of the set of free 
agents.118 All reasons either contain a free-agent variable or they do not. The 
former reasons are subjective; the latter are objective.  
Now, suppose there is a reason for Richard to restore art because doing 
so would be good for Richard. This suggests a principle of action corresponding 
to Richard’s reason:  
                                            
116 Nagel distinguishes between subjective and objective reasons in The Possibility of Altruism. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970. Parfit later introduces the term agent-relative and agent-
neutral in Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Nagel adopts this 
nomenclature in The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. There are other 
ways to draw the distinction. For alternatives, see P. Pettit, “Universality without Utilitarianism,” 
Mind, 72 (1987): 74-82 and Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1993. 
117 Nagel (1970): 47. 
118 Nagel (1970): 91. 
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For any person p and any action A, if A would be good for p, then p has 
reason to promote A.  
This first principle of action captures the agent-relativity of well-being: it says that 
if an action contributes to one’s well-being, then one has reason to promote the 
action. Parfit asserts boldly that all civilizations have accepted this principle in all 
times. 
Conversely, suppose that we express Richard’s reason to restore art as 
follows: there is a reason for Richard to restore art because doing so would be 
good for someone. In the second case, the fact that the person benefitted is 
Richard is incidental. If restoring art were good for Richard’s neighbor, then 
Richard would have just as much reason to restore art. This suggests a principle 
of action corresponding to this reason:  
For any person p and any action A, if A is good for someone, then p has 
reason to promote A. 
This second principle of action is agent-neutral: it says that if an action 
contributes to anyone’s well-being, then one has reason to promote the action. 
The second principle raises two difficulties.  
First, the claim that we already accept that one has an agent-neutral 
reason to promote someone else’s well-being is difficult to accept. Suppose that, 
contra Parfit, someone will be killed by a falling rock, and that what they now 
most want is to survive. It is far from undeniable that the moral sceptic has a 
reason to do anything at all. Even if they accept that there are reasons for acting, 
it is an open question whether there are moral reasons, that is, whether there are 
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agent-neutral reasons that motivate an action that would prevent the falling rock 
from killing someone, especially when doing so will put the rescuer’s own well-
being at risk. The point is not that no moral reasons can be given to motivate a 
duty of rescue, but only that those reasons are open to doubt in the way that 
agent-relative reasons to promote one’s well-being are not.  
The second difficulty is that the agent-neutral principle effaces the 
relevance of the identity of the agent who stands to benefit from the action one 
promotes. On the second account, the fact that Richard is the agent having a 
negative experience, and that Richard is the agent whose schedule of concerns 
is frustrated, is not germane to the judgment that one has reason to promote an 
action addressing his plight, even if one is Richard himself. To paraphrase Parfit, 
this hardly seems like a claim that all civilizations, at all times, would have 
accepted. It seems incredible to claim that a welfare judgment that disregards 
Richard’s identity so completely has anything to do with him at all. The second, 
agent-neutral principle risks reducing the welfare subject to a bare person of a  
Rawlsian kind, an abstraction that is “ready to consider any new convictions and 
aims, and even to abandon attachments and loyalties, when doing this promises 
a life with greater overall…well-being, as specified by a public ranking.”119 
Whether the life of a bare person is good for that person seems to have nothing 
to do with the person who actually lives that life or their schedule of concerns. 
                                            
119 John Rawls mentions bare persons in the context of an argument against utilitarianism and 
subjective theories of well-being. See “Social Unity and Primary Goods,” in Utilitarianism and 
Beyond. Edited by Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, 1982, 181. 
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Instead, it has everything to do with the agent-neutral reasons moving one to 
action, and the good one can promote from an agent-neutral standpoint.  
On the second account of prudential reasons, then, well-being is divorced 
entirely from the person whose well-being is at issue, reduced to one value 
among others that one might promote for the sake of increasing the world’s total 
stock of value. One can imagine Richard considering whether to sacrifice his 
schedule of concern for the sake of the value his work creates without giving a 
second thought to the fact that the schedule of concerns sacrificed will be his. 
This misrepresents the nature of well-being and its role in practical reasoning. 
Without affirming the endorsement thesis, we lack an argument to bring out the 
agent-relativity of well-being. Once we grant that endorsement plays a 
constitutive role in the nature of well-being, however, the agent-relative 
normativity of well-being stems plainly from schedules concerns. 
 
3.4 Objections 
One might object to making any value, even welfare value, conditional on 
endorsement. In Virtue, Vice and Value, for instance, Hurka considers the 
endorsement thesis in the context of a general thesis about the nature of value. 
According to the conditionality view, suggests Hurka, we can say that an object’s 
intrinsic value is conditional on the love, desire, or pleasure one takes in an 
object. Like the endorsement thesis, the conditionality view makes the value of 
an object provisional on one’s attitude: “the love of x is in some cases not an 
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additional good to x but a condition on x’s having value.”120 Hurka ascribes the 
conditionality view to political philosophers who defend an endorsement 
constraint on perfectionist goods.121  
The defining feature of the conditionality view is that it denies that 
perfectionist states such as knowledge and achievement have value in the 
absence of an appropriate response on the part of the subject. If the subject does 
not believe that knowledge or achievement are intrinsically good, or if they are 
not the object of a generic positive attitude on the part of the subject, then 
perfectionist states are worthless. Hurka argues that this denial is 
counterintuitive, a point he presses by imagining an artist who creates 
exceptional works of art, but whose performance hinges on setting exacting 
standards for her work. Regrettably, her standards take their toll and she 
gradually becomes dissatisfied until she no longer loves her work either 
intellectually or emotionally. “It is uncontroversial that her inability to value her 
work for itself is a loss,” suggests Hurka, “but to say it deprives her highly skillful 
activity of all worth is going too far.”122  
A second related objection to making any value, even welfare value, 
conditional on endorsement is that one can endorse the conditions of one’s life 
for superficial reasons. The endorsement thesis holds welfare value hostage to 
the whims of the subject’s responses, which can be weak, impulsive, and 
confused. Richard Arneson makes this case most forcefully. He imagines the 
                                            
120 Thomas Hurka, Vice, Virtue, Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 181. 
121 See Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
216, 277-8. 
122 Hurka (2001): 187-8. 
 102 
 
case of a brilliant writer who fails to endorse the quality of her work on the ground 
of an aesthetic theory she has foolishly embraced.123 Surely, her achievement is 
good for her despite the fact that she fails to endorse it intellectually.  
Where the first objection insists on the perfectionist value of objects one 
fails to endorse, the second insists on their welfare value. The trouble is that both 
objections lead inexorably to the problem of authority. If we deny that 
endorsement is necessary for well-being, then we risk alienating subjects from 
their own well-being. We can grant the two objections without jeopardising the 
endorsement thesis, however. We can do so in two ways.  
First, we can restrict the scope of the endorsement thesis explicitly to 
welfare value. Much like our Richard, the disillusioned artist toils at her art but 
she does not endorse the conditions of her life. She endorses neither the process 
nor the product, yet she creates striking works of art that add to the world’s store 
of objective goods. One can hold that the art she produces has great value, as 
Hurka does, yet deny that it has welfare value. That is, we can hold that the state 
of affairs is good simpliciter without holding that it is good for her. The art she 
produce may have a great deal of value in a perfectionist sense, but she does 
not fare much better from her standpoint for all that. Hurka can resist the 
restricted application of the conditionality view to welfare, but only at the cost of 
identifying welfare value with perfectionist value.124 Unfortunately, this response 
                                            
123 Richard Arneson, “Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction,” Social Philosophy and 
Policy 16 (Winter 1999): 35-8. 
124 It is worth noting that Hurka proposes perfectionism as an alternative to welfare value. See 
Perfectionism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, 15. 
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not only generates the problem of authority, alienating the welfare subject from 
her well-being, but it also reduces welfare value to a rival dimension of value.125 
Second, we can question whether the artist’s endorsement occurs under 
suitable conditions. If more information about the independent value of her work 
would change her evaluative criteria or her grasp of the state of affairs under 
evaluation, then her endorsement is suspect. We can draw a similar conclusion if 
there is reason to believe that the life of the struggling artist has eroded her 
capacity to reflect critically on her values, standards, and expectations. One can 
hold that the actual endorsements of welfare subjects are sometimes weak, 
impulsive and confused, as Arneson holds, yet insist that endorsements under 
suitable conditions are necessary for well-being. Again, to insist otherwise invites 
the kind of alienation from her well-being that generates the problem of authority. 
Arneson is willing to take the objection further. Imagine that the struggling 
artist attains all the goods listed on the most promising objective theory of well-
being but that by some quirk of her psychology, she fails to respond positively to 
them. For good measure, we can imagine that she responds to this axiological 
bounty under suitable conditions. Given that she has every good but the good of 
endorsement, it seems incredible to claim that this single character trait reduces 
her well-being to nothing.126 Surely, the independent value of the state of affairs 
she fails to endorse contributes to her well-being at least to some extent. This 
more ambitious objection resonates with the objectivist’s concern with informed 
                                            
125 Section 2.3, 66. 
126 Richard Arneson, “Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction,” Social Philosophy and 
Policy 16 (Winter 1999): 37. 
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desire accounts.127 It is difficult to imagine recommending the life of the grass-
counter to others because of a nagging sense that the grass-counter does not 
fare as well as he could fare. These three objections suggest that the agent 
sovereignty thesis is false: our concerns are not all that matters to our well-being. 
In some cases, the worth of the object of those concerns also matters.  
In effect, Arneson’s objection raises the double bind problem under a 
slightly different guise. Moore’s method of isolation can guide our intuitions in this 
case.128 Consider two nearly identical states of affairs, each of which the 
disillusioned artist equally fails to endorse. The only relevant difference between 
the two worlds is that one contains objective goods and the other does not. 
Which state of affairs does she have most reason to pursue for her own sake, 
and which one do others have most reason to promote for the sake of another? 
The intuition that objective goods matter at least to some extent seems correct. It 
seems unreasonable to claim that objective goods by themselves fail to count 
towards the disillusioned artist’s well-being. One might be tempted to reply that 
the disillusioned artist should be indifferent between the two worlds insofar as her 
welfare is concerned, but it is difficult to accept this response from the third 
person standpoint of someone who cares for her. When I think about which state 
of affairs I would promote for my own child, each of which he fails to endorse, I 
estimate that I would have most reason to promote for his own sake the state of 
affairs that contained objective goods over another that contained none. 
                                            
127 Section 2.3, 56. 
128 G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica. Oxford University Press, 2003, 142, 145-7, 236, 256. 
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Arneson concludes that endorsement is not necessary for well-being, 
which invites the kind of alienation that generates the problem of authority. This 
will not do. As I argued in section 3.3, agent-relativity is an essential feature of 
welfare value. If there really is no endorsement, then there is no welfare value. 
This does not imply that the lives under examination are worthless. In the case of 
the disillusioned artist, as in the case of Richard, there are plenty of other kinds 
of goods present. Our disillusioned artist is involved in the creation of beauty, and 
her activity displays excellence appropriate to the kind of activity in which she 
engages. Moreover, it is plausible to suppose that the art she creates is useful to 
others, and that the activity in which she engages has a kind of moral value. The 
presence of these other kinds of value might explain our hesitation when faced 
with a Moorean choice. If I had to choose between two equally unendorsed 
states of affairs on behalf of someone for whom I cared, I might promote a 
valuable state of affairs over a worthless one. I could take comfort in knowing 
that they would at least lead valuable lives, even if they failed to endorse them. 
However, an unendorsed state of affairs has no welfare value. This analysis 
explains our reaction to the double bind problem without claiming that goods 
have value by themselves. It implies that, given two states of affairs, each of 
which one equally fails to endorse, it makes sense to promote the state of affairs 
that contains independently valuable goods than over another that does not.  
What are we to do with the grass-counter? It is difficult to imagine 
recommending the life of the grass-counter to others because of a nagging sense 
that the grass-counter does not fare as well as he could fare. Our concerns are 
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not all that matters to our well-being. In some cases, the worth of the object of 
those concerns also matters. We can explain our reaction to the case of the 
grass-counter if we accept that a discontinuity in welfare value between what I 
call “low fare” and “full fare.” A discontinuity in value is a sharp break between the 
welfare contributions of different kinds of welfare goods such that no amount of 
one good can ever be more valuable than some finite amount of another good. In 
the central case, faring well involves both endorsement and goods. Call the great 
contribution that endorsement and worth make together “full fare.” It is also true 
that endorsement on its own counts toward well-being, though it counts for less 
than the unity. Call the small contribution that endorsement makes on its own 
“low fare.” This discontinuity is necessary to deal with the double bind problem 
without abandoning the endorsement thesis. On this view, the grass-counter 
fares well since we are supposing that he endorses his worthless activity, but he 
experiences a relatively low amount of welfare. The discontinuity in welfare value 
not only explains why the disillusioned artist fares much better in any state of 
affairs she does endorse; it also explains why it is difficult to imagine 
recommending the life of the grass-counter to others. However well he fares, he 
would fare much better if he endorsed a more worthy state of affairs.  
Hence, in standard cases, endorsement is necessary for well-being. In 
cases when endorsement is not in the offing, one has most reason to choose for 
oneself or for someone for whom one cares the state of affairs with independent 
value, though an endorsed state of affairs would still be for the best.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that addressing the problem of authority requires 
that we recognize that endorsement is necessary for well-being in central cases. 
A descriptively adequate theory of well-being should incorporate the 
endorsement thesis: that is, it should grant that, in most cases and under suitable 
conditions, the possession of some good contributes to one’s well-being only if 
one endorses it. However, it should also grant that objective goods on their own 
make at least some welfare contributions. 
I formulated a pluralistic model of endorsement according to which one 
endorses an object when one favours it. The favouring relation situates the 
subject’s orientation toward a state of affairs along an evaluative dimension. We 
can say that one endorses an object when one favours it under suitable 
conditions; that is, when one is positively oriented towards it in feeling, thought, 
and action; one anticipates it enthusiastically and is disposed to pursue it; one is 
pleased when it obtains and one is disposed to continue the experience or 
maintain the state of affairs; and one has pleasant thoughts about it after it 
obtains. I committed to a number of claims.  
First, this account of endorsement at a time identifies two relevant 
evaluative dimensions, but it is not a conjunctive account of the subjective part of 
well-being. Insisting on describing favouring as a single distinctive evaluative 
state or a necessary conjunction of such states would be misleading. In some 
cases, the obtaining of a single dimension will be sufficient to warrant the claim 
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that a subject favours a state of affairs; in most cases, several conditions will be 
jointly sufficient.  
Second, the experience requirement, properly understood, commits us to 
the view that the welfare value of a state of affairs derives in part from its effect, 
actual or possible, on human experience and its quality.  
Third, the requirement that favouring occur under suitable conditions 
concedes that some favourings are susceptible to procedural mistakes. The 
upshot is a descriptively adequate account of endorsement that can capture the 
wide range of evaluative states characteristic of different welfare subjects from 
the animal to the human, the fetus to the senior. A full discussion of the 
descriptive adequacy of my considered view must wait for the fifth chapter, where 
I defend a hybrid view of well-being according to which one fares well at a time 
when one endorses goods worthy of concern.  
Finally, I argued that what best explains the agreement that endorsement 
matters to well-being is that experiences of endorsement are constituted in part 
by a distinctive evaluative attitude that captures the intrinsic importance of such 
experiences to one’s well-being. This evaluative attitude is consistent with the 
agent-relativity of welfare claims. 
I then considered three objections to making welfare value depend on the 
subject’s endorsement. The first two objections resist making value conditional 
on endorsement or weak endorsement. I argued that we can grant both 
objections by restricting the scope of the endorsement thesis and insisting that 
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endorsement occur under suitable conditions. The third objection is a 
restatement of the double bind problem. I argued that endorsement is necessary 
for welfare in central cases, and that objectively good states of affairs one does 
not endorse do not contribute to one’s welfare. The trouble with our intuitions 
surrounding tortured artists objections is that it is difficult to tell whether they 
capture welfare value or a rival dimension of value. I argued that it still made 
sense to hope that the grass-counter would opt to endorse worthy goods. I 
suggested that this commits us to a discontinuity in welfare value between low 
fare and full fare. 
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Chapter 4: Well-Being and Worth 
“It is surely a strange reversal of the natural order of thought to say that our 
admiring an action either is, or is what necessitates its being good. We think of its 
goodness as what we admire in it, and as something it would have even if no one 
admired it, something it has in itself.” 
~ W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good 
 
4.1 Introduction 
We now turn to the problem of worth. The greatest obstacle for 
subjectivists is their reluctance to introduce an independent value requirement 
that bears on one’s well-being. Critics of subjective theories object that not all the 
objects in one’s schedule of concerns are on equal axiological footing. Some 
objects have more worth than other objects. In fact, some objects are so 
worthless that they seem not to have any welfare value at all, whatever one’s 
schedule of concerns. It is difficult to imagine recommending the life of the grass-
counter to others because of a nagging feeling that the grass-counter is pursuing 
a worthless object. To deal with the problem of worth, we need an account that 
explains the sense in which the objects of one’s concerns have value 
independently of the fact that they engage one’s active interest, attention, and 
care. The account must address the problem of worth without sacrificing fidelity 
to generality, and it must accommodate the intuition that endorsement counts 
toward well-being to some extent even in the absence of objective goods. 
In chapter four, I argue that we can explain the sense in which objects are 
independently valuable without rejecting the endorsement thesis, but it requires 
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that we abandon the agent sovereignty thesis. That is, in most cases and under 
suitable conditions, endorsement is necessary for well-being, but one’s schedule 
of concerns alone does not determine one’s well-being. Other things matter. In 
most cases, welfare subjects fare well over time when they endorse objects of 
greater worth. An object has independent value if its value is not entirely 
determined by one’s actual schedule of concern. One object has greater worth 
than another object if it has greater independent value than that object. I argue 
that these claims are consistent with the previous chapter’s conclusions. Under 
suitable conditions, endorsement remains necessary for well-being in central 
cases, worthy goods on their own contribute to well-being at least to some 
extent, and one fares better in states of affairs one endorses than in states of 
affairs one does not endorse.  
I make this case in the following way. In section 4.2, I argue that we 
should abandon the agent sovereignty thesis. I analyse the welfare judgments 
that we make from the first-person and the third-person standpoint. I argue that 
some welfare judgments presuppose that some objects are more worthy of 
concern than other objects, and that we have good reason to accept this 
characterisation of welfare judgments. Endorsement figures prominently in 
welfare judgments, but so do questions concerning the worth of the objects one 
endorses.  
In section 4.3, I argue that we can explain the sense in which certain 
objects are more worthy of concern than other objects without denying the 
endorsement thesis I defend in chapter three. The skillful pursuit of welfare is an 
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expertise that one acquires and develops over time. The endorsements that 
subjects make under suitable conditions situate them as epistemic authorities in 
a community of knowers who share an interest in faring well. On this view, 
judgments of worth are intersubjective ideals that play a crucial role in developing 
expertise in the pursuit of welfare and enabling the practice of welfare value. By 
the practice of welfare, I mean the norms, activities, and institutions that guide 
human behaviour in determining what well-being consists in and how best to 
achieve it. Specifically, judgments of worth guide welfare subjects toward 
authentic standards and reliable sources of well-being. My view is not that appeal 
to the community assists us in determining the means to well-being. Rather 
appeal to the community assists us in determining the nature of welfare. 
Communal norms determine in part what welfare consists in. Faring well over 
time consists in endorsing objects worthy in this sense. 
In section 4.4, I consider objections to this characterization of worth. First, 
I suggest that judgments of worth do not figure to the same extent in all welfare 
judgments. The extent to which a particular welfare judgment emphasizes the 
worth of the objects in a given schedule of concerns reflects in part the authority 
of the welfare subject, which is a function of their expertise in the pursuit of 
welfare. This conclusion is consistent with an intuition I discuss in section 4.2, 
namely, that judgments of worth arise naturally when one considers what it 
makes sense to want for a child for whom one cares. I then argue that judgments 
concerning the worth of an object must be defeasible. Some communal ideals 
represent the wisdom of the age, others, its prejudice. The soundness of a 
 113 
 
judgment of worth is conditional on the most reliable empirical evidence 
concerning the standards and objects that are likely to constitute the well-being 
of welfare subjects over time. I grant that the resulting account of worth remains 
tied to schedules of concerns at least in an intersubjective sense, but I suggest 
that this is an asset rather than a liability of the account. 
 
4.2 Worth 
In this section, I analyse the welfare judgments that we make from the 
first-person and the third-person standpoint, and I argue that we should reject the 
agent sovereignty thesis. One’s schedule of concerns alone does not determine 
one’s well-being. Other things matter. 
We make welfare judgments from a first-person and a third-person 
standpoint.129 From a first-person standpoint, welfare judgments are the 
foundation for rational decisions in which only one’s interests are concerned. One 
has reason to be concerned with what makes one’s life go well for one’s own 
sake: if a state of affairs is good for me, then I have a prima facie reason to want 
that state of affairs to obtain.130 First-person welfare judgments are the intuitive 
heartland of subjective accounts of well-being, the logical space in which one’s 
evaluative perspective has pride of place. Surely, the argument goes, one’s own 
schedule of concern is the most relevant consideration when determining what is 
                                            
129 See “Value, Desire and the Quality of Life.” The Quality of Life. Edited by Martha Nussbaum 
and Amartya Sen. 185-200. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1993; “The Status of 
Well-Being.” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 1996: 93-143; What We Owe Each Other. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997: chapter 2. 
130 On the agent-relativity of welfare judgments, see Section 3.3.  
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in one’s best interest, or what one has most reason to do for one’s own sake.131 
Provided one forms one’s schedule of concerns under suitable conditions, no 
other reference group is more authoritative to establish whether one fares well. 
When we frame the subjectivity of well-being as a matter of self-ownership in this 
way, an independent value requirement readily becomes a paternalistic 
infringement on one’s individual sovereignty.132  
The plausibility of this subjective account of first-person welfare judgments 
relies in part on unassuming examples that analogize reasons to matters of taste. 
For example, if one favours ice cream and one prefers strawberry to rocky road, 
one will fare better to the extent that others respect one’s favouring of strawberry 
ice cream and the state of affairs one prefers obtains. On this view, one’s 
endorsements provide agent-relative reasons to pursue a given state of affairs. 
Provided one forms one’s endorsement of strawberry ice cream under suitable 
conditions, no other consideration is relevant to one’s judgment, no other reason 
more authoritative than the mere fact that one endorses it. In such cases, it 
makes sense to conclude that one’s endorsement is the sole consideration 
relevant to whether one fares well at a time, and that endorsement by itself 
contributes to one’s well-being. After all, there are no arbiters of taste.  
One can make a case for the claim that the taste model satisfies the 
generality criterion for descriptive adequacy. The model seems to capture the full 
range of welfare judgments we make, and to fit all core welfare subjects. It tells 
us what it is for a person to fare well or poorly at a time and over a period, and for 
                                            
131 Sumner (1996): 42 – 44. See also Scanlon (1997): 124, 387. 
132 For instance, Sumner (1996): 163 – 166. 
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a person to gain or lose over time. It captures what it is for sentient entities to 
fare well, from the animal to the human, the fetus to the senior. However, we 
must be careful lest we purchase generality at the expense of fidelity. If the taste 
model cannot explain our pre-analytic beliefs about well-being, then we have 
reason to revise it. As it stands, the taste model gives a lucid account of welfare 
judgments involving simple cases. However, there is reason to believe that it fails 
to explain cases that are more complex.  
Many reasons motivate the endorsements we make, only some of which 
are analogous to taste. Barring trivial choices of the kinds of ice cream one 
favours, mere endorsement is seldom the sole reason motivating our pursuits. 
Suppose there are states of affairs that Derek wants to experience, goals that he 
wants to achieve, and relationships that he wants to nurture. He wants to enjoy 
espresso on the Canal Grande, he wants to save Venice from the hungry 
Mediterranean, he wants others to remember him as the Saviour of Venice, and 
he wants to be a successful parent. Beyond these projects, Derek also wants to 
be a certain kind of person. He wants to be a diligent colleague, a considerate 
friend, and a caring partner. These goods form a more or less unified schedule of 
concerns, a loose program that specifies the objects that engage his active 
interest, attention, and care.133 He may have developed some goods in detail, 
reflected carefully on his motivation for pursuing them, and given loose priority to 
them in a way that provides a general structure in which to situate other goods. 
He need not have organized this loose program very carefully, however. To 
                                            
133 I first specify what a schedule of concerns consists in in section 2.1, page 27.  
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constitute a schedule of concerns, it is sufficient that these objects engage his 
interest, attention, and care. 
Now, we may reduce the reason for Derek’s desire to enjoy espresso on 
the Canal Grande to mere endorsement without misrepresenting its justification. 
If one were to ask him why he wanted to enjoy espresso on the popular Venetian 
thoroughfare, he might credibly respond because I want to do it or because I 
enjoy it. If one were to press him further, he might describe the experience in 
detail, the flavor of espresso, the Venetian vista, the history of the Canal, but his 
justification could stand on his endorsement alone. Like my simple endorsement 
of strawberry ice cream, Derek’s desire to enjoy espresso on the Canal may be 
simply a matter of taste. Moreover, under this description, it makes sense to 
conclude that Derek’s endorsement is the sole consideration relevant to whether 
he benefits from enjoying his espresso. It is enough that he favours it, that he is 
positively oriented towards it in thought, feeling, and action, that he is motivated 
to pursue it, that he is pleased when it obtains, and that he has pleasant thoughts 
about it once it obtains. If he formed his endorsement under suitable conditions, 
then it is sufficient for his well-being. 
As one moves to the more complex goods on his schedule of concerns, 
the claim that endorsement is the sole justification for his pursuit becomes less 
credible. His decision to pursue an important project certainly reveals a 
preference for its completion, but endorsement may not be the exclusive or even 
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the most important reason for his pursuit.134 The justification of Derek’s desire to 
restore Venice hinges not only on his endorsement but also on his judgment that 
the end itself is worth endorsing. The precise nature of the judgment Derek 
makes certainly needs an explanation. However, our direct experiences of well-
being seem to warrant the claim that worth plays a role in justifying his interests 
in the goods he pursues. One wants to complete a difficult project, to be a 
successful parent, a diligent colleague, a considerate friend, and a caring partner 
because one believes that these states of affairs matter for reasons other than 
the mere fact that one wants them to obtain. Mere endorsement does not 
exhaust the justification of our pursuit of these goods. One endorses them 
because one believes they are worthy of endorsement. 
The attitudes one takes in practice toward practical reasoning are 
evidence that such considerations are pervasive in welfare judgments. It would 
not be at all strange for Derek to confess that he had reflected carefully about the 
worth of his goals before leaving for Venice, revising some, rejecting others, and 
adopting new ones. All the while, Derek acted as if there was actually something 
to discover beyond what he wanted, some fact about the worth of restoration 
work or parenthood that might weigh in their favour against other considerations. 
Even in cases in which only his interests are concerned, he worried about which 
state of affairs he had most reason to pursue, whether he was in fact making the 
right decisions, and whether his endorsement would ultimately be for the best.  
                                            
134 Let there be two bundles of goods a and b, and a fully-informed and self-interested agent S. If 
S chooses a over b, we say that S has a revealed preference for a over b. See P. Samuelson. “A 
Note on the Pure Theory of Consumers' Behaviour,” Economica 5 (1938):61-71. 
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Moreover, while we are imagining a case in which Derek’s endorsement 
ultimately tracked the worth of his goals, such convergence was hardly a forgone 
conclusion. We can imagine a slightly different case in which Derek concluded 
that restoring Venice and becoming a successful parent were indeed worthy and 
achievable goals he endorsed, but he found that he had difficulty mustering the 
energy to act on his endorsement. Part of the knotty problem Aristotle calls 
akrasia or weakness of will stems from not pursuing states of affairs one 
endorses as worthy of concern.135 In this case, Derek might settle for a less 
worthy goal against his better judgment and regret that he would not fare as well 
overall, or he might decide to cultivate his determination to pursue his goals 
despite his ambivalence. One might explain away the akratic conflict as a clash 
between Derek’s current tastes and his considered tastes. Yet appealing to what 
Derek deems worthy of concern captures the intuition that the relevant standard 
is not entirely up to him. Under the second description, the akratic Derek believes 
restoring Venice and becoming a successful parent and partner are worthy ends, 
even if he fails to pursue them. 
If my argument for the persistence of worth in first-person welfare 
judgments is correct, then the agent sovereignty thesis is false. One’s schedule 
of concerns alone does not determine one’s well-being. 
                                            
135 The akratic has the correct decision but acts on misdirected appetites instead. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle compares the weak of will to a poorly governed city, one “that 
votes for all the right decrees and has good laws, but does not apply them, as in Anaxandrides’ 
taunt, ‘The city willed it, that cares nothing for laws’ ” (1152a20-24). 
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My argument is most directly indebted to Adams’ discussion of well-being 
as enjoying the excellent.136 Adams proposes a hybrid theory of well-being 
according to which one’s well-being depends on the excellence of the states of 
affairs one enjoys. He suggests that the fact that we could not enjoy the goods 
we do if we thought that valuing them was mistaken commits us to the claim that 
our valuation to some extent captures the worth of the object we enjoy. He 
writes:  
It is important to our good to enjoy things that we think are in some degree 
excellent, so if we think we would not be fortunate to be deluded in such 
matters, we should think it important to our good to enjoy things that really 
are in some degree excellent.137 
For Adams, one’s attitude to the objects one values and enjoys is evidence that 
one’s valuation extends to the importance or significance of the objects one 
enjoys. 
It is worth noting that the resulting account of well-being need not have 
anti-hedonistic implications. For instance, if we grant (reasonably, I think) that 
enjoyment itself is in some degree worthy of concern, enjoying seemingly neutral 
or worthless objects will contribute to one’s well-being. I might think that comic 
books are nearly worthless objects of concern yet fare well to the extent that I 
enjoy them with relish. Denying the welfare value of the enjoyment of so-called 
worthless objects implies that the subjective part of well-being on its own does 
                                            
136 See also Thomas Scanlon, “Value, Desire and Quality of Life,” in The Quality of Life, edited by 
Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 185-200, 1993. 
137 Robert Adams. Finite and Infinite Goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999: 98. 
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not contribute to one’s well-being, which is counter-intuitive. I first discuss this 
double bind problem with regard to subjective theories in section 2.3. Subjects 
may fare well when independently valuable goods figure on their schedule of 
concerns, but why not think endorsements alone count at least to some extent 
toward their well-being? Given the choice of two states of affairs in which one 
fails to concern oneself with a valuable object, it must be the case that one fares 
better in the state of affairs one endorses than the one that one does not. 
The view I discuss in the previous paragraph is not Adam’s view, which is 
enmeshed in a view of enjoyment that presupposes “a life somewhat structured 
by purposes and valuings.”138 For Adams, enjoying the excellent seems to occur 
in the context of a rational plan of life. Such views lend themselves best to the 
assessment of well-being over a complete life. In contrast, well-being as 
endorsing worthy goods, the considered view I defend in chapter five, is an 
account of faring well at a time and over a period. 
In sum, the justification of Adams’ account of well-being as enjoying the 
good parallels those cited in the case of Tom. If Tom would not be fortunate to 
find out that he was radically deceived about the conditions of his life, then other 
things matter than mental states. Adams’ position takes the argument further, 
however: on his view, Tom can also be mistaken about the worth of the objects 
that he pursues. Faring well is not only a matter of endorsement; one’s 
endorsements must also align with worthy objects or states of affairs. 
                                            
138 Idem. 
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Other writers have made similar connections between the axiological 
assumptions we make in practice and the nature of value. In Meaning in Life and 
Why it Matters, Wolf argues that meaningfulness is an essential evaluative 
standard for human beings. “Meaning in life arises,” she writes, “when subjective 
attraction meets objective attractiveness, and one is able to do something about 
it.”139 Her approach to meaningfulness, which she identifies as a dimension of 
value distinct from well-being as I define it here, takes seriously the importance 
that human beings place in living meaningful lives. Like Adams, she asks which 
conditions must be satisfied to vindicate this kind of human striving, and finds 
that it is important that we think the things we find appealing are objectively 
attractive in some sense. Adams and Wolf share an appetite for transcendental 
arguments. They resist purely subjective readings of value by asking what 
conditions must be in place for widely held assumptions about human lives to be 
true. By their lights, excellence and attractiveness underwrite judgments 
concerning enjoyment and meaningfulness respectively, at least in the case of 
individuals capable of such judgements. One can argue that a yet unspecified 
notion of worth underwrites welfare judgments in the same way.  
We might be tempted to argue that dispensing with the notion of worth is 
necessary to simplify the measurement and interpersonal comparison of well-
being. We must proceed carefully, however. While one cannot pursue an account 
of the nature of well-being in isolation from concerns about its measurement and 
interpersonal comparison, dispensing with worth for the sake of these practical 
                                            
139 Susan Wolf. Meaning in Life. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010: xii. 
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matters risks misrepresenting the nature of well-being. Models of well-being that 
eschew judgments of worth are not mere proxies that we construct for the sake 
of convenience but rival accounts of what faring well consists in.  
Specifically, abandoning worth for the sake of convenience risks idealizing 
the concept of well-being in a way that permanently removes the possibility that 
the properties of the object of one’s concerns constitute part of what faring well 
consists in, and no set of assumptions will once again restore a full description of 
the concept’s intension.140 Not all idealizations are permanent in this way. If I 
want to predict the speed at which a mass will slide down an inclined plane, I 
may choose to work from an ideal case that discounts friction for the sake of 
convenience. This common idealization is reversible, however. I can later add a 
coefficient of friction to the model without compromising its integrity. This is not 
the case with purely subjective accounts of well-being. Once we preclude worth 
from welfare judgments, we permanently limit the information to which one can 
appeal in considering the nature of well-being to formal, procedural 
considerations, and abandon the assessment of the worth of the objects of our 
concerns. All ends are equally worthy, none intrinsically better than another end. 
If subjectivists are to reconcile judgments of worth with the claim that Derek’s 
endorsements are necessary for his well-being, they must find a way to capture 
worth in subjective terms without misrepresenting the nature of well-being. 
                                            
140 On degenerate idealizations in science, see Robert Batterman. The Devil in the Details: 
Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction, and Emergence. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002. 
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The claim that considerations of worth are prevalent in welfare judgments 
becomes even more credible when we shift from a first-person to a third-person 
standpoint. Third-person welfare judgments capture what one has most reason to 
promote for the sake of another as a benefactor or as an agent. When one 
reflects on which gift to select for a friend, or on what it makes sense to want for 
the sake of a child, one has reason to be concerned with what will benefit the 
interested party for their own sake. The common view is that the first-person 
standpoint has pride of place in discussions of well-being: well-being matters to 
benefactors and agents because of its importance to the welfare subject.141 Not 
everyone is willing to give first-person judgments priority, however. Some writers 
have thought that the third-person standpoint is more representative of well-being 
than the standpoint of a person striving to promote their own well-being. 
Adams’ writings are a case in point. “The question, what would be best for 
a given person,” he writes, “is less characteristic of that person’s own point of 
view…than of the point of view of someone who loves [them].”142 Likewise, in 
Welfare and Rational Care, Darwall suggests that “a person’s good is 
constituted, not by what that person values, prefers or wants (or should value), 
but by what one (perhaps she) should want insofar as one cares about her.”143 
Darwall takes his view to be a metaethical account of the concept of welfare, but 
he suggests that it goes hand in hand with the so-called Aristotelian thesis, a 
substantive account of well-being according to which what is best for someone is 
                                            
141 In section 3.3, I suggest that the priority of first-person welfare judgments is grounded on the 
agent-relativity of welfare claims. 
142 Robert Adams. Finite and Infinite Goods. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999: 93. 
143 Stephen Darwall. Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002: 4. 
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a life of “significant engagement in activities through which one comes into 
appreciative rapport with agent-neutral values.”144 Such “valuing activity” is 
sensitive to the independent value of the objects of one’s concerns.145 It is 
noteworthy that both Adams and Darwall hold that the attitudes and practices 
surrounding first-person judgments are less typical of the nature of well-being 
than those surrounding appropriate third-person judgments.  
The shift away from the first-person standpoint broadens the set of 
considerations relevant to well-being in a way that reflects the welfare judgments 
we actually make. When one considers what it makes sense to want for 
someone for whom one cares, especially in the case of a child, questions 
concerning the worth of the objects one has most reason to choose enter quite 
naturally into one’s considerations. “Few parents would desire for their children a 
lifetime of narcotic highs, or a life of devotion to wealth or power or fame,” writes 
Adams, “no matter how much they would be enjoyed.”146 Even if the lover or 
caregiver is the person whose well-being is in question, they are less likely to 
limit the considerations relevant to welfare judgments to mere endorsement when 
reasoning from the third person standpoint. The properties of the states of affairs 
one endorses matter. 
The broadening of the set of considerations relevant to well-being does 
not preclude the possibility that, in many cases, one will want the person one 
cares about to get what they most desire, or what they most enjoy. It will depend 
                                            
144 Darwall (2002): 7, 75. 
145 Idem, 80. 
146 Adams (1999): 97. 
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on the object of the enjoyment or desire. Nor does it imply that the relation 
between the nature of well-being and the judgments we make from the third 
person standpoint is one of straightforward identity. As Feldman suggests, there 
is plenty of room for healthy skepticism concerning whether the third-person 
standpoint is entirely definitive of well-being. Writes Feldman,  
Suppose a religious fanatic looks into his child’s crib… suppose he thinks 
the best imaginable life for the child is one in which the child becomes a 
martyr for God... [I]t is not clear that he is expressing a hope about what 
we would normally think of as the child’s well-being.147  
This seems right. Still, I hope to show in what follows that, in contrast to first-
person welfare judgments, the claim that welfare judgments should aim solely to 
respect the welfare subject’s schedule of concerns is less plausible in the welfare 
judgments we make from the third-person standpoint. 
When reflecting on what is in the best interest of their beneficiary or 
principal, it is legitimate in all but the most trivial cases for a benefactor or an 
agent to consider the worth of the object of one’s concerns. Of course, when one 
considers what is best for someone else, one must take into account his or her 
settled standards and dispositions, and their considered expectations. One may 
select a gift for family and friends with an eye to please them or satisfy their 
preferences. Likewise, one may have separate ethical or legal reasons to respect 
the preferences of healthy, autonomous adults, or the preferences of those on 
whose behalf one is acting as an agent. In most cases, beneficiaries and 
                                            
147 Fred Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 10. 
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principals will retain a large measure of ownership over their well-being. Yet one 
is not always bound to take another’s concerns as definitive of their well-being. 
Only rarely is choosing what is best for another simply a matter of determining 
what they prefer.  
It is worth noting that purely subjective theories of well-being can 
accommodate this claim. For instance, when acting on another’s behalf, one 
might choose to disregard uninformed or heteronomous preferences, or 
disregard an intense but short-lived preference in favour of a slightly weaker but 
long-standing preference. The outcome of the subjectivist’s analysis will depend 
on the factors at a play in the given case. Still, when advising someone on what 
they have most reason to do for their own sake, or when choosing on behalf of 
someone for whom one cares, one expects to share and sometimes act on one’s 
judgment about what is good for them. Beyond simple cases, one is often 
justified in appealing to worth in one’s considerations. 
The prevalence of worth in welfare judgments is most stark in third-person 
judgments involving the well-being of children. Unlike adult beneficiaries, children 
have few settled dispositions, and the choices of caregivers have a large part to 
play in settling their future character. This process of education is necessary and 
appropriate, for the dispositions they would have in the absence of such 
influence would hardly constitute anything that one could equate with their well-
being. Even sensory hedonists will want to shape the dispositions of the children 
in their care to impart to them the capacity to defer gratification, and desires 
theorists, the capacity to correct mistaken desires. The caregiver’s tastes may 
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play some role in generating a set of options from which to choose, as will the 
emerging tastes of the child. However, the criterion guiding one’s judgments in 
choosing among options in this context cannot be merely a matter of taste. 
Writes Adams: 
In thinking about what would be good for a child, we must think about what 
interests and habits of choice to encourage and foster in her, and cannot 
presuppose a system of preference and volitional tendencies already in 
her as defining the good that we intend for her.148  
The point is that, barring simple cases, endorsement is unlikely to be the sole 
reason for the goods one pursues for the sake of someone else. One has reason 
to be concerned with what will benefit the person for whom one cares at a 
moment and over a period. What matters is not that one gets what one wants, or 
that the child does, but that the child fare well. One might have ethical reasons to 
avoid choices that would compromise the child’s capacity to choose for him or 
herself in the future, but to the extent that one chooses on their behalf, one 
cannot avoid judgments of worth.149 This does not rule out the possibility that 
experiencing surplus pleasure and satisfying desires formed under suitable 
conditions will constitute an important part of a child’s well-being. Endorsement 
still matters. Enjoyment too can be worthy of concern. 
                                            
148 Adams (1999): 97. 
149 On the child’s right to an open-future, see Joel Feinberg See Joel Feinberg, “The Child's Right 
to an Open Future,” in Freedom and Fulfillment. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1992: 76; see also, Claudia Mills, “The Child’s Right to an Open Future,” Journal of Social 
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And so the case for worth largely rests on the fidelity criterion for 
descriptive adequacy. Accounts of well-being that take into consideration the 
worth of the objects of one’s concerns cohere better with some of our pre-
analytic beliefs about well-being. The taste model gives a lucid account of 
welfare judgments involving simple cases; however, it fails to explain the welfare 
judgments we make in cases that are more complex. Some of these judgments 
presuppose that some objects are more worthy of concern than other objects. If 
this argument correct, then the agent sovereignty thesis is false: one's schedule 
of concerns alone does not determine one’s well-being. Still, the conclusion of 
the argument is consistent with the claim that the endorsement thesis is true. 
Endorsement remains necessary for well-being at a time in central cases, and 
well-being remains agent-relative. I have shown in chapter three that it is 
possible to defend the endorsement thesis without asserting the agent 
sovereignty thesis. That is, we can hold that endorsement is necessary for well-
being in central cases without committing to the view that schedules of concern 
alone determine one’s well-being. Other axiological factors matter too.150 
Finally, admitting that schedules of concerns alone do not determine well-
being violates strong neutrality, but this is not a mark against the account. As 
agent sovereignty goes, so goes strong neutrality. Here is how the argument 
works. In chapter one, I suggested that strong neutrality disqualifies accounts of 
well-being that violate the welfare subject’s evaluative perspective.151 
                                            
150 See section 3.2, 87. 
151 See section 1.3, 18 – 21.  
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On this view, descriptively adequate theories of well-being should be entirely 
indifferent to the choices of welfare subjects, since the evaluation of welfare 
goods squarely rests on a welfare subject’s concerns. For better or worse, well-
being is a function of choice. I argued then that strong neutrality is an overly 
demanding criterion for descriptive adequacy. Some welfare judgments seem 
consistent with the claim that the nature of well-being is not entirely up to the 
welfare subject. We cannot rule against these accounts of well-being before we 
set out on our inquiry, especially since we do not yet have reason to believe that 
the concerns of welfare subjects alone determine the nature of well-being. In this 
section, I argued that addressing the problem of the worth requires that we 
abandon the agent sovereignty thesis. Since we have good reason to believe 
that the evaluation of an object does not squarely rest on schedules of concerns, 
we cannot expect descriptively adequate accounts of well-being to be completely 
indifferent to the choices of welfare subjects. This gives us another reason to 
abandon strong neutrality as a criterion for descriptive adequacy. 
 
4.3 Expertise 
In this section, I argue that we can explain the sense in which certain 
objects are more worthy of concern than other objects without denying the 
endorsement thesis. The skillful pursuit of welfare is an expertise that one 
acquires and develops over time. The endorsements that subjects make under 
suitable conditions situate them as epistemic authorities in a community of 
knowers who share an interest in faring well. On this view, judgments of worth 
 130 
 
are not objective. They are intersubjective ideals that play a crucial role in 
developing expertise in the pursuit of welfare and enabling the practice of welfare 
value. Specifically, judgments of worth guide welfare subjects toward authentic 
standards and reliable sources of well-being. Faring well over time consists in 
endorsing objects worthy in this sense. 
The story of well-being tends to describe the practice of welfare in largely 
individualistic terms that abstract from the accidental features of welfare subjects 
and their context. By the practice of welfare, I mean the norms, activities, and 
institutions that guide human behaviour in determining what well-being consists 
in and how best to achieve it.152 I argued that one model, which likens the 
practice of welfare to taste, is overly simplistic.153 The second model likens the 
practice of welfare to perception. On this view, to recognize the welfare value 
inherent in a state of affairs is to perceive the good-making properties that would 
lead anyone to adopt the state of affairs as a goal. The perception model is 
perhaps sharpest in Griffin’s work on well-being. In Value Judgment, for instance, 
Griffin stipulates that only desires “formed by appreciation of the nature of [their] 
object” count towards one’s well-being, a process that “includes anything 
necessary to achieve it.”154 Likewise, Darwall describes his own account of what 
is best for humans as a “quasi-perceptual, felt relation between the person and 
merit-making values that such activities usually involve.”155 On both the taste and 
                                            
152 The account of the practice of welfare is most directly indebted to discussions in Joseph Raz, 
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153 See section 4.2, 103-6. 
154 It is worth noting that he rejects a strong distinction between understanding and desire. See 
James Griffin. Value Judgments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 26. 
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the perception models, the practice of welfare is largely a solitary matter, the 
purview of self-governing, self-sufficient individuals functioning at the height of 
their capacities. The story of well-being that I rehearsed in section 2.1 tends to 
characterize well-being in these terms.  
On the view I develop in section 3.2, if one endorses an object, then one 
favours it, one is positively oriented towards it in thought, feeling, and action, one 
is motivated to bring it into being, one is pleased when it obtains, and one has 
pleasant thoughts about it once it has obtained.156 Richard spends his days 
working at the Smithsonian cleaning and stabilizing works of arts. In the possible 
world where Richard endorses his work, he is motivated to start work in the 
morning, he is pleased when he is working and finds it difficult to leave work at 
the end of the day, perhaps remembering it fondly now and again when he is 
away from it. In this first case, my view implies that he is faring well, at least 
when he is at work. However, in the possible world where Richard does not 
endorse his work, he finds it difficult to start work in the morning, grumbles as he 
struggles through his day, and looks forward to stop working as soon as he can 
at the end of each day. If he happens to remember his work when he is away 
from it, he finds the memory distasteful. In this second case, my view implies that 
he is not faring very well. Given two states of affairs he fails to endorse, it may be 
for the best if he found himself relating to independently valuable objects. 
However, he would fare much better in a possible world he endorsed.157 
                                            
156 See section 3.2, 76.  
157 I explore cases like these in section 3.4. 
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Call this view narrow endorsement. The problem of authority arises when 
one ignores the bearing of narrow endorsement on well-being. The case of 
Richard is tragic because he does not endorse the worthy objects in his life. 
Objective theories fail to capture this judgment because they do not count 
endorsement as a necessary condition of well-being. In their view, endorsement 
is at best one good among others. I argued in section 3.3 that what is needed is 
an account of well-being in which schedules of concern operate as a creative 
constraint restricting the sort of lives that count as good for Richard. We must 
assert the endorsement thesis. Under suitable conditions, narrow endorsement 
must be necessary for well-being in central cases. However, if narrow 
endorsement were all that there was to the story of well-being, then one could 
describe the practice of welfare as a solitary pursuit. Welfare subjects would 
need only to exercise the designated faculties under suitable conditions to fare 
well. We should not settle for this description of the practice of welfare. 
If we model the practice of welfare as a solitary pursuit, we will miss the 
social interactions that enable and influence practice. I argue in what follows that 
the practice of welfare is not a solitary but a social enterprise, one that relies on 
the shared understanding of others for its success. Specifically, welfare subjects 
rely on others to develop expertise in recognizing good ways to direct one’s life 
and to pursue these successfully. The reader should not take the reference to 
good lives to indicate that welfare assessments are limited to complete lives. 
Well-being as endorsing the good is an account of faring well at a time and over 
a period. 
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The practice of welfare relies on communities in various ways. Many 
sources of welfare value would not exist in the absence of related social 
practices. We could hardly say, for instance, that restoring Venice contributed to 
Derek’s well-being in a possible world that did not contain the practices that 
produce the related set of human activities. This suggestion amounts to more 
than the trivial claim that espresso could not contribute to Derek’s welfare in a 
world in which espresso did not exist, though that much is true. The status of 
Derek’s ambition to restore Venice depends not only on The Floating City’s 
existence, but also on the historical forces that brought it into being and 
established its cultural importance. I have in mind the social practices associated 
with architecture, art history, conservation, and restoration, and those that 
influence the significance that Derek imparts to these activities. In the same way, 
the status of the particular relationships that Derek wants to cultivate depend in 
part on complex social practices around work, marriage, and friendship, practices 
that influence not only which emotions and attitudes toward the other are fitting 
but also the actions appropriate to them.158  
Most of the ways that Derek relates to states of affairs, and the importance 
that he accords to them in his schedule of concerns, depend critically on the 
social practices embedded in culture. In this sense, culture is to community what 
memory is to the individual. The social practices embedded within it are the tools 
and ideas that the community amends, shares, and transmits to its members 
because they once promoted their well-being, practices that constitute in part the 
                                            
158 On communal influences on norms surrounding friendship, see The Morality of Freedom. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, 308-13. 
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nature of well-being.159 Derek shapes his understanding of welfare value in 
concert with these communal tools and ideas, at once borrowing and contributing 
to the conceptual resources that are available for thinking about good ways to 
direct one’s life, authentic standards of self-assessment to adopt, and reliable 
sources of well-being to pursue. Derek wants to do certain things, and to be a 
certain kind of person, because he believes and feels that these ends are worthy 
of concern. He may not be aware fully of the worth of a given goal or object, and 
his understanding may be imperfect, as may be the understanding of others in 
the community. Yet, the social practices that underwrite his judgments of worth, 
however indeterminate, ground his belief and attitudes toward the objects he 
deems worthy of concern, and his choices both contribute to and transform the 
practices on which they rely. 
Not all of Derek’s orientations to the states of affairs that affect him 
depend on communal practices in this way. The sensory pleasure Derek 
experiences as he sips his morning espresso on the Canal does not. It is true 
that he could not enjoy a morning espresso in a world in which no one knew of 
this simple pleasure, or in which the economic and political institutions supporting 
the trade of espresso did not exist. It is also true that the judgment that sensory 
pleasure is in some measure worthy of concern depends in part on social 
practices. That is, the judgment that some amount of pleasure is likely to be a 
reliable source of well-being over time depends on what we know about 
                                            
159 For a useful discussion of the relationship between culture and subjective well-being, see 
Harry C. Triandis, “Cultural Syndromes and Subjective Well-being,” in Culture and Subjective 
Well-Being. Edited by Ed Diener and Eunkook M. Suh. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000, 13-
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pleasure, human psychology, and human lives. However, the experience of 
sensory pleasure that Derek has when sipping espresso does not depend on 
social practices in the same way. 
We can grasp the relevant sense in which welfare judgments rely on 
social practices if we reflect on an ambiguity at the heart of the term 
“endorsement.” On my view, narrow endorsement is a set of orientations to 
states of affairs that affect welfare subjects. However, endorsement also has a 
broad sense of confirming, sanctioning, or vouching for a person, an activity, or 
an object, in a way that provides an opinion of its nature and value. The 
judgments of worth that Derek makes are endorsement in a broad sense. 
The friend who asks why Derek wants to have an espresso on the Canal 
Grande, save Venice from the waves, or be a successful parent is not asking one 
question too many. Rather, he is asking Derek to elaborate on the reasons that 
justify his broad endorsement of these goods as worthy of concern. He does so 
because he shares his interest in developing and sustaining the kind of expertise 
necessary to recognize good ways to direct one’s life, authentic standards of self-
assessment to adopt, and reliable sources of well-being to pursue. If one were to 
ask Derek why he was pursuing the complex goods on his schedule of concerns, 
the response “because I want to pursue them” would ring hollow, as if he had left 
something unsaid. When Derek endorses a given end as worthy, he is 
acknowledging tacitly his status as an epistemic agent in a community of actors 
who share his interest in recognizing good ways to direct their lives. Derek’s 
choices are broad endorsements in the sense of being actions that confirm, 
 136 
 
sanction, or vouch for an end as worthy of concern. Granted, one may not always 
have reasons for what one does. Derek may not be able to justify why he wants 
to be a successful parent or save Venice from the waves. He may even pursue 
these goods for no reason or for bad reasons. However, when Derek does justify 
his pursuits, he makes at least a tacit appeal to their worth as ends for himself 
and for relevant others, one that relies on and contributes to communal practices 
surrounding the recognition of good ways to direct one's life and the rest. 
Communal norms determine in part the nature of welfare. 
Derek is not required to answer his friend’s questions, of course; he may 
insist on presenting his preferences as an end of the reason-giving process. 
However, the legitimacy of even this final appeal relies on a tacit judgment that 
preference satisfaction itself is an end worthy of concern, one likely to promote 
one’s well-being over time. In individualistic cultures that advocate the primacy of 
individual experience, for instance, internal psychological attributes are prevalent 
as a basis of life satisfaction judgments. This is not the case in all cultures. Life 
satisfaction judgments in collectivistic cultures that view individuals as 
fundamentally interdependent and socially related are more likely to emphasize 
external social cues, norms, and expectations.160 “Because I want to pursue 
them” is a reasonable justification for one’s pursuits only if preference satisfaction 
is itself worthy of concern, and the force of the justification changes from one 
community to the next.  
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Broad endorsements highlight the interdependence of welfare subjects as 
epistemic agents concerned with developing expertise in choosing their goals, 
and recognizing good ways to direct their lives. Inquiry into what constitutes a 
worthy object is a collaborative project, one whose outcome rides largely on 
one’s unavoidable reliance on the expertise and testimony of others.161 
Specifically, welfare subjects rely on the testimony of others to develop expertise 
in recognizing good ways to direct one’s life and to pursue them successfully. 
This interdependence requires that theories of well-being account for the 
dynamic relation between the welfare subject, the objects they pursue, and those 
who share their epistemic labor. As Rawls concedes, welfare subjects appreciate 
this capacity to stand apart from specific welfare judgments and question 
whether the ends they pursue are really worth pursuing: 
…citizens recognize one another as having the moral power to have a 
conception of the good. This means that they do not view themselves as 
inevitably tied to the pursuit of the particular conception of the good…they 
espouse at any given time. Instead…they are...capable of revising and 
changing this conception on reasonable and rational grounds.162 
Modelling judgments of worth as broad endorsements joins the nature of well-
being to a relational account of the welfare subject. Welfare subjects emerge as 
                                            
161 Recent work in naturalized epistemology stresses the pervasiveness of epistemic 
interdependence, especially due to our unavoidable reliance on testimony. See Lynn Hankinson 
Nelson. Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism. Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1990. 
162 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge, 1971, 544. 
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individuals in communities who rely on others to develop the necessary 
intellectual and affective capacities to recognize good ways to direct their lives. 
Their axiological capacities honed, welfare subjects continue to rely on the 
testimony of others to exercise them. They take a step back and question their 
beliefs and dispositions in light of the information, experiences, and arguments 
that others provide, and contribute their own considered judgments to the mix.  
On this view, judgments of worth are intersubjective ideals that play a 
crucial role in determining the nature of welfare, developing expertise in the 
pursuit of welfare, and enabling its practice. Much like J.S. Mill’s competent 
judges, welfare subjects who receive the right education and experiences 
develop expertise in the skillful pursuit of welfare. They learn that there are better 
or worse ways to live one’s life, more or less authentic standards of self-
assessment to adopt, and more or less reliable sources of well-being over time. 
Eventually, they become epistemic authorities in their own right, welfare subjects 
whose judgments of worth contribute to their community’s knowledge about good 
ways to direct human lives.163 Unlike Mill’s judges, however, epistemic authorities 
make judgments of worth that guide others to authentic standards and reliable 
sources of well-being rather than higher pleasures. This process is part of the 
division of epistemic labor essential to the smooth functioning of complex 
axiological communities. Welfare subjects cannot develop expertise in the pursuit 
of welfare in isolation, nor can they acquire all the specialized knowledge they 
need in order to avoid relying on someone else’s testimony as they reflect on the 
                                            
163 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism. Edited by R. Crisp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 
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best course of action to pursue. It follows that welfare subjects who endorse 
objects worthy of concern in this sense fare better over time than those who do 
not. 
In keeping with the distinction I introduce in section 2.1, the defining 
feature of subjective theories is that they make well-being depend on the 
subject’s concerns, whereas objective theories exclude all reference to attitudes 
and concerns. The conception of worth I develop is intersubjective rather than 
objective; that is, it is not entirely divorced from schedules of concerns.164 The 
view is open to the objection that social forces might warp or corrupt worth such 
that it no longer truly reflects what matters. I address this objection below. Still, 
on this view, faring well over time is a function of communal ideals that track 
authentic standards of self-assessment and reliable sources of well-being. Well-
being remains a function of schedules of concerns, at least in an intersubjective 
sense. Moreover, the account blurs the line between the nature of well-being and 
the sources of well-being. This is not surprising given the hybrid nature of the 
account. Subjective theories hold that well-being is a feature of one’s response to 
the objects in one’s life; objective theories, a feature of one’s relation to 
independently valuable objects. As a hybrid account, well-being as endorsing 
worthy goods integrates features of the subject and the object into a single 
account. The best empirical evidence concerning the standards and objects that 
are likely to ensure the well-being of the welfare subjects in a given community is 
what singles out the relevant objects for consideration. 
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The concession that worth is intersubjective rather than objective does not 
undermine its significance as a solution to the problem of worth and the problem 
of authority.165 Endorsement remains necessary for well-being in central cases: 
Derek fares well at a time to the extent that he endorses the objects in his life. 
The view does deny the agent sovereignty thesis: Derek’s schedule of concerns 
alone does not entirely determine the nature of his well-being. Moreover, not all 
objects are axiologically neutral: some objects remain more worthy of pursuit 
than other objects, and Derek fares well over a period to the extent that he 
endorses objects worthy of concern. What is critical to Derek’s well-being is that 
he exercises expertise in choosing his goals and in recognizing good ways to 
direct his life, an expertise he develops in community, one that ultimately 
contributes to the axiological resources from which he benefits.  
Well-being as endorsing worthy goods supplies what was missing from the 
subjectivist’s assessment, namely, an appraisal of the object Derek endorses. 
Return to the grass-counter example. Given what we know about human 
psychology, Derek is unlikely to remain positively oriented over time toward grass 
counting, and he would likely come to regret his decision to join John who is busy 
at work on the university lawn. Grass counting, we can suppose, is generally not 
a reliable source of well-being. If Derek abandoned the other items on his 
schedule of concerns for grass counting, his friends would have good reason to 
attempt to dissuade him. This judgment is conditional on the most reliable 
empirical evidence concerning the standards and objects that are likely to ensure 
                                            
165 On the problem of worth, see section 2.3, 62. 
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the well-being of welfare subjects over time. That is not to say that this view is 
about the means rather than the nature of welfare. Rather, the nature of well-
being depends in part on facts about the conditions under which human beings 
thrive. This condition is meant to address concerns about social forces that might 
undermine the external norms that the concept of worth is meant to capture. 
In sum, Derek’s narrow endorsement is necessary for well-being. His 
orientation to the states of affairs that affect him places a creative constraint 
restricting what counts as good for him at a time. However, it is not entirely up to 
his schedule of concern which goods are worthy of his concern. Which goods are 
likely to comprise reliable sources of well-being and sustain authentic standards 
of self-assessment depends in part on the community. This part of well-being 
depends on communal ideals, collective judgments conditional on the most 
reliable empirical evidence concerning the standards and objects that are likely to 
ensure the well-being of welfare subjects over time. To paraphrase the chapter’s 
epigraph, we can imagine that Derek thinks of worth as what he admires in his 
pursuits, something his pursuits would have even if he did not admire them, 
something they have in themselves. Unlike the narrow endorsements Derek 
formed under suitable conditions, his broad endorsements can be mistaken. This 
explains why he seeks evidence for his opinions about the best course to pursue; 
why he acts as if there is something to discover; why he acts as if there is a fact 
of the matter about what well-being consists in; and how we might talk of Derek 
knowing the better course even while he pursues the worse. However, worth in 
this sense is not generally something his pursuits would have if no one admired 
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them. This part of well-being is not objective in this sense. Rather, well-being as 
endorsing worthy goods is an intersubjective account of what faring well consists 
in. 
 
4.4 Objections 
One might challenge the descriptive adequacy of the resulting account of 
well-being. First, perhaps we can grant that welfare judgments involving children 
presuppose that some objects are more worthy of concern than other objects. 
After all, children are presumably in greater need of normative guidance, and it is 
fitting that someone who cares for them safeguard their well-being. However, 
what reason do we have to accept that the model extends to adults? We must 
take care lest well-being as endorsing worthy goods sacrifice fidelity for 
generality in the same way as other accounts of well-being seemingly do. 
Second, one might worry that the resulting account of well-being violates the 
weak neutrality criterion for descriptive adequacy. That is, one might worry that it 
advances unfounded critiques of a welfare subject’s concerns. What happens to 
welfare subjects immersed in racist or sexist societies? If well-being as endorsing 
worthy goods assigns lexical priority to intersubjective ideals embedded in the 
community, then so much the worse for the account. The objections identify 
legitimate concerns; however, I believe the response below highlights the 
strengths of the account. 
First, we can grant that judgments of worth do not fulfil the same function 
in all welfare judgments. The extent to which one relies on worth in assessing 
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one’s well-being in part reflects the epistemic authority of the welfare subject. 
Epistemic authority represents one’s skill in the pursuit of welfare, one’s expertise 
in choosing one’s goals and recognizing good ways to direct one’s life. 
Schedules of concerns are more likely to promote one’s well-being over time if 
the goods one pursues are worthy of concern, that is, if they reflect the most 
reliable empirical evidence concerning the standards and objects that are likely to 
ensure the well-being of welfare subjects over time. Questions of worth arise 
naturally when one considers what it makes sense to want for children for whom 
one cares because one cannot presuppose that their schedule of concerns is 
likely to ensure their well-being over time. Worthy goods help welfare subjects 
develop epistemic authority in the pursuit of well-being, that is, the expertise to 
recognize good ways to organize their lives. This process of education is 
necessary and appropriate, since the dispositions of subjects do not always track 
their well-being over time.  
The function of judgments of worth changes when subjects attain some 
measure of epistemic authority. In normal circumstances, most adults have a 
sufficient measure of epistemic authority, which explains in part the reluctance to 
interfere with the schedule of concerns of others. His capacities honed, Derek 
continues to draw on the epistemic resources embedded in the community, but 
his relationship to them changes. He continues to use them to shape his 
schedule of concerns toward authentic standards of self-assessment and reliable 
sources of well-being. However, he now shapes his understanding of welfare 
value in concert with his community, at once borrowing and contributing to the 
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conceptual resources that are available for thinking about good ways to direct his 
life. He remains open to persuasion, of course. Unless there is reason to believe 
that his epistemic authority has been undermined, however, it is perhaps best to 
leave well enough alone. 
Next, anxieties concerning weak neutrality misconstrue the social 
dimensions of welfare judgments. Characterising welfare value as broad 
endorsements does not assume a right answer about every question concerning 
welfare value, nor does it assume that community ideals are infallible. The worry 
seems to assume that broad endorsements accumulate in communal networks, 
determined and infallible, like entries in a navigation table guiding welfare 
subjects as they set sail for worthy shores. Certainly, communal ideals will often 
be determined enough to establish reliably that some goods are more worthy of 
concern than other goods, and these ideals may conflict with the schedule of 
concerns of some welfare subjects. However, broad endorsement enables rather 
than jeopardises the autonomy and the authority of welfare subject.  
Communal interactions not only generate and reinforce common values, 
but they challenge them as well, revising old judgments of worth and extending 
them to new circumstances. In giving substantive reasons for his choices, Derek 
asserts his epistemic authority to recommend an object as worthy of concern to 
others in similar circumstances, and to participate in this process of review and 
reconsideration. The reason-giving process not only enables his participation in 
established social practices, but also challenges them, and in time, creates new 
ones. Ultimately, judgments of worth are defeasible. Some will capture the 
 145 
 
wisdom of the age, others, its prejudice. The soundness of a particular judgment 
of worth is conditional on the most reliable empirical evidence concerning the 
standards and objects that are likely to constitute the well-being of welfare 
subjects.166 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that we could explain the sense in which some 
objects are more worthy of concern than other objects without rejecting the 
endorsement thesis. First, I argued that some welfare judgments presuppose that 
some objects are more worthy of concern than other objects, and that we have 
good reason to accept this characterisation of welfare judgments. Endorsement 
figures prominently in welfare judgments, but so do questions concerning the 
worth of the objects one endorses. Next, I argued that what grounds judgments 
of worth are intersubjective ideals about faring well over time. The skillful pursuit 
of welfare is an expertise that one acquires and develops over time. The broad 
endorsements subjects make under suitable conditions situate them as epistemic 
authorities in a community of knowers who share an interest in faring well. On 
this view, judgments of worth play a crucial role in developing expertise in the 
pursuit of welfare and enabling its practice. Specifically, judgments of worth guide 
welfare subjects toward authentic standards and reliable sources of well-being. 
                                            
166 The recent surge of research in the psychology, economics, and sociology of well-being is 
generating the kind of evidence that I have in mind. For useful surveys from a philosophical point 
of view, see Daniel M. Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008. See also Sissela Bok, Exploring Happiness. Yale: Yale University Press, 2010. 
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This is a view about the nature of well-being and not merely the means to attain 
it. 
Hence, in most cases, welfare subjects fare well over time when they 
endorse worthy objects. This claim is consistent with the previous chapter’s 
conclusions. The endorsement thesis is true; the agent sovereignty thesis, false. 
Under suitable conditions and in central cases, endorsement remains necessary 
for well-being, and a person’s evaluative perspective alone does not determine 
what is good for that person. Finally, we fare better if we endorse the states of 
affairs we experience.   
If the grass-counter invited me to join him on the lawn of the local 
university, then, I would politely decline, except out of curiosity, perhaps, and I 
would try to discover the reasons that motivated my friend’s unusual life project. 
Finding none, I suppose, I would try to empower him to discover worthier pursuits 
towards which to direct his considerable talents. However well Derek would fare 
counting grass with John, he would likely fare better if he endorsed a worthier 
object.  
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Chapter 5: Endorsing Worthy Goods 
 
5.1 Introduction 
My considered view is that we can address the problem of authority and 
the problem of worth by defending an eirenic view of well-being according to 
which one fares well at a time and over a period when one endorses goods 
worthy of concern. This is a hybrid theory of well-being. It provides an account of 
well-being at a time that strives to bridge the gap between objective and 
subjective theories.  
The second section of the chapter examines the most important current 
hybrid theories of well-being. I argue that the three theories examined are not 
theories of well-being at a time. Two are theories about what it is to fare best or 
what it is to live a successful life, and a third is a theory about the structure of the 
greatest source of well-being. Moreover, either the theories imply the contentious 
claim that endorsement and worth have no welfare value on their own, or they 
provide little guidance on how to deal with the difficult cases that arise from the 
problem of authority and the problem of worth. 
The third section draws on the analysis of previous chapters to summarize 
an alternate hybrid account of well-being at a time. I describe faring well at a time 
as endorsing worthy goods. Endorsement and objective value each count toward 
well-being on their own at least to some extent. However, one generally fares 
well over time if one endorses worthy goods. I then show that the account can 
deal with the problem of authority and the problem of worth without 
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compromising its descriptive adequacy. I close the chapter by discussing some 
puzzles that the account leaves unresolved. 
 
5.2 Three Hybrid Theories 
Others have provided hybrid theories of well-being. Parfit’s account is 
perhaps the most familiar. He relates well-being to both subjective endorsement 
and objective “facts about [the] value” of the states of affairs one endorses. What 
is good for someone is “to have knowledge, to be engaged in rational activity, to 
experience mutual love, and to be aware of beauty, while strongly wanting just 
these things.” 167 According to this view, both endorsements and objective goods 
are necessary but not sufficient for well-being. This conjunctive account entails 
that subjective endorsements and objective goods on their own are prudentially 
worthless. Suppose that reading poetry is objectively valuable; and reading 
doggerel, worthless. A person who gets no satisfaction from reading poetry does 
not benefit from the activity, nor does a person who prefers to read doggerel. 
Parfit’s hybrid account generates a solution to the problem of authority and 
the problem of worth. Since wanting objective goods is necessary for well-being, 
it is not possible to fare well and fail to endorse the conditions of one’s life. One 
cannot become alienated from one’s well-being. Likewise, one’s schedule of 
concerns alone does not determine one’s well-being. The objective value of the 
objects one endorses matters to one’s well-being. However, as I mentioned, the 
claim that one part of well-being has no welfare value without the other is difficult 
                                            
167 Parfit, Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, 501. 
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to accept168 This is the double bind problem. Unendorsed objective goods might 
not count for much, but why not think they count for a bit? Meanwhile, subjects 
may fare well when they endorse objective goods, but why not think their 
concerns alone counts on their own at least to some extent? Surely, I must 
benefit at least a bit from the reading of doggerel I strongly prefer despite its low 
objective value, and from the reading of more sophisticated poetry despite my 
aversion to it.  
One might concede that each part of well-being has a bit of value, but that 
I would fare better if I preferred objectively valuable goods. On this moderate 
view, I benefit at least to some extent from my unappreciated encounter with 
poetry and my misguided endorsement of doggerel, but I would have been better 
off had I preferred Robert Frost over Ogden Nash. Endorsement and objective 
value on their own count toward my well-being to some extent, but I would fare 
better if I endorsed goods of greater objective value. Parfit’s account precludes 
this moderate view, however. 
The trouble is that the account constructs welfare value exclusively in 
intentional terms. That is, the only states of affairs that have welfare value are 
wholes in which one endorses an objectively good object. The account produces 
a reasonable explanation in the case of Richard, the depressed artist whose 
tragic life illustrates the problem of authority. Richard relates suitably to 
objectively valuable objects, remember, but fails to enjoy these goods. The 
trouble with Richard is that without making his endorsement a necessary 
                                            
168 Section 2.2, page 47; section 2.3, page 68. 
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condition of his well-being, his schedule of concerns does not yet restrict the sort 
of lives that count as good for him. Parfit’s account suggests that Richard fares 
well only if he takes pleasure or satisfaction in the objective goods in his life. We 
do not do away with the tragic conditions of his life by plugging him into a 
pleasure machine for an hour at the end of each day. This seems right. However, 
Parfit’s insistence on the intentional structure of well-being deprives its 
constitutive parts of any welfare value. Endorsement and objective goodness do 
not matter on their own. This unhappy conclusion would deny the welfare value 
of the unsophisticated toddler’s simple pleasures, and the welfare value of 
Richard’s unendorsed but objectively valuable work. 
We can rescue Parfit from the unhappy conclusion if we shift the 
evaluative focal point of his account from moments to lives, and narrow its scope 
from what is good for a person to what makes a life go best. Parfit’s account 
vacillates between these two accounts of well-being; however, his endorsement 
of global theories of well-being suggests that he means his hybrid theory to be an 
account of the latter.169 Global theories hold that what matters to one’s well-being 
are the desires one has about some part of one’s life considered as a whole, or 
about one’s whole life.170 Conversely, local theories hold that what matters to 
one’s well-being is the greatest total net sum of subjective fulfilment. As Parfit 
well knows, local theories are vulnerable to an analogue of the Repugnant 
                                            
169 Compare his initial questions, which he frames in terms of what makes a life go best, with the 
ultimate description of his compromise in terms of what is good or bad for someone. Parfit, 
Reasons and Persons, 493, 502. 
170 Idem, 498. 
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Conclusion.171 On local theories, an indefinitely long life that is barely worth living 
would trump a short life of an extremely high quality since it would produce the 
greatest total sum of subjective fulfilment. Parfit believes, rightly, I think, that 
most people would choose a short life of high quality over an indefinitely long life 
that is barely worth living. Since global theories imply that the short life would be 
better, Parfit believes that global theories are more plausible. Global theories 
also produce intuitive results in the case of addiction. Even if addiction to a 
particular substance would have no harmful side effects and I provided you with 
a ready supply, I do not make your life better by making you an addict, though I 
do increase the sum-total of your desire satisfaction.172 Once again, Parfit 
believes that most people would not welcome this kind of addiction. Endorsing 
global theories commits Parfit to abandoning the notion that the welfare value of 
a life is entirely determined by the welfare value of the moments contained in that 
life. The global features of a life are what matters. 
The concession has important implications. A descriptively adequate 
theory of well-being should account for how the contributions of particular welfare 
goods combine to determine one’s overall level of well-being at a time, over a 
period, and over one’s life. Abandoning this requirement limits the account’s 
ability to reconcile the various evaluative focal points we take when making 
judgments about what is good for someone. We are not exactly limited to making 
                                            
171 The Repugnant Conclusion holds that “for any possible population of at least ten billion 
people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population 
whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives 
that are barely worth living.” Parfit (1984): 388. 
172 Parfit (1984): 497. 
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rough comparisons between lives; we can still assess whether someone fares 
well over a period as a whole. However, we have little guidance on how to 
assess welfare at a time, or how to reconcile periods and lives. Surely, a theory 
of well-being can do better.  
Narrowing the scope of Parfit’s account to what makes a complete life go 
best weakens the strength of this objection. If the intended explanadum is the set 
of conditions that constitute an optimum human life as a whole, then it is less 
important that his account capture the instant welfare contributions of the 
toddler’s simple pleasures. One could make the case that, however good simple 
pleasures are at a time for those who experience them, wanting objective goods 
is what makes a complete life go best. Perhaps the global welfare contributions 
of a lifetime spent wanting and pursuing objectively valuable objects are so great 
that they dwarf the relative welfare contributions of simple pleasure. In this way, 
Parfit can resist both the unhappy and the Repugnant Conclusion. However, the 
victory comes at the cost of abandoning a description of faring well simpliciter. 
Finally, the account is susceptible to an objection from weak neutrality. 
The weak neutrality criterion for descriptive adequacy requires that judgments of 
worth be justified and impartial.173 The intent of weak neutrality is to guard 
against poorly justified and biased accounts of well-being that support 
unwarranted intrusions in the schedule of concerns of welfare subjects, and 
impose, dogmatically, a standard discount rate on subjective reports of well-
being. Parfit is coy about describing the ground of objective value, content to 
                                            
173 I first discuss weak neutrality in section 1.3, 21. 
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suggest how the subjective and the objective parts of well-being might interact in 
a single account. Without a more substantial description of facts about value, 
however, the account is reasonably open to doubt. A functioning hybrid account 
must not only enable judgments of worth but also safeguard schedules of 
concerns from unwarranted intrusions. 
In Welfare and Rational Care, Darwall develops a hybrid account of well-
being that goes further in describing what facts about value might consist in. On 
this account, the concept of welfare consists in what one should want for that 
person insofar as one cares for them. Darwall suggests that the nature of welfare 
that best defines the intension of this concept is the so-called Aristotelian thesis, 
according to which what is best for someone is a life of “significant engagement 
in activities through which one comes into appreciative rapport with agent-neutral 
values.”174 Such “valuing activity” is “the most important source of welfare,” and a 
life of such activity, “the most beneficial human life.”175  
Valuing activity involves two agent-neutral values distinct from welfare 
value. Merit is a kind of value that persons and actions have in virtue of relating 
to objects that are intrinsically worthy of esteem, emulation, admiration, and 
praise. Hence, it bears an essential connection to distinctive evaluative attitudes, 
such as respecting, appreciating, promoting, honoring, or cherishing. We can 
grasp the evaluative dimension of merit if we contrast it with other states of 
affairs we deem intrinsically valuable. Most pluralistic accounts of welfare would 
count the pleasure one gets from a warm shower on a cold morning and the 
                                            
174 Darwall (2006): 7, 75. 
175 Idem, 80. 
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pleasure one gets from a creative undertaking as intrinsically valuable. However, 
the pleasure one gets from writing a play has a kind of value that the pleasure of 
a warm shower lacks. Only the former is intrinsically estimable, an enviable 
status it derives from its relation to a more fundamental value, namely, the value 
of worth. Darwall’s conception of worth involves a kind of significance or 
importance that something has in virtue of being valued, for example, as an 
appropriate object of care, a characteristic shared by persons, music, and merit, 
among other things. 
The upshot of Darwall’s account is an axiology that identifies two kinds of 
intrinsically valuable objects: a basic class of worthy objects; and a second class 
of meritorious persons or actions properly oriented to or guided by the first.176 
Unlike welfare value, which Darwall ties to the perspective of someone who 
cares for the person, merit and worth correspond to no particular perspective. 
These are agent-neutral values. Insofar as they are normative for distinctive 
evaluative attitudes, they are normative for such attitudes from anyone’s 
perspective.177 Much like the goods of objectivists, merit and worth are valuable 
regardless of one’s concerns.178 Thus, merit and worth enjoy the special status of 
common values. Since they correspond to no particular perspective, communities 
can share the recognition and appreciation of these values. For example, 
parenting has merit because it responds appropriately to the worth of children. 
                                            
176 Darwall’s account of welfare is structurally similar to Hurka’s recursive theory of virtue, which 
starts with a base-clause affirming a set of intrinsic goods, then adds a recursion-clause about the 
intrinsic goodness of a certain attitude to what is good. See Hurka, Vice, Virtue and Value. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, chapter 1. 
177 Darwall (2006): 98. 
178 Section 2.2, page 34. 
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Since merit also has worth, parents whose actions appropriately respond to the 
importance of their children as worthy of care also have worth as such, as do 
those who appreciate the merit of good parenting. In this way, the appreciation of 
merit and worth tends to create “coherent structures of mutually supporting 
prudential values.”179  
Like Parfit, Darwall suggests that the most important sources of well-being 
have an intentional structure, though his account is more complex. Valuing 
activity involves a preference for worthy activities, an appropriate evaluative 
response to their worth, and a correct belief about their worth.180 Hence, the 
account generates a Parfit-style solution to the problem of authority and the 
problem of worth. Since valuing activity includes a robust endorsement of worthy 
states of affairs, it is not possible for one to live the best kind of life yet fail to 
endorse the conditions of one’s life. Likewise, one’s schedule of concerns alone 
does not determine one’s well-being. The worth of the states of affairs one 
endorses matters. However, valuing activity does not deny the intrinsic welfare 
value of less intricate states of affairs. Strictly speaking, only the most important 
sources of welfare have a hybrid structure. Neither endorsement nor worth are 
necessary for well-being simpliciter. 
The qualification allows Darwall to reach for the more moderate view that 
Parfit’s account precludes. Darwall can deal with the double bind problem. One 
can benefit if one never endorses the goods in one’s life, if one endorses 
unworthy goods, or if one’s endorsement falls short of the robust intellectual and 
                                            
179 Darwall (2006) : 103. 
180 Idem, 89. 
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emotional conditions that characterise valuing activity. Happy toddlers benefit 
from simple pleasures; Tom, from illusory satisfaction; Richard, from the 
unappreciated yet worthy goods in his life; and I, from my passion for doggerel. 
The concessions are consistent with the claim that welfare subjects fare best 
when they endorse more worthy states of affairs. The most important benefits are 
organic unities consisting of worthy activities and an appreciation of their relation 
to worth, “a quasi-perceptual, felt relation between the person and the merit-
making values that such activities involve.”181 
Unfortunately, the qualification also limits the account’s capacity to 
address controversial cases involving merely faring well at a time. For instance, 
the claim that illusory satisfaction has welfare value is consistent with the 
assertion of the endorsement and agent sovereignty theses; the claim that one 
benefits from unappreciated worthy activities, with their denial. Once again, 
narrowing the account’s intended explanandum from faring well to faring best 
diminishes the force of this objection. Darwall’s account is perhaps best 
understood as an account of what constitutes the most important sources of well-
being, a concession that limits its descriptive adequacy as an account of faring 
well at a time. Moreover, the account fits some welfare subjects better than 
others. Darwall presupposes a welfare subject clever enough to produce the 
complex epistemic and evaluative states necessary for well-being, which limits 
the generality of his account. We should strive to describe the relation between 
                                            
181 Idem, 97. 
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endorsed experience, worth, and well-being in a framework that captures their 
relative importance at a time without limiting descriptive adequacy.  
Finally, Darwall’s account is susceptible to an objection from weak 
neutrality. Its merits notwithstanding, valuing activity takes the existence of worth 
as given, and makes no attempt to ferret out its ground. We know that worth is a 
kind of importance something has in virtue of being deemed intrinsically 
significant, but we know little about who does the deeming, or how one should 
address conflicts between one deeming and another. The omission impedes an 
assessment of whether judgments of worth are warranted, or merely dogmatic 
intrusions on schedules of concerns. 
Dworkin’s model of challenge is more explicit about the communal ground 
of the objective part of well-being. On this account, faring well consists in leading 
a successful life, which exhibits the right mix of volitional and critical interests. 
Volitional interests capture what one wants to do; critical interests, what one 
should do in order to have the right kind of life.182 For Dworkin, the two parts of 
well-being are axiomatic, and they intersect in various ways. Some measure of 
success in what one happens to want very much is critically important, and what 
one wants tends to track what one thinks reflects one’s critical interests. Acting 
on present interest or desires does not always conflict with acting on one’s critical 
interests, but the two can also conflict. In such cases, there is no higher standard 
to decide between them. When the akratic is tempted to act against his critical 
                                            
182 Dworkin writes in terms of ethical value rather than welfare value, but his notion of critical 
interests makes a recognizable appeal to the concept of welfare, that is, what it is to fare well. 
Ronald Dworkin. Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 2000: 244. 
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interests, we can appeal to no higher-order concept to adjudicate between what 
he wants to do and what he thinks he should do in order to have a successful life. 
The model of challenge considers one’s life successful only if one’s performance 
is skillful, that is, only if it displays the features characteristic of meeting the 
challenge of living well under the circumstances. “Living a life is itself a 
performance that demands skill,” Dworkin writes; “it is the most comprehensive 
and important challenge we face, and…our critical interests consist in the 
achievements, events, and experiences that mean that we have met the 
challenge well.”183  
No simple algorithm exists to determine the contribution of a given 
performance to the success of a life, or the conditions for a performance’s 
successful realisation, though culture will carry some of the discriminations 
necessary to make the relevant distinctions. Relevant circumstances include 
one’s health, physical power, length of life, material resources, friendships and 
associations, commitments, family and communal traditions, the social, and the 
legal and cultural system in which one lives.184 Circumstances both shape and 
constrain what counts as a successful life in a particular case. 
Though the model is relatively indeterminate, it allows for subtle 
judgments in assessing the success of a life. For instance, the contribution of a 
particular invention to a life’s success might include its degree of technical 
difficulty, its originality, the degree to which it taxed the abilities of the inventor, 
the intensity of her dedication, or the way in which the work connected to a 
                                            
183 Idem, 253. 
184 Idem, 260. 
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particular community or tradition.185 In assessing a given performance, cultural 
norms do not necessarily take lexical priority over individual schedules of 
concerns. The considerations that go into the assessment of a life are indexed to 
culture in some way, but they are open to revision. Pursuing one’s concerns in 
the face of opposing cultural norms can generate an especially apt life 
performance, one that changes the prevailing views of what constitutes a 
successful life. Just as we expect artists to expand what the tradition counts as a 
skillful performance, so too can we expect that some people’s lives will challenge 
what a community counts as a successful life. 
The upshot is a metaphysically modest account of the conditions that 
govern more substantive judgments about the success of a life. The model of 
challenge is not obviously partial to one form of life. Much like the worth condition 
I describe in the fourth chapter, the parameters of a skillful performance are 
intersubjective and dynamic: a particular performance can revise the rules that 
govern what a successful performance consists in much an artist’s work can 
change the parameters of artistic merit.186 Meanwhile, Dworkin insists that the 
model need not have elitist or paternalistic implications – as if living well were 
only possible for great souls – nor need it reduce prudential value to aesthetic 
value. It takes seriously the idea that one should make of one’s life an original 
work of art without assuming that less original lives must be less successful 
ones.187 
                                            
185 Idem, 256. 
186 See section 4.3. 
187 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 259. 
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Dworkin’s model generates a solution to the problem of authority. Its 
support for the endorsement thesis is explicit: a good cannot make one’s life 
better against one’s belief or feeling that it does not. This claim follows from the 
analogy between living and performing. “Intention is part of performance,” writes 
Dworkin, ”we do not give credit to a performer for some feature of his 
performance that he was struggling to avoid, or would not recognize, even in 
retrospect, as good or desirable.”188 Endorsement might take place 
counterfactually or in hindsight, but it is necessary for one to fare well. It follows 
that one cannot become alienated from one’s well-being.  
Likewise, the model generates a solution to the problem of worth. One’s 
schedule of concerns alone does not determine one’s well-being; the source of 
one’s well-being also matters. One might be mistaken in believing or feeling 
one’s life is a good one, because either one mistakenly counts something as 
good, or one fails to recognize and respond to contextual features that, if 
recognized, would have made one’s life better. What matters is that one achieves 
ethical integrity, that one lives out of the conviction that the central features of 
one’s life are appropriate to one’s circumstances, that no other life one might live 
would be a better response to those circumstances rightly judged.189  
The performance analogy central to Dworkin’s model is at once an asset 
and a liability. First, the analogy subtly shifts the evaluative focal point of welfare 
assessments from moments to complete lives. As in previous hybrid accounts of 
well-being, the greatest welfare comes from states of affairs in which the 
                                            
188 Idem, 268. 
189 Dworkin (2000): 270-4. 
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subjective coincides with the objective over time, that is, a life in which one’s 
volitional interests coincide with one’s critical interests. This strengthens its 
merits as an account of what the best kind of life consists in, but it limits its 
descriptive adequacy as an account of faring well at a time. One wants to assess 
the lives of existential heroes, who make the most of their circumstances and 
secure achievements that meet and revise the standards by which one takes the 
measure of a life. Yet one wants also to assess whether these heroes fared well 
at a time, and determine the relation between their well-being at a time and over 
a period. The account is less well suited for this second task.190  
Moreover, like Darwall’s account of welfare as rational care, Dworkin’s 
account of welfare as a successful performance is susceptible to the objection 
that it fits some welfare subjects better than others. There is an implicit demand 
that one shape, contour, and in some sense control one’s life according to some 
plan or blueprint that makes the most of one’s circumstances. This limits the 
account’s descriptive adequacy. A toddler snuggled under a warm blanket fares 
well at a time despite the fact that the state of affairs does not figure in a rational 
life plan. If we are to capture welfare judgments involving a variety of subjects, 
we will need to escape from the tyranny of the well-planned life.  
Next, the analogy allows Dworkin to reach for only a part of the moderate 
view, according to which each part of well-being counts at least a bit without the 
other. The double bind problem strikes again. Volitional interests matter to one’s 
                                            
190 To be fair, Dworkin is more concerned with the question of whether political liberals can have 
a substantive conception of well-being given their commitment to neutrality than with giving a 
descriptively adequate account of welfare. Idem, 237-8. 
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well-being to some extent, but unendorsed critical interests do not. That is, some 
measure of success in getting what one wants matters, but a successful 
performance whose features one does not endorse does not matter. It follows 
that the happy toddler’s simple pleasures make at least some contribution to his 
well-being, but Richard’s unusually reluctant performance does not. Once again, 
narrowing the account’s explanandum from faring well to faring best diminishes 
the force of these objections. We can take seriously the suggestion that a 
successful life is one in which no other life one might live would be a better 
response to one’s circumstances rightly judged, but only at the cost of the 
model’s descriptive adequacy as an account of faring well at a time. 
 
5.3 Endorsing Worthy Goods 
One way to understand where previous hybrid theories diverge from the 
one I describe is to appeal to the formality criterion for descriptive adequacy. In 
section 1.3, I argue with Sumner that a theory of well-being should meet a 
formality criterion. That is, it should complete the following formula:  
where S is the welfare subject and x is the object affording harm or 
benefit, an account of well-being W must explain the property that makes 
x good or bad for S at a time or interval t, and how the particular 
contributions of a given object determines the overall level of well-being of 
S over time.191 
                                            
191 Section 1.3, page 8. 
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Extant hybrid theories of well-being define a different relation. Parfit’s account 
describes what it is to fare best over a life; Dworkin, what it is to lead a 
successful life; Darwall’s, the property that makes x best for S at a time or 
interval t. The first two are global relations that describe a view of the highest 
well-being over a more or less complete life. The third is a description of the 
structure of most important source of well-being. The accounts are important in 
their own right, but their descriptive adequacy as accounts of well-being sans 
phrase is limited.  
Moreover, the welfare subject each account envisions limits its descriptive 
adequacy. This difficulty is most noticeable in Dworkin. Welfare as skillful 
performance applies best to adults with highly developed affective and cognitive 
capacities and the inclination to shape the contours of their experience into a 
well-planned life. Not all welfare subjects have these capacities or this inclination, 
yet we can speak meaningfully of their welfare. A toddler snuggled safely under a 
warm blanket is faring well at a time despite the fact that her affective and 
cognitive capacities are relatively undeveloped and the shape of her life largely 
undetermined. Finally, the record of each account on the problem of authority, 
the problem of worth, and the double bind problem is mixed.  
How well does well-being as endorsing worthy goods meet the analytic 
criteria outlined in the first two chapters? Well-being as endorsing worthy goods 
is not a view of the highest well-being, that is, it is not an account of what makes 
a life go best. It is not an account of what counts as a successful life. It is an 
account of what faring well-consists in at a time. This formulation meets the 
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formality criterion for descriptive adequacy. It holds that x benefits S at t if x 
stands in relation W to S at t, where W meets the following two conditions: 
(1) S endorses x under suitable conditions, and 
(2) x is worthy of S’s concern. 
What is the relation between faring well at a time and faring well over a period or 
over a life? On this account, the particular welfare contributions of moments 
combine to determine the overall level of well-being of S in a particular domain, 
over an extended period, and over the life of S. Whether we are satisfied with 
mere summation will depend on how much weight we place on the problem of 
aggregation. However, well-being as endorsing worthy goods allows for the 
possibility that each part of well-being counts at least to some extent in the 
absence of the other, and it defines the worth condition in a way that does not 
warrant dogmatic intrusions on schedules of concerns. I describe each condition 
briefly. 
The first condition defines a pluralistic account of endorsement. If one 
endorses an object, then one favours it, one is positively oriented towards it in 
thought, feeling, and action, one is motivated to bring it into being, one is pleased 
when it obtains, and one has pleasant thoughts about it.192 I argued that 
endorsement in this sense requires that one experience a state of affairs in order 
to benefit from it. The reason that I do not benefit from the satisfaction of my 
desire that a stranger met briefly fare well is that it does not affect my experience. 
In a limited sense, experience delineates the boundaries of well-being. This 
                                            
192 For a defence of defining endorsement in attitudinal term, see section 3.2. 
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experience may be dispositional rather than occurrent. This caveat allows for 
cases like flow states, in which subjects benefit from a mental state to which they 
are positively oriented only in hindsight. The experience may also be 
counterfactual. This allows for cases like Tom’s, in which more information would 
change their assessment of the conditions of their lives. For instance, if learning 
that his family and friends deceived him affects Tom’s experience of the 
conditions of his life, then he does not fare well after all. 
Endorsement as favouring is a pluralistic account of the subjective part of 
well-being. It does not insist on describing favouring as a single distinctive 
evaluative state or a necessary conjunction of such states. In some cases, the 
obtaining of a single dimension will be sufficient to warrant the claim that a 
subject favours a state of affairs; in most cases, several conditions will be jointly 
sufficient. The upshot is a descriptively adequate account of endorsement that 
can capture the wide range of evaluative states characteristic of different welfare 
subjects from the animal to the human, the fetus to the senior. The favourings of 
children may be simpler than those that adults experience, but they are no less 
significant. The dimension of favouring we emphasize will depend on the state of 
affairs under consideration, and the purpose for which one is conducting the 
analysis. The requirement that favouring occur under suitable conditions 
concedes that some favourings are susceptible to procedural mistakes. The 
upshot is an account of endorsement that makes the most of relevant differences 
between welfare subjects without sacrificing generality for the sake of fidelity. 
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The second condition defines worth in terms of an intersubjective ideal 
independent from one’s actual endorsements. This ideal in part constitutes the 
nature of welfare. It guides welfare subjects to authentic standards of self-
assessment and reliable sources of well-being, and it plays a crucial role in 
developing expertise in the pursuit of welfare and enabling the practice of welfare 
value. One fares well over time when one endorses worthy goods. The concept 
of worth reflects the point that the skillful pursuit of welfare is an expertise that 
one acquires and develops over time, and that one practices in community. The 
endorsements that subjects make under suitable conditions situate them as 
epistemic authorities in a community of knowers who share an interest in faring 
well. These are broad endorsements: they are actions that confirm, sanction, or 
vouch for an end as likely to generate authentic standards of self-assessment 
and lead to reliable sources of well-being.  
Most of the ways that one relates to states of affairs, and the importance 
that one accords to them in one’s schedule of concerns, depend critically on the 
social practices embedded in culture. In this sense, culture is to community what 
memory is to the individual. The social practices embedded within it are the tools 
and ideas that the community amends, shares, and transmits to its members 
because they once promoted their well-being.  
How well does well-being as endorsing worthy goods meet the analytic 
criteria I defend in the first two chapters? I will consider the three problems first 
and the criteria for descriptive adequacy second. 
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First, it deals with the problem of authority by recognizing that 
endorsement is necessary for well-being in central cases. Next, it deals with the 
problem of worth by recognizing that not all goods are on equal axiological 
footing. Some goods have more worth than other goods; that is, some goods are 
more likely to lead the welfare subject to authentic standards of self-assessment 
and reliable sources of well-being. What is critical to one’s well-being is that one 
exercises expertise in choosing one’s goals and in recognizing good ways to 
direct one’s life, an expertise one develops in community. Judgments concerning 
the worth of an object are defeasible. The soundness of a judgment of worth is 
conditional on the most reliable empirical evidence concerning the standards and 
objects that are likely to constitute the well-being of welfare subjects over time. 
As one develops expertise in making judgments of worth, one ultimately 
contributes to the axiological resources from which one benefits, confirming 
some judgments, revising others.  
Next, well-being as endorsing worthy goods deals with the double bind 
problem in two ways. First, it accepts that independently valuable goods do not 
count toward well-being in the absence of endorsement. Consider two nearly 
identical states of affairs, each of which I equally fail to endorse. One contains 
objective goods and the other does not. I have reason to pursue the objectively 
good state of affairs, but only because it contains values other than welfare 
values. This concession is necessary to secure the solution to the problem of 
authority.  
 168 
 
Now, it is difficult to imagine recommending the life of the grass-counter to 
others because of a nagging sense that the grass-counter does not fare as well 
as he could fare. Our concerns are not all that matters to our well-being. In some 
cases, the worth of the object of those concerns also matters. We can explain 
our reaction to the case of the grass-counter if we accept a discontinuity in 
welfare value between what I call “low fare” and “full fare.” In the central case, 
faring well involves both endorsement and goods. Call the great contribution that 
endorsement and worth make together “full fare.” It is also true that endorsement 
on its own counts toward well-being, though it counts for less than the unity. Call 
the small contribution that endorsement makes on its own “low fare.” This 
discontinuity is necessary to deal with the double bind problem without 
abandoning the endorsement thesis. On this view, the grass-counter fares well 
since we are supposing that he endorses his worthless activity, but he 
experiences a relatively low amount of welfare. The discontinuity in welfare value 
not only explains why the disillusioned artist fares much better in any state of 
affairs she does endorse; it also explains why it is difficult to imagine 
recommending the life of the grass-counter to others. However well he fares, he 
would fare much better if he endorsed a more worthy state of affairs.  
Second, well-being as endorsing worthy goods allows that endorsement 
itself is in some degree worthy of concern. Enjoying seemingly neutral or 
worthless objects will contribute to one’s well-being. I might think that comic 
books are nearly worthless objects of concern, yet I might fare well to the extent 
that I enjoy them with relish. Subjects may fare well when they endorse worthy 
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goods, but their endorsements counts at least to some extent toward their well-
being. Given the choice of two states of affairs in which one fails to concern 
oneself with a valuable object, it must be the case that one fares better in the 
state of affairs one endorses than the one that one does not.  
The treatment of the double bind problem has an interesting implication. 
The asymmetry in welfare contributions between unendorsed but worthy states of 
affairs and endorsed states affairs implies that the disillusioned artist would fare 
better reading comic books than engaging in drudgery work whose product she 
does not endorse, however worthy it might be. This implication is necessary to 
prevent a resurgence of the problem of authority. If the disillusioned artist would 
fare better engaging in drudgery work whose product she did not endorse, she 
would fare better if she remained alienated from her well-being than if she 
endorsed worthless goods. Well-being as endorsing worthy goods is preoccupied 
with ascribing worth to objects without alienating the subject from her well-being. 
Given the agent-relativity of well-being, it must be the case that her well-being is 
good for her. 
I argued throughout that endorsing worthy goods is a descriptively 
adequate theory of well-being. As an account of faring well at a time, it meets the 
formality criterion: S fares well at a time if S endorses x under suitable 
conditions, and x is worthy of S’s concern. As a pluralistic account of 
endorsement, it acknowledges the diversity of subjective evaluative states that 
welfare subjects experience. The upshot is a relatively general account of well-
being that allows us to discuss a range of welfare judgments and capture the 
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well-being of different kinds of sentient animals at different stages of life. Next, 
the worth condition captures the intuition that not all objects are axiologically 
neutral: some objects are more worthy of concern than other objects. I argued 
that this intuition is more faithful to common intuitions about well-being. It is 
important to note that well-being as endorsing worthy goods captures the idea 
that each composite of endorsement and worthy goods is an organic unity that 
contributes much more welfare value than endorsement alone. The value of the 
two together is not just the sum of the parts such that the view reduces to a list 
theory whose members can be combined in ways that are better or worse for the 
welfare subject.  
Finally, endorsing worthy goods does not obviously violate the weak 
neutrality criterion for descriptive adequacy; that is, it does not obviously favour a 
given form of life. The concept of worth may be indexed to a given community, 
but its details are defeasible and open to revision. Welfare subjects who have 
attained a measure of epistemic authority can contribute to the community’s 
knowledge about good ways to direct human lives. They can explore the ground 
and implications of the claim that a given object is more worthy of concern than 
another object, weigh it critically against the most reliable empirical evidence 
concerning the standards and objects that are likely to ensure the well-being of 
welfare subjects over time, and come to their own conclusions. 
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research shows that in fact the core variable is the endorsement of goods worthy 
of concern. This finding allows the formulation of welfare judgments sensitive to 
relevant differences in welfare subjects.  
 
MA Philosophy   The University of Western Ontario  2006 
BA Philosophy (honors)  Acadia University    2005 
BA  History (honors)  Royal Military College of Canada  1997 
 
Specialization 
AOS Moral and Political Philosophy (esp. Normative Ethics, Applied Ethics) 
AOC History of Philosophy, Symbolic Logic 
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Teaching Development 
 
Western Certificate in University Teaching and Learning      2012 
Instructional Skills Workshop (ISW)        2012 
GS 500: Theory and Practice of University Teaching   2005 
 
Research Activities 
 
1. Translations 
 
“Medicine and Philosophy” (Joel Chandelier) in The Encyclopedia of Medieval 
Philosophy. Henrik Lagerlund (ed.) New York: Springer, 2010 pp. 735-742. 
 
2. Academic Presentations 
 
Commentary: Dario Conkovic (The University of Western Ontario). “Turning 
Proast upside down: Against religious toleration and liberal neutrality.” 
Canadian Philosophical Association. The University of Waterloo (May 2012). 
 
“Memory, Ethics and the Extended Mind.” Canadian Society for the Study of 
Practical Ethics. The University of Waterloo (May 2012).  
 
“Retrospective Assessments of Well-Being.” Canadian Philosophical 
Association. The University of Waterloo (May 2012). 
 
“The reconstructive turn in memory science and life satisfaction accounts of 
well-being.” Graduate Philosophy Conference. York University (May 2012). 
 
 “Well-Being and Authority.” Graduate Philosophy Conference. University of 
Windsor (March 2012). 
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“Endorsement, Worth and Well-Being.” Poster Presentation: Arts and 
Humanities Research Day. The University of Western Ontario (March 2012). 
 
Commentary: Alexandre Sayegh (Université de Montréal). “Eradicating Global 
Poverty: Ideal or Non-Ideal Theory?” Canadian Philosophical Association. 
University of New Brunswick (June 2011). 
 
“The Damage Done: Intravenous Drug-Use, Harm Reduction, and Well-
Being.” Canadian Society for the Study of Practical Ethics, University of New 
Brunswick (June 2011). 
 
“Subjectivity and Well-Being.” Philosophy Graduate Student Association. The 
University of Western Ontario (March 2011). 
 
 “Why not Hedonism?” Philosophy Graduate Student Association. The 
University of Western Ontario (March 2010). 
 
“The Heterogeneity Problem in Plato’s Philebus.” The Upper Canadian 
Society for Ancient and Medieval Studies. The University of Western Ontario 
(February 2010). 
 
Commentary: Ryan Middleton (Queen’s University). “The Problem of Middle-
level Ends in the Nicomachean Ethics.” Graduate Conference for the History 
of Philosophy. The University of Western Ontario (March 2008). 
 
 “Hume on the Ideal Observer.” Philosophy Graduate Student Association. 
The University of Western Ontario (March 2007). 
 
Commentary: Kyle Mennen (University of Toronto). “Problems for Michael 
Smith’s Theory of Moral Motivation.” Graduate Conference for Ethics and the 
History of Philosophy. The University of Western Ontario (March 2007). 
 189 
 
 
3. Pedagogical Presentations 
 
“Teaching Critical Thinking in the Disciplines.” Future Professor Seminar, The 
University of Western Ontario Teaching Support Centre (Each March 2008 – 
11). 
 
“The Evil of Indifference and the Ethics of International Development” 
Teaching Master Class for Graduate Students, The University of Western 
Ontario Teaching Support Centre (October 2010). 
 
“Teaching you own course: challenges and possibilities.” Future Professor 
Seminar, The University of Western Ontario Teaching Support Centre (June 
2010). 
 
“The Metaphors of Business Ethics: Exploring Perspective-Taking in Case-
based Teaching.” Society for Teaching and Learning in Higher Education 
(STLHE) Annual Conference, The University of Windsor (June 2008). 
 
“The Ethics of Teaching.” Winter Graduate Conference on Teaching, The 
University of Western Ontario (January 2008). 
 
“Discussion as a Way of Teaching.” Winter Graduate Conference on 
Teaching, The University of Western Ontario (January 2008). 
 
“Facilitating Difficult Discussions.” Winter Graduate Conference on Teaching, 
The University of Western Ontario (January 2007). 
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4. Teaching Experience 
 
a. Sessional Faculty   The University of Western Ontario 
 
A Brief History of Drug Use      2013 
Business Ethics (Online)        2013 
Business Ethics         2011 
The Metaphysics, Epistemology of Witchcraft     2010  
Philosophical Theories of Evil       2010 
The Philosophy of Terrorism       2010 
 
b. Sessional Faculty   Huron University College 
 
Perspectives on Happiness                 2012 
The History of Political Philosophy     2012 
Business Ethics        2008 – 13 
 
c. Instructor    Western Teaching Support Centre 
 
Teaching Assistant Training Programs               2006 – 12 
    
d. Teaching Assistant   The University of Western Ontario 
 
Biomedical Ethics          2008 – 09 
Introduction to Philosophy      2007 – 08  
Critical Thinking        2006 – 07 
Business Ethics         2006 
Questions of the Day       2005 
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e. Teaching Assistant  Huron University College 
 
Critical Thinking         2009 
 
f. Teaching Assistant   Acadia University 
 
Introduction to Philosophy         2004 – 05 
 
e. Guest lectures    The University of Western Ontario 
 
Introduction to Ethics and Value Theory     Mar 2011 
Questions of the Day            Nov 2010  
Questions of the Day        Oct 2010 
Introduction to Philosophy                   Feb 2009  
  
5. Research Groups 
 
Upper Canadian Society for Ancient and Medieval Studies 2005 – 2012 
Reading Group, Rotman Institute of Philosophy             2010 – 2012 
French Translation Seminar                2012 
 
6. Honors and Awards 
 
a. The University of Western Ontario 
 
Western Graduate Research Scholarships ($27,763)   2005 – 10    
Great Ideas for Teachings      2008 
Ontario Graduate Scholarship ($15,000)    2006 – 07   
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b. Acadia University 
 
University Medal in Philosophy               2005 
Gregory Doane Hatfield Prize in Creative Writing                 2003 – 05    
Kirconnell Scholarship ($3000)       2004  
Preston Warren Prize in Philosophy                2004   
Sgt. Philip Sydney Beals Memorial Prize in Poetry              2004  
 
c. Royal Military College of Canada 
 
Regular Officer Training Scholarship ($50,000)   1992 – 97   
 
7. Graduate Course Work 
 
20th Century Moral Philosophy  
20th Century Value Theory  
Ancient Practical Reason  
Aristotelian Logic 
Aristotle’s Worst Idea  
Contemporary Value Theory  
Dennett and Fodor  
Ethics, Rationality and Context  
Hume: Ethics and Passions  
Moral Contextualism  
Plato’s Epistemology 
Probability and Evidence  
Re-reasoning Ethics  
Research Seminar  
Sidgwick’s Ethics  
Stoics and Epicureans 
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8. Professional Societies 
 
American Philosophical Association      2011 – 2013 
Canadian Philosophical Association      2011 – 2013 
Society for the Study of Practical Ethics     2011 – 2013 
Rotman Institute of Philosophy      2010 – 2013 
 
9. Volunteering  
 
Sexual Assault Centre of London, Board Member        2013 –  
English Conversation Leader, Western Student Success Centre 2007 – 12 
Needle Exchange, London Regional HIV Aids Connection  2010 
Academic Tutor         2010 – 11 
 
10. Languages 
 
Fluent: French, English       
